Opinion
980 EDA 2021 J-A16033-22
11-03-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. NATHANIEL WILLIAMS
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2021, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0030428-2019
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
McLAUGHLIN, J.
The Commonwealth appeals from the order denying their motion to refile charges against Nathaniel Williams. It argues it presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of unsworn falsification to authorities, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, tampering with public records or information, and obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4904, 4910, 4911, and 5101.
Edwin Williams was charged as a co-defendant, but the allegations against him are not at issue in the present appeal.
In November 2019, the Commonwealth charged Nathaniel Williams, a former Philadelphia Police Detective, with the above-mentioned crimes, which related to allegations that Williams conducted searches of a citizen's license plate and provided the information he obtained from the searches to his cousin. In September 2020, the court held a preliminary hearing, where Theresa Williams and Lieutenant James Clough testified.
Theresa and Nathaniel have the same last name but are not related. To avoid confusion, we will refer to Theresa Williams by her first name.
Despite sharing the same surname, Ms. Williams and Edwin Williams are not related.
Theresa testified that in October 2017 Edwin Williams approached her in the parking lot of a Michaels craft store and asked for her phone number. N.T., 9/11/2020, at 6, 8. Theresa informed him she was not interested. She got in her car, and as she went to back-up, she saw Edwin pull his car behind hers and sit there. Id. at 8. Theresa "felt like he was doing something behind [her] car." Id. Theresa testified that a week or two later, she heard a knock on the door to her home, and saw Edwin at her door. Id. at 9. When she opened the door she "asked him how the hell he found [her]." Id. at 10. He would not leave, so she had him write his phone number on a piece of paper. Id. She stated that a couple days later, she went to the SEPTA police department to file a report. Id. at 11. She testified she went to SEPTA because during one of their encounters Edwin had told her he worked for SEPTA. Id. at 9, 20, 22. She further testified that in the days following his appearance at Theresa's home, Edwin left roses and cards on her car. Id. at 14.
Edwin and Nathaniel are cousins with the same last name. Again, to avoid confusion, we will refer to Edwin Williams by his first name.
The trial court had precluded the admission of the written statement at the first preliminary hearing held on September 11, 2020.
Lieutenant Clough, with the Internal Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department, testified that he received Theresa's complaint and conducted an investigation. Id. at 57. He stated that the investigation revealed that on October 17, 2017, Williams ran a search for Theresa's license plate number through national and state databases - NCIC and PCIC - and conducted a voter registration check. Id. at 58-57, 59. Lieutenant Clough also interviewed Williams. Id. at 77. The court ruled the Internal Affairs interview of Williams was inadmissible as a coerced statement, under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
The NCIC is the national crime data base and the PCIC is the state crime data base. N.T., 4/22/2021, at 45.
The shooting occurred on July 31, 2017, and the decedent succumbed to his wound on August 1, 2017. The subject database searches were performed on October 17, 2017. Nathaniel Williams' interview with Lieutenant Clough took place on December 27, 2017. There is no corroboration in the record for Nathaniel Williams' claim that he ever saw a murder suspect, Tashaun Curtis, enter a white van which he suspected belonged to Ms. Williams.
In Garrity, the United States Supreme Court held that "the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic." 385 U.S. at 500. Here, the court at the first preliminary hearing found that Garrity was not an issue for a suppression hearing but that an interview inadmissible under Garrity could not be used, even at the preliminary hearing stage. N.T., 9/11/2020, at 38, 51.
Lieutenant Clough stated in an affidavit for an arrest warrant that the subject homicide file "contained no computerized print outs or 'workups' of Theresa Williams inside. The activity sheets for M17-185 also do not include any documentation of the alleged sighting of Tashaun Curtis getting into a car in the area of [Ms. Williams' neighborhood]." Affidavit for Arrest Warrant, 11/18/2019, at 3.
Lieutenant Clough testified that after the interview, he proceeded to the homicide division unit and procured a homicide file needed in the investigation of Williams' searches regarding Theresa. Id. He collected one folder, which he reviewed and found no reference to Theresa. Id. at 78. He stated that the following day, Williams called and informed the Internal Affairs Division that there was a second folder for the homicide investigation. Id. Lieutenant Clough testified he retrieved that folder and when reviewing it found "several references to [Theresa] which included a Facebook photograph, a photograph of [Theresa] and her children that was printed from Facebook," and handwritten notes on the back, with Theresa's name, "no record/no wants, 75-48A negative, no friends shared, autism supporter, the abbreviation for possibly, p-o-s-s and neighbors." Id. at 78-79. It also had Theresa's license plate number and some biographical information. Id. at 79. He stated the folder contained no other references to Theresa and for "[a] lot of the inquiries" made during the investigation and included in the file "there [were] copies, there [were] printouts of various license plates, tags, houses that were checked. And this was the only one, the only thing that was not printed out, it was just handwritten on the back of a Facebook page." Id. at 79-80. The Commonwealth did not admit any part of the homicide file into evidence.
The Commonwealth admitted into evidence phone records showing text messages between Williams and Edwin, and phone calls before and after Edwin's first encounter with Theresa. The material showed text messages from the day of the encounter, October 14, as well as October 15, and October 17, the day Williams conducted the NCIC and PCIC searches. Id. at 87-88. Further, on November 24, 2017, the day the police interviewed Edwin, Williams replaced his phone. Id. The Commonwealth did not have the actual content of the text messages. Id.
Following the preliminary hearing, the court discharged the case against Williams for lack of evidence. Id. at 89.
In September 2020, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Refiling of Criminal Complaint, listing charges of tampering with public records, obstruction of administration of law/other government function, unsworn falsification, tampering with/fabricating physical evidence.
