Opinion
J-S48029-19 No. 3309 EDA 2018
12-12-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MICHAEL TWIGGS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1017181-1975 BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Michael Twiggs, appeals from the order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On March 31, 1976, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder. The conviction stemmed from an incident on September 30, 1975, during which Appellant shot Christopher Ross with a sawed-off shotgun. Appellant was seventeen years old at the time of the crime. On February 7, 1977, the trial court denied Appellant's post-verdict motions and sentenced him to serve a mandatory term of life imprisonment. On July 6, 1979, our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Twiggs , 402 A.2d 1374 (Pa. 1979). Thereafter, Appellant filed seven petitions seeking post-conviction relief, all of which proved to be unfruitful. On July 16, 2010, Appellant filed another PCRA petition. While the PCRA petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The PCRA court set forth the remaining procedural history of this matter as follows:
On July 24, 2012, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition, seeking resentencing pursuant to Miller. On March 4, 2016, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition, raising a Montgomery [ v. Louisiana , 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016)] claim. The Appellant entered into negotiations with the Commonwealth[,] which concluded when the Appellant agreed to accept the Commonwealth's recommended sentence of thirty-five years to life. The Appellant's decision to accept the recommended sentence resulted in a negotiated resentencing, which occurred on November 30, 2016. N.T. 11/30/2016. Before the Appellant's original sentence was vacated, this Court conducted a colloquy of the Appellant which, inter alia, advised the Appellant that he was not required to accept the sentence the Commonwealth was recommending to the Court, advised him of his absolute right to have a resentencing hearing before a judge, and advised that if he accepted the Commonwealth's recommended sentence he gave up the right to a resentencing hearing. Id. at 9-10. The Appellant stated he understood his right to a resentencing hearing and wanted to accept the recommended sentence and proceed with a negotiated resentencing. Id.
Further, the Appellant was advised that if he agreed to accept the sentence offered by the Commonwealth his appellate rights would be extremely limited to challenging the jurisdiction of the Court, the legality of the sentence imposed, and the voluntariness of his decision to accept the recommended sentence. Id. at 10-11. The Appellant stated that he understood his appeal rights. Id. at 12. At the conclusion of the colloquy, this Court found that the Appellant's decision, to accept the recommended sentence, was made voluntarily, knowingly, and of his own free will. Id. at 14. The original sentence imposed on February 7, 1977, was vacated and a new sentence of thirty-five
years to life was imposed for the conviction of first degree murder. Id. at 44. The Appellant received credit for all original credit time awarded and all time previously served in this case. Id. at 45. At the time of the resentencing, the Appellant had served forty-one years of his original sentence. The newly imposed sentence of thirty-five years to life made the Appellant immediately eligible for parole consideration. Id. The Appellant was subsequently granted parole by the state of Pennsylvania and was released from prison.PCRA Court Opinion, 1/15/19, at 2-5.
On April 15, 2017, the Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, asserting that his new sentence was illegal. James F. Berardinelli, Esquire, was appointed counsel for the Appellant, and on March 31, 2018, counsel filed the "Defendant's Amended Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition" ("Amended Petition"). In the Amended Petition, counsel raised four claims concerning the illegality of the Appellant's sentence of thirty-five years to life: (1) that his sentence violated the holding of Miller and Montgomery ; (2) that the imposition of a maximum term of life violates the constitutional mandate of proportionality; (3) that the imposition of the maximum term of life violated the requirement of meaningful release based on demonstrated maturity; and (4) that no statutory sentencing scheme exists which authorizes the imposition of the sentence of thirty-five years to life.
On September 6, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a "Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" ("Commonwealth Response"). The Commonwealth agreed that the imposition of a mandatory maximum term of life was illegal in the Appellant's case. Commonwealth Response, p. 1. The Commonwealth asserted that "where defendants have demonstrated that they have been rehabilitated or that they have the capability of being rehabilitated, the mandatory imposition of continued, lifetime punishment is disproportionate, and violates the requirements of individualