Opinion
J-S18045-16 No. 1492 MDA 2015
04-26-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. DEMETRIUS LAWRENCE WILLIAMS, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 9, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000681-2014 BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS, and STRASSBURGER, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Demetrius Lawrence Williams (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions for statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault without consent, aggravated indecent assault -complainant less than 16 years of age, indecent assault without consent, indecent assault - complainant less than 16 years of age, sexual assault, and retaliation against a witness or victim. We affirm.
Appellant purports to appeal from both his judgment of sentence and the August 13, 2015 order denying his post-sentence motion. We have corrected the caption to reflect that Appellant's appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence entered on April 9, 2015. Commonwealth v. Dreves , 839 A.2d 1122, 1125 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).
On October 30, 2014, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of a number of crimes related to the sexual assault of S.S., who was thirteen years old at the time the offenses occurred. On April 9, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven and one half to 16 years of incarceration, along with mandatory lifetime sexual offender registration. Appellant was not designated as a sexually violent predator. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied by the trial court on August 13, 2015. This timely-filed appeal followed. On September 3, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied, and the trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 19, 2015.
Appellant raises three issues for our review.
I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty on all charges.Appellant's Brief at 7 (issues reordered for ease of disposition; unnecessary capitalization omitted).
II. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial by finding that the weight of the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions on all charges.
III. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the sentence imposed upon [Appellant] was not excessive in nature.
In his first two questions, Appellant challenges the weight and sufficiency of all six of his convictions. In his argument, Appellant conflates these two concepts. Appellant's Brief at 13-19.
Our Supreme Court has explained:
[I]t is necessary to delineate the distinctions between a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that challenges the weight of the evidence. The distinction between
these two challenges is critical. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas a claim challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would permit a second trial.Commonwealth v. Widmer , 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations and footnote omitted).
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
With respect to Appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, our standard of review is well-settled:
whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.Commonwealth v. Gonzalez , 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
Before we address Appellant's issues on the merits, we must determine whether they have been preserved properly for our review. With respect to sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, it is well-settled that the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient, or the claim may be waived. Commonwealth v. Williams , 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-58 (Pa. Super. 2008). However, even if a sufficiency claim is vague, this Court may review it where the case is straightforward, the record is not long and complex, the trial court readily apprehended the appellant's claim, and the trial court thoroughly addressed the merits of the claim in its opinion. Commonwealth v. Laboy , 936 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007).
In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant asserts general sufficiency challenges for each of his seven convictions, but fails to specify which element or elements of each crime he is challenging. Appellant's Concise Statement, 10/2/2015. Nonetheless, in its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed each claim in turn. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2015, at 8-14. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver. Laboy , supra. Moreover, following our review of the certified record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that the opinion of the Honorable Nancy L. Butts states findings of fact that are supported by the record, evidences no abuse of discretion or errors of law, and thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes of Appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues and supporting arguments. Accordingly, we adopt pages 1 through 14 of the trial court's opinion, filed on August 14, 2015, as our own in resolving Appellant's sufficiency claims.
We turn next to Appellant's weight-of-the-evidence challenge.
The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is well-settled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Gonzalez , 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Appellant assails the credibility of S.S.'s testimony, arguing that she should not be believed because she was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the alleged assault and the Commonwealth failed to prove that the alleged penetration occurred without S.S.'s consent. Appellant's Brief at 13-16. Thus, Appellant asks us to reweigh the evidence in his favor. Our case law is clear that a jury sitting as finder of fact is "in the best position to view the demeanor of the Commonwealth's witnesses and to assess each witness' credibility." Commonwealth v. Olsen , 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, the jury was presented the testimony of S.S., Appellant's friend, and two Williamsport Bureau of Police Agents. Appellant did not testify on his own behalf. The jury was free to find the Commonwealth's witnesses' testimony credible and resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth's favor. See generally Commonwealth v. Horne , 89 A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that Horne's weight of the evidence claim could not prevail as "the jury resolved the inconsistencies among the testimonies as it saw fit and reached a verdict."). Based on the foregoing, the trial court determined that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding. Accordingly, Appellant's weight claim does not warrant relief.
In his final claim, Appellant asks this Court to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is manifestly excessive and unreasonable. Appellant's Brief at 20-22.
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).Commonwealth v. Griffin , 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
The record reflects that Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and that Appellant preserved this issue by including it in his motion for reconsideration of his sentence. Moreover, Appellant has included in his brief a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We now turn to whether Appellant has presented a substantial question for our review.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul , 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). "A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." Griffin , 65 A.3d at 935 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant's brief contains a 2119(f) statement. In his statement, Appellant makes a bald assertion that his aggregate sentence is excessive and inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Appellant's Brief at 9-10. However, he fails to specify which particular provision of the Code was violated or which aspect of his standard-range sentence was contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme. Id. It is well-settled that bald claims of excessiveness do not present a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Lutes , 793 A.2d 949, 964 (Pa. Super. 2002).
We note that "where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code." Commonwealth v. Moury , 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010). Additionally, where, as here, the sentencing court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report "we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors." Id.
Further, our Supreme Court has held that
only where the appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process, will such a statement be deemed adequate to raise a substantial question so as to permit a grant of allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of the sentence.Commonwealth v. Mouzon , 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002).
Accordingly, because Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question, he is not entitled to relief.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence. The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court's August 14, 2015 opinion in the event of further proceedings.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/26/2016
Image materials not available for display.