The Notice also listed official oppression, but at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth conceded it did not have prima facie evidence for that crime. N.T., 4/22/2021, at 61.
An order denying the refiling of charges is final and immediately reviewable. The charges against Nathaniel Williams in this case were initially dismissed following a preliminary hearing before the Honorable William Austin Meehan, Jr. on September 11, 2020. The Commonwealth then moved to refile the complaint, but the successor judge, the Honorable Crystal Bryant-Powell, denied the refiling of the charges after a second hearing. This was a final and appealable order because the Commonwealth had unsuccessfully sought to refile the charges pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 520(H), and an appeal from the order denying refiling was the Commonwealth's only recourse.
The court held a second preliminary hearing, which incorporated the testimony from the first hearing. N.T., 4/22/21, at 3. This time, the court allowed into evidence the transcript of Williams' internal affairs interview, and Lieutenant Clough read it into the record. During the interview, Williams stated that he ran Theresa's license plate in connection with a homicide investigation. He said he had seen a suspect in the homicide investigation get into a vehicle a few months before, and when he found what he believed was the vehicle the following day, he "ran that tag." Id. at 35. He did "[a]ll kinds of cross checks," as follow ups, including "car stops, 48-As, voters, real estate, criminal history, property ownership, and social media." Id. at 36.
Williams further stated that Edwin was his cousin and, when asked the last time he had last spoken with Edwin, he stated, "I am not sure; maybe a year or more." Id. Williams further said he did not disseminate information related to Theresa's license plate or other records to Edwin. Id. at 39-41. Lieutenant Clough testified that Williams signed each page of the interview. Id. at 29.
The court found the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the elements of the crimes by a preponderance of the evidence and denied the motion to re-file. Id. at 77. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Commonwealth raises the following issue:
Did the [trial] court err in denying the Commonwealth's motion to refile the charges of unsworn falsification to authorities, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, tampering with public records or information, and obstruction of the administration of law or other governmental function where the evidence, when viewed in the proper light and accepted as true, proved a prima facie case that [Williams] committed these crimes?Commonwealth's Br. at 4.
Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is a question of law, which we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. 2021). "The principal function of a preliminary hearing is to protect an individual's right against an unlawful arrest and detention." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991)). "[T]he Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing at least a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the one who committed it." Id. (quoting McBride, 595 A.2d at 591) (emphasis omitted).
"[A] prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense." Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original). "[T]he evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to be decided by the jury." Id. (citations omitted). "The weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at the preliminary hearing stage, and the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe the person charged has committed the offense." Id. (citations omitted).
"[I]nferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth's case." Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original). "The use of inferences is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as the logical consequence from the existence of other facts that have been established." Id. at 1102-03. "The 'more-likely-than-not' test, must be applied to assess the reasonableness of inferences relied upon in establishing a prima facie case of criminal culpability." Id. at 1103.
Accordingly, we must determine whether the Commonwealth presented a prima facie case for each of the crimes alleged - unsworn falsification to authorities, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, tampering with public records or information, and obstruction of the administration of law or other governmental function.
Unsworn Falsification to Authorities
We will first address whether the trial court properly concluded the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of unsworn falsification to authorities. The Commonwealth maintains Williams made a written statement when he signed the interview that Lieutenant Clough had transcribed, because he adopted the words as his own. It argues the statement was false because Williams claimed he had not spoken with Edwin in almost a year, but the phone records established text messages and phone calls between Edwin and Williams two months before the interview. It further maintains the court failed to credit the reasonable inference that Williams lied about performing the search of Theresa's license plate during a police investigation, rather than to aid his cousin. The Commonwealth also asserts Williams knew the statements were false and he made the false statements to mislead Lieutenant Clough in the performance of his official duties.
Williams counters that there was no written statement, as required by the statute. He maintains that the fact that he signed a statement that Lieutenant Clough had memorialized of the oral conversation did not transform the answers to a written statement in the meaning of the statute. He further claims the Commonwealth did not show that any statement was false.
The Commonwealth responds that prior cases have found a defendant made a written statement based on a signature on a document. It points out that in Commonwealth v. Cherpes, 520 A.2d 439, 444 (Pa.Super. 1987), the defendant had signed, but not drafted, a written financial disclosure on which the unsworn falsification conviction was based. It further claims there are no cases holding that a statement the defendant adopted by signing it cannot be a written statement for purposes of the statute.
A person commits the crime of unsworn falsification to authorities "if, with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function, he: (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)(1).
The trial court did not err in finding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of unsworn falsification to authorities. The internal affairs interview, which was conducted as an oral interview, memorialized in writing by Lieutenant Clough, and signed by Williams, does not constitute a "written false statement," under the statute. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gaithers, 13 Pa.D&C.3d 668, 670 (Pa.C.P. Montg. 1978) (defendant convicted of making an unsworn falsification to police officer where defendant gave a false identity during an interview and signed her false name on the interrogation form).
Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence
We next will address whether the Commonwealth presented a prima face case for tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. A person commits tampering with or fabricating physical evidence under Section 4910(1) where the person, "believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: (1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1).
The Commonwealth argues the reasonable inferences from the evidence support the conclusion that Williams presented to Lieutenant Clough a fake homicide file to impede the internal affairs investigation. It argues Williams "could not have failed 'to believ[e] that an official . . . investigation was pending,'" pointing out he was being interviewed by an internal affairs officer for purposes of discovering why he ran Theresa's plates. Commonwealth's Br. at 20 (alteration in original). It argues Williams then knowingly presented a fake homicide file with the intent to mislead Lieutenant Clough into believing Theresa was a person of interest in a police investigation. The Commonwealth argues the homicide file was a "record, document or thing" and Williams presented the folder containing information he knew to be false.
Williams maintains the Commonwealth failed to prove a prima facie case of tampering with evidence. He argues that it is "unclear how [his] addition of materials to an investigative file that he was required to compile, maintain and update constitutes either the destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence within the meaning of the statute." Williams' Br. at 28. He also points out that the Commonwealth did not present any testimony to show when the information was printed. As a result, according to Williams, it cannot prove it was printed after the internal affairs interview, and therefore there is no evidence he had knowledge of the official investigation at the time he allegedly printed the materials.
He further argues the Commonwealth did not show he had the requisite intent to impair the availability of the item to the proceeding or investigation. He maintains this is so because he claims he did not alter, conceal, destroy or remove evidence. Rather, in his view, "[t]he information [he] printed and placed in the homicide investigation file remained in the investigation file, and it was therefore accessible to anyone who wished to review it." Id. at 29.
The Commonwealth responds there is no indication that the definition of "alter" cannot include an addition to something, such as Williams adding the folder containing Theresa's information to the homicide file.
We conclude the court did not err in dismissing this charge. The Commonwealth failed to present prima facie evidence that the information regarding Theresa was added to the file after Williams learned of the Internal Affairs Division's investigation. Rather, the IAD detective merely testified he retrieved the file, and the prosecution presented no testimony from anyone that the entire file had been procured for him. That the second file was not included with the first is not evidence, even at a prima facie level, that the material was added after Williams learned of the investigation.
Tampering With Public Records or Information
The Commonwealth next challenges the dismissal of the tampering with public records or information, as a third-degree felony, charge.
A person commits the offense of tampering with public records or information under Section 4911(a)(1) if he:
(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record, or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government[.]18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(a)(1). Because the Commonwealth charged Williams with tampering with public records graded as a third-degree felony, it needed to prove he intended to "defraud or injure." Id. at § 4911(b) (providing "[a]n offense under this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree unless the intent of the actor is to defraud or injure anyone, in which case the offense is a felony of the third degree").
The Commonwealth argues the reasonable inferences from the evidence support the conclusion that Williams presented Lieutenant Clough a fake homicide file to impede the internal affairs investigation. It argues Williams knowingly presented a fake homicide file with the intent to mislead Lieutenant Clough into believing Theresa was a person of interest in a police investigation. The Commonwealth argues the homicide file was a "record, document or thing" kept by the government for information or record and Williams presented the folder containing information he knew to be false and with the intent that the internal affairs division take it as a genuine part of the homicide file.
Williams maintains the Commonwealth failed to prove a prima facie case of tampering with public records or information because it failed to establish the homicide file qualified as a public record within the purview of the statute. He relies on Clites v. Upper Yoder Township, 485 A.2d 724, 727 n.5 (Pa. 1984), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded a police chief's destruction of logbooks did not constitute a violation of Section 4911. He argues the Commonwealth failed to present evidence as to how the homicide files are stored or maintained or whether they would be required to provide the contents of the file to anyone. He also maintains the Commonwealth failed to show he made a false entry or alteration in the file. He also faults the Commonwealth for failing to elicit testimony about what materials usually are included in a homicide file. He reasons the inclusion of his own notes and computer print-outs cannot be a false entry or alteration. He further notes that the Commonwealth charged obstruction of public records as a felony and therefore was required to establish Williams had an "intent to defraud or injure," claiming that an intent to defraud or injure required pecuniary or property loss or the loss of an important right.
The Commonwealth responds by distinguishing Clites, and citing Commonwealth v. Barger, 375 A.2d 756, 764 (Pa.Super. 1977), which held a state police accident investigation report is a "record, document or thing" under Section 4911(a)(1). It argues it did not have to present at the preliminary hearing stage evidence regarding how homicide files are stored and maintained. It further maintains the intent to defraud did not require pecuniary loss, and rather falsifying a homicide could have been found to defraud or injury individuals and organizations, including the Philadelphia Police Department by undermining the public trust, the citizens of Philadelphia who have a right to effective and honest investigation, and Theresa, who was falsely implicated by Williams' actions. It also maintains Williams defrauded the internal affairs division by deceiving it to avoid punishment.
The trial court did not err in dismissing this charge. The homicide file is a "public record or thing," as contemplated by the statute, as it is kept by the government and is something that police officers are required to compile. See Barger, 375 A.2d at 763-64 (finding police accident report was a public record, pointing out the all-inclusive language of the statute, and reasoning that at a minimum the report was kept by the police and noting the police were required to distribute to specified individuals and agencies, and noting that the fact that it was inadmissible as evidence did not affect its status under Section 4911). However, the Commonwealth failed to prove Williams made a false entry or alteration to the file. As the homicide detective, he added his own notes and computer printouts to the file. The Commonwealth's assertion that Williams "falsified" the second file is mere supposition and speculation. There is nothing of record to show that such was the case. The Commonwealth failed to adduce prima facie evidence of tampering with a public record.
In Clites, relied on by Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a police officer could not be disciplined for destroying logbooks. In doing so, it found the Board of Supervisors "erred in concluding that [the] appellant's destruction of the old log books constituted a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911." 485 A.2d at 727 n.5. It reasoned there was no evidence "concerning the nature of the log books" that "impl[ied] a duty to keep them for future use." Id. at 727. It pointed out the logbooks were like diaries and "there was no evidence that the books contained any information that was essential to the legal recordkeeping requirements of a police department" and there were separate records kept for arrests. Id. Here, the homicide file is more akin to the accident report in Barger than the logbooks in Clites.
Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Functions
The final charge at issue is the obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions charge.
The Commonwealth argues Williams intentionally obstructed the internal affairs investigation by lying about his contact with Edwin and presenting a false homicide file, which also was a breach of his official duty. Further, Williams committed "any other unlawful acts" when he committed unsworn falsification and tampering with evidence and with public records.
Williams argues the Commonwealth failed to show Williams lied to Lieutenant Clough, claiming that the question asked was when was the last time Williams "spoke" with Edwin, to which Williams responded possibly a year ago, and the Commonwealth presented evidence that Williams and Edwin texted each other, not spoken with each other. He claims the phones calls were not answered or were sent to voice mail, as they were under two minutes. He further argues that "mere lying" in response to police questioning does not violate Section 5101. Williams contends the alleged falsification of the homicide file cannot support the charge because the Commonwealth provided no evidence about the dates the documents were printed and did not introduce the file itself to show the information concerning Theresa did not belong there.
A person commits the crime of obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions if "he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.
In Commonwealth v. Shelly, the defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice after the trial court found his providing a wrong name to police officers constituted an "unlawful act." 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa.Super. 1997). We concluded that "no statute . . . criminalizes 'mere lying' in response to police questioning, and section 5101 does not fill this gap." Id. at 504. We reasoned that the Crimes Code provides specific situations where "falsity is punishable," such as with unsworn falsification, but that each provision contained elements not contained in the obstruction statute. Id. at 504, 504 n.6. We concluded that, as there were sections dealing with falsity to police, "we cannot presume the legislature's failure to include this most common scenario to be the result of a desire to penalize it in the 'catchall' of section 5101." Id.
Shelly's holding that providing false identification to law enforcement is not a crime has been superseded by statute. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 4914. This has no bearing on our reasoning.
We conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing the obstruction charge. Lying during the internal affairs interview cannot be the basis of an obstruction charge, as mere lying during an interview does not meet the definition of any codified crime and therefore is not an "unlawful act." See id. Further, the allegation that Williams' added information to the homicide file, a file which would be used by him to conduct the investigation, is akin to lying, cannot support an obstruction charge as "any other unlawful act." Moreover, because we have concluded that the Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case for the other crimes charged, the charge cannot be based on the "any other unlawful act" catchall provision. Further, although the Commonwealth maintains the alleged addition to the homicide file was a breach of official duty, they provide no legal citation to support this claim.
Order affirmed.
Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM
PELLEGRINI, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the trial court's determination that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to hold over for court a former police officer, Nathaniel Williams, on one count each of unsworn falsification (18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(a)); fabricating physical evidence (18 Pa.C.S. § 4910); tampering with public records (tier-3 felony) (18 Pa.C.S. § 4911); and obstructing administration of law or other governmental function (18 Pa.C.S. § 5101).
At a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth only has to present a prima facie case as to a defendant's guilt of the charged crimes. There is undisputed evidence here that, while employed as a detective in the Philadelphia Police Department, Nathaniel Williams (a) used police databases to look up a woman's personal information at the behest of his cousin, enabling his cousin to then stalk that woman; (b) lied to an internal affairs investigator about having no contact with his cousin; (c) concocted an implausible justification for using the police databases, implicating the stalking victim as a person of interest in a murder investigation; and (d) altered a homicide investigation file in an effort to thwart the inquiry into this conduct.
By nevertheless affirming the trial court's ruling, the majority has departed from well-settled law and imposed on the Commonwealth a more stringent test for establishing a prima facie case. Under the majority's rationale, the Commonwealth is required to disprove or rebut interpretations of the evidence that favor the defendant, even where the evidence presented allows a reasonable inference of guilt and the defendant's interpretation is uncorroborated. For the reasons below, I would find that the evidence was more than sufficient as a matter of law as to all four charged offenses which the Commonwealth seeks to hold over for court.
I.
A.
I will begin by summarizing the underlying material facts which are critical to our review. On October 14, 2017, at about 12:00 p.m., Theresa Williams was in a parking lot with her children. While she was preparing to leave, Ms. Williams was approached by Edwin Williams, who she had never met before.1 Edwin Williams asked for Ms. Williams' phone number,2 but she declined. Nevertheless, about one or two weeks after that encounter, Ms. Williams was alarmed to find Edwin Williams knocking on the front door of her house. She asked how he had learned her address and Edwin Williams did not give her an explanation.
When Edwin Williams appeared reluctant to leave Ms. Williams' home, she attempted to gather his personal information. Ms. Williams asked him to write down his phone number and he did so. During their conversation, she also learned that Edwin Williams worked for the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA).
In the next few weeks, Edwin Williams continued contacting Ms. Williams indirectly by leaving her gifts such as flowers or greeting cards on her vehicle. Ms. Williams reported this conduct to SEPTA and the Philadelphia Police Department. The Internal Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department then assigned Lieutenant James Clough to investigate.
B.
On November 7, 2017, Lieutenant Clough began his investigation by auditing police databases to determine whether they had recently been used to access Ms. Williams' personal information. These systems included the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Police Crime Information Center (PCIC), and the Pennsylvania Justice Network (JNET).
Lieutenant Clough discovered that three days after she was first accosted by Edwin Williams in a parking lot, on October 17, 2017, the Police Payroll Number belonging to Nathaniel Williams had been used to access the above databases and make inquires relating specifically to Ms. Williams. Moreover, Lieutenant Clough found that on that same date, October 17, 2017, Nathaniel Williams and Edwin Williams had exchanged a series of text messages between 3:00 p.m. and 3:15 p.m.
The timing of the messages between the two men was significant because they were sent less than a half hour before Nathaniel Williams first queried Ms. Williams on JNET. Nathaniel Williams also used NCIC and PCIC to search for more information about Ms. Williams later that day. Nathaniel Williams and Edwin Williams continued exchanging messages and phone calls from October 17, 2017, until November 5, 2017.
Lieutenant Clough interviewed Edwin Williams on November 24, 2017. During the questioning, Edwin Williams denied receiving information about Ms. Williams from a police officer, and he specifically stated that he did not know Nathaniel Williams. However, later that same day, Nathaniel Williams replaced the personal cell phone he had been using to communicate with his cousin in the preceding months.
Nathaniel Williams was then interviewed by Lieutenant Clough on December 27, 2017. This interview was done orally, but the questions and answers were reduced to a written statement and signed by Nathaniel Williams. See Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 12/27/2017, at p. 29.
C.
On November 21, 2019, Nathaniel Williams was charged with one count of tampering with records, one count of tampering with evidence, four counts of unsworn falsification to authorities, and obstruction of administration of law/other governmental function. These charges were all dismissed following a preliminary hearing on September 11, 2020, on the ground that the Commonwealth had not carried its burden of presenting enough evidence to establish a prima facie case that Nathaniel Williams had committed the offenses.
The Commonwealth moved to refile its complaint on September 17, 2020. This time, the charges included one count each of unsworn falsification (18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(a)); fabricating physical evidence (18 Pa.C.S. § 4910); tampering with public records (tier-3 felony) (18 Pa.C.S. § 4911); and obstructing administration of law or other governmental function (18 Pa.C.S. § 5101). A second preliminary hearing was held on April 22, 2021.
At the second hearing, the Commonwealth was for the first time permitted to read into evidence the transcribed questions and answers given during Lieutenant Clough's interview of Nathaniel Williams. See Hearing Transcript, 4/22/2021, at pp. 29-45.3 It was undisputed that the transcribed interview was signed by Nathaniel Williams on all six pages of the transcription, and that he had signed the document in the presence of Lieutenant Clough. The very end of the transcribed statement included the clause, "I have read the foregoing statement consisting of six pages and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge." Id. at pp. 44-45.
In the interview, Nathaniel Williams denied that he had allowed anyone else to login with his credentials to search the license plate number of Ms. Williams' vehicle or look up any other information about her. Nathaniel Williams claimed that he ran the searches himself only because he had then suspected that Ms. Williams was somehow involved in a homicide he had been investigating for about three months. Specifically, Nathaniel Williams stated that on October 16, 2017, he saw a murder suspect entering a white SUV or van, and a day later, Nathaniel Williams saw what he thought was the same vehicle parked near the suspect's home, learning after looking up its license plate number that it belonged to Ms. Williams:
I saw the target of my investigation[,] Tashaun Curtis[,] get into a car a couple of months ago on the 6600 block of Ogontz right in front of his house. I was driving by. I saw him get into a white or white-colored SUV or van, and I drove around the block and the car was gone. A day later [on October 17, 2017,] I surveyed the neighborhood, and I saw a vehicle that I thought he had gotten into. I ran that tag.Id. at p. 35.4
Nathaniel Williams admitted that Edwin Williams was his cousin, but he claimed that he had not "spoken" to him for "maybe a year or more" and that he had not given him any of Ms. Williams' personal information. Id. at p. 36. Nathaniel Williams claimed to be completely unaware of any of Edwin Williams' conduct toward Ms. Williams. See id. at p. 40.
It is worth mentioning here that Nathaniel Williams' responses to Lieutenant Clough were inconsistent with phone records demonstrating substantial communications between Nathaniel Williams and Edwin Williams at the relevant times. In the preceding year, the two men had exchanged over 20 recorded phone calls and over 100 text messages. This regular contact abruptly ceased at nearly the precise moment when Lieutenant Clough's investigation began. See Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 9/11/2020, at pp. 86-88.
After Lieutenant Clough had interviewed Nathaniel Williams, he began attempting to verify the explanation given for his inquiries as to Ms. Williams. To that end, he contacted Nathaniel Williams' superior officer so that he could obtain a copy of the police department's "homicide file" concerning the subject murder in Ms. Williams' neighborhood. Lieutenant Clough went to the Homicide Division Unit and obtained the homicide file relating to the murder investigation referred to by Nathaniel Williams. The file was marked with the numerical designation, "M17-185," and it contained not a single reference to Ms. Williams. See id. at pp. 77-78.
However, the next day, Lieutenant Clough learned from a colleague in Internal Affairs that Nathaniel Williams had contacted him to supplement the homicide file with additional documentation. Nathaniel Williams produced a second folder containing, among other things, a photograph of Ms. Williams and her family which had been printed from her publicly accessible Facebook account. On the back of the photograph were some handwritten notes concerning Ms. Williams' personal information and the license plate number of her vehicle. See id. at pp. 77-80. No explanation has been given as to why this information was written on the back of a photo rather than printed directly from a database.
Lieutenant Clough testified that the printout of the Facebook photo differed from the form and content of documented searches of other individuals in the homicide file, suggesting to him that Nathaniel Williams only added the printout to the file to make it appear as if his inquiry into Ms. Williams was part of a legitimate homicide investigation.5
At the conclusion of the hearing held on April 22, 2021, the trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion to refile its complaint. The Commonwealth timely appealed, and the trial court entered an opinion giving its reasons why the order should be affirmed. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/2021. As to the charge of unsworn falsification, the trial court found that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case because no evidence was introduced showing that Nathaniel Williams acted with intent to mislead or deter Lieutenant Clough during his investigation.
As to the charge of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, the trial court found that there was no evidence that Williams had altered, destroyed, concealed or removed a government record with the intent to thwart a proceeding or investigation. As to the count of tampering with public records or information, the trial court reasoned only that the evidence was insufficient, and that the statute was not intended to criminalize Nathaniel Williams' conduct. Finally, as to count of obstruction of the administration of law or other governmental function, the trial court found that a prima facie case had not been established by the Commonwealth. Id. at 9-10.
The Commonwealth now argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case on all four counts. See Appellant's Brief, at 4. The Commonwealth contends that it carried its burden at the preliminary hearing because, when accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence satisfies the elements of each of the four charged crimes.6
II.
The majority overlooks key components of what constitutes a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing stage resulting in an erroneous disposition. I would, therefore, expand on the majority's summary of law with the following points of emphasis that should guide our determination.
At a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth does not have to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of an offense - it is enough that the evidence "establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense." Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513-14 (Pa. 2005); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D). Reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence to establish a prima facie case, and the reasonableness of the inferences is evaluated on a "more-likely-than-not" test. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 996 (Pa. 1983). "[T]he prima facie showing is a low threshold for the Commonwealth to surpass." Commonwealth v. Munson, 261 A.3d 530, 540 (Pa. Super. 2021).
"[T]he trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden to make out the elements of a charged crime." Karetny, 880 A.2d at 513 (emphasis added). "Weight and credibility of evidence are not factors at the preliminary hearing stage." Munson, 261 A.3d at 540 (emphasis added).
With these points in mind, I will now examine each of the four charges at issue and explain how the trial court and the majority have adopted an improper evidentiary test for preliminary hearings.
A.
The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case as to the count of unsworn falsification. A defendant commits this offense where, "with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function, he: (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true[.]" 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(a). In its opinion, the trial court gave little explanation for its disposition on this count, but Nathaniel Williams argues for the most part that he could not have made an unsworn falsification because his statements were not false, and even if they were false, Nathaniel Williams had not himself reduced them to writing. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/2021, at 8; Appellee's Brief, at 25-27.
The majority did not squarely address whether Nathaniel Williams lied to or misled Lieutenant Clough, but the falsehoods are so apparent from the record that they must be taken as a given. The majority's decision, therefore, hinges on a finding that Nathaniel Williams did not produce a "written false statement" for the purposes of Section 4904(a). See Maj. Op., at 9. Here too, though, the majority's reasoning is hard to discern, as the analysis is minimal and only one case was cited in support of the conclusion -Commonwealth v. Gaithers, 13 Pa. D&C.3d 668, 670 (Pa.C.P. Montg. 1978).
The majority's reason for citing Gaithers is not immediately obvious because it is a 1978 decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County discussing why a conviction for unsworn falsification was sustained by sufficient evidence. The defendant in Gaithers had signed a written statement using a false name when taken into police custody, and the court of common pleas rejected the defendant's recantation defense as a matter of law. The case had nothing to do with whether the evidence met the lower evidentiary standard applicable at a preliminary hearing.
I would hazard a guess that the majority intended to analogize the facts of Gaithers to those in the present matter. That is, since Nathaniel Williams signed his name on a document typed up by someone else, the only thing Nathaniel Williams himself put in "writing" was true, precluding his conviction for making a written false statement under Section 4904(a). If that is what the majority intended to suggest, it finds no support in Gaithers, the plain language of Section 4904(a) or any other authorities.
First, the fact that the defendant in Gaithers violated Section 4904(a) by signing a document with a false name in no way suggests that a defendant cannot violate the statute by signing an otherwise fraudulent document with his true name. Such facts were never contemplated in that case.
Second, Nathaniel Williams' conduct would clearly amount to "making" a false written statement, since his transcribed oral statements would be meaningless without the signed written attestation that the content or substance of the writings was indeed uttered by him. The record establishes that during their interview, Lieutenant Clough contemporaneously transcribed Nathaniel Williams' verbal responses to questioning, and Nathaniel Williams then voluntarily adopted the entire transcription by initialing all six pages of the document. He further adopted the written statements by signing his name under the final clause, which reads, "I have read the foregoing statement consisting of six pages and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge." Motion to Refile Hearing Transcript, 4/22/2021, at pp. 44-45.
These attestations make the document his own, just as if he had typed or written the document in his own hand. There is no cogent reason why a defendant would not be liable under Section 4904(a) for attesting to the truth of a false written statement that happened to be memorialized by a third party. In fact, it is commonplace for signatories to affidavits prepared by third parties to be subject to the penalties prescribed by Section 4904. See e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 102 (definition of "affidavit" in the Judicial Code, including "an unsworn document containing statements of fact and a statement by the signatory that it is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. 4904[.]").
Third, and consistent with the discussion above, we have previously affirmed a conviction under Section 4904(a) where a false written statement was memorialized by a third party and then adopted by way of the defendant's signature. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Cherpes, 520 A.2d 439 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding that defendant could be convicted for making false written statements under Section 4904(a)(1) regardless of whether the defendant had personally memorialized the statements); Commonwealth v Herd, 81 Pa. D. &C.4th 85, 92 (Pa.C.P. Burks), aff'd, 935 A.2d 12 (Pa. Super. 2007) ("[Defendant] gave a signed written witness statement to the Colebrookdale Township Police Department detailing the events described above[.]"). Nathaniel Williams, therefore, "made" the written statements by attesting in writing that the statements were his and that they were true, subjecting him to liability under the statute.
The remaining elements of Section 4904(a) are the presence of a deliberately false statement and an intent to mislead. Again, the majority did not address these points, likely because it is so apparent from the record that there is ample record evidence proving these elements. However, in any event, a summary of the most pertinent facts will provide some useful context.
In his interview with Lieutenant Clough, Nathaniel Williams gave a false statement by denying having "spoken to" his cousin for the preceding year. Nathaniel Williams made this statement despite having communicated extensively with his cousin via phone calls and text messages at the relevant times. The two men also curiously stopped communicating right when Lieutenant Clough's investigation began. Nathaniel Williams even started using a new phone the day after Edwin Williams was interviewed.
Moreover, Nathaniel Williams denied that he used government databases to assist his cousin in learning the personal information of Ms. Williams, but there is compelling evidence that this is exactly what happened. The record easily supports the reasonable inference that Nathaniel Williams looked up Ms. Williams' personal information at his cousin's behest, within minutes of having conversations with him and within two days of Edwin Williams' first encounter with Ms. Williams in a public parking lot.
Nathaniel Williams has claimed that he had a legitimate reason for his interest in Ms. Williams, denying that he looked up her information as a favor to his cousin. However, consideration of his alternative account, his credibility and the weight of conflicting evidence must be reserved for the jury in the first instance. The trial court was also not permitted to credit Nathaniel Williams' dubious story at a preliminary hearing because all reasonable inferences from the evidence had to be drawn in favor of the Commonwealth. See id. Thus, because Nathaniel Williams gave a false written statement to Lieutenant Clough with an intent to mislead, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the Commonwealth's motion to refile the charge of unsworn falsification.
B.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case as to the count of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence (18 Pa.C.S. § 4910). A defendant commits an offense under Section 4910 if he:
(1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation; or
(2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false and with intent to mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in such proceeding or investigation.18 Pa.C.S. § 4910.
At the two preliminary hearings, the Commonwealth's evidence allowed the reasonable inference that Nathaniel Williams added a notated photograph of Ms. Williams to a homicide file so that he could falsely establish the legitimacy of his prior inquiries using police databases. The Commonwealth established that during Lieutenant Clough's investigation, he reviewed a homicide file corresponding to a pending case Nathaniel Williams claimed he was working on when he looked up Ms. Williams' information. A hard copy of the homicide file was kept in the Homicide Division Unit of Nathaniel Williams' department, and it was designated with the number, M17-185. At Lieutenant Clough's request, the homicide file was retrieved by Nathaniel Williams' superior officer. The homicide file contained no references to Ms. Williams whatsoever.
It was only the day after being interviewed by Lieutenant Clough that Nathaniel Williams turned up a supplemental homicide file which, among other things, contained a printout of a Facebook photo, on the back of which Nathaniel Williams had made handwritten notes with some of Ms. Williams' personal information.
The majority reasons that the Commonwealth did not present a prima facie case as to the tampering charge because (a) there was no evidence as to when the material about Ms. Williams was added to the second homicide file, and (b) there was no evidence that Lieutenant Clough received the entirety homicide file M17-185 on the date he initially retrieved it. Respectfully, the majority has erred by discounting reasonable inferences that Nathaniel Williams tampered with police records.
I have already recounted above how Nathaniel Williams lied to and misled Lieutenant Clough in connection with his use of police databases, diminishing his credibility. No doubt he also had a motive and opportunity to add materials to the homicide file in order to corroborate his purported reason for using those resources to inquire about Ms. Williams. Moreover, the purported incident prompting the searches - seeing a murder suspect enter a white van in Ms. Williams' neighborhood - is completely uncorroborated.
Nevertheless, aside from that, the contents of the second homicide folder were independently suspect. Lieutenant Clough described at length why he believed that Nathaniel Williams manufactured research in the homicide file only after the internal affairs investigation was underway:
Lieutenant Clough: I inspected the contents of that [second] file folder as well. And it was within that file folder there were several references to Ms. Williams which included a Facebook photograph, a photograph of Ms. Williams and her children that was printed from Facebook. And on the back of it there were some handwritten notes. And the handwritten notes had some things such as it said Ms. Williams' name, no record/no wants, 75-48A negative, no friends shared, autism supporter, the abbreviation for possibly, p-o-s-s and neighbors.
Commonwealth: Did it also include some of the biographical information of Ms. Williams like her license tag?
Lieutenant Clough: The license tag, the one that I had queried previously, that was on there as well. That was definitely on there along with those other things that I stated.
Commonwealth: The Facebook picture, did that appear to you that it came from a publicly available Facebook profile?
Lieutenant Clough: Yes, because I actually logged in and viewed it myself and I was able to see it without being restricted, without having to be a friend of Ms. Williams.
Commonwealth: And those handwritten notes, was that all information that you would have referred to in Detective Williams interview with him?
Lieutenant Clough: Those things that were handwritten on there, yes. They were in -- some of them were in the interview of Detective Williams, yes. And he received a copy of that interview at the conclusion of his statement.
Commonwealth: Besides that Facebook page and the notes on the back was there any other reference to Theresa Williams in the file?
Lieutenant Clough: No, there was not. I looked extensively through that file. A lot of the inquiries that were made there was copies, there was printouts of various license plates, tags, houses that were checked. And this was the only one, the only thing that was not printed out, it was just handwritten on the back of a Facebook page.
Commonwealth: So you are saying this information was different from other checks that you saw in the file; is what you're saying?
Lieutenant Clough: Yes.Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 9/11, 2020, at pp. 77-80.
In sum, the only material in the second file about Ms. Williams was a print-out of a publicly available Facebook photo, on the back of which Nathaniel Williams had handwritten her personal information corresponding to the same information that Lieutenant Clough had provided to Nathaniel Williams at the conclusion of their interview the day earlier. Nathaniel Williams did not print out any of the queries of Ms. Williams from October 17, 2017. Unlike all of the other materials in the homicide file, the one piece of paper referring to Ms. Williams was publicly available, the information on the back of the photo was handwritten, and the inclusion of the photo into the file was not logged or time-stamped. How convenient.
The majority nevertheless seems to suggest that the Commonwealth had to present direct evidence as to when the Facebook photo was printed and when Nathaniel Williams wrote notes on the back of it. However, this is erroneous because at a preliminary hearing, courts are compelled to consider all the evidence of guilt (including circumstantial evidence) to make reasonable inferences of guilt that are more likely than not to be true, and to view the evidence in the Commonwealth's favor. Ignoring the inferences of guilt and accepting the explanations given by Nathaniel Williams amounts to an improper credibility determination and weighing of the evidence.
When viewed in the most favorable to the Commonwealth, the record facts and circumstantial evidence allow the reasonable inference that Nathaniel Williams added a photo to the second file to mislead Lieutenant Clough and thwart an official investigation. The lack of direct evidence as to when the photo was added is of no moment, particularly because Nathaniel Williams himself made it impossible to track the date of that activity. Because Nathaniel Williams' conduct satisfies the elements of Section 4910, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that a prima facie case had not been established as to this offense.
C.
The trial court also erred as a matter of law in finding that the Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case as to the count of tampering with public records (18 Pa.C.S. § 4911), graded as a third-degree felony. A person commits the offense defined in Section 4911 if he:
(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record, or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government;
(2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false, and with intent that it be taken as a genuine part of information or records referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or
(3) intentionally and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes or otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record, document or thing.18 Pa.C.S. § 4911(a).
Where, as in this case, the offense is charged as a felony, it must also be shown that the defendant acted with an intent to "defraud or injure." 18 Pa.C.S. § 4911(b). "Fraud" generally means "anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth or look or gesture." Moser v. DeSetta, 589 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. 1991).
Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there is evidence which establishes a prima facie case. The majority found, and I agree, that the homicide file relied upon by Nathaniel Williams to establish the legitimacy of his inquiries into Ms. Williams was a "record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record." See Commonwealth v. Barger, 375 A.2d 756, 76364 (Pa. Super. 1977) ("It is a written report of an investigation of a motor vehicle accident which, at the very minimum, is kept by the State Police for informational purposes.").
Where the majority and I differ is whether there is evidence that Nathaniel Williams altered the homicide file. The majority finds that such an alteration to the file is merely speculative, reiterating the idea discussed above that the Commonwealth had to present direct evidence that the material about Ms. Williams was added only after the internal affairs investigation began. See Maj. Op., at 14.
Once again, the majority is applying the wrong evidentiary standard in reviewing whether a prima facie case has been presented. Circumstantial evidence of the crime is sufficient, and a court's conclusions must be drawn from all reasonable inferences that favor the Commonwealth. The elements of tampering (with intent to defraud) were proven circumstantially by irrefutable facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom:
• Theresa Williams was first accosted by Edwin Williams in a parking lot on October 14, 2017;
• Nathaniel Williams used police databases on October 17, 2017, within minutes of communicating with his cousin, Edwin Williams, to look up information about Theresa Williams;
• Nathaniel Williams and Edwin Williams then both lied to and misled an internal affairs investigator about the extent of their communications with each other at the relevant times;
• Nathaniel Williams suggested a link between Ms. Williams and a murder suspect that is both tenuous and uncorroborated;
• Nathaniel Williams produced a photo of Ms. Williams a day after his interview with Lieutenant Clough in a second homicide file that was for some reason not kept with the first file retrieved by Lieutenant Clough at the police department; and
• Unlike all of the other items in both homicide files, the one photo of Ms. Williams was publicly accessible, with handwritten notes on it which were not time-stamped.
The reasonable inference from this evidence is that Nathaniel Williams used official recourses to enable his cousin to stalk a woman and then tried to cover it up by manipulating a government record to make it appear that the woman was implicated in a murder investigation. While Nathaniel Williams has given innocent explanations for his conduct, it is not proper for a court at a preliminary hearing to disregard reasonable inferences of guilt by relying on the defendant's uncorroborated word, especially a defendant who has already been caught making false statements to an internal affairs investigator. The trial court erred in ruling that the Commonwealth had not made out a prima facie case as to the count of tampering with public records.
D.
Finally, I would find that the trial court erred in ruling that the Commonwealth had not established a prima facie case as to the count of obstructing administration of law or other governmental function (18 Pa.C.S. § 5101). A defendant may be found guilty of this offense "if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act[.]" 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101. This crime requires more than "mere lying" or giving false information to a police officer. See Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997). The conduct causing obstruction or interference must be an independently illegal act. See id.
I have outlined above why the record evidence compels the inference that Nathaniel Williams lied to Lieutenant Clough during his interview and altered a homicide file to give the false impression that he made inquiries about Ms. Williams for a legitimate purpose. This conduct was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Nathaniel Williams violated Sections 4904(a), 4910 and 4911 of the Crimes Code. Since there is no doubt that Lieutenant Clough was engaged in the administration of a government function during his investigation into Nathaniel Williams' conduct, all of the elements of Section 5101 were met. I would, therefore, hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt as to this count.
In dismissing the four charges that the Commonwealth brought against Nathaniel Williams and precluding the requested refiling of the charges, the trial court erred as a matter of law in misapplying the test for whether a prima facie case has been presented. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's order so that all four counts may be bound over for trial.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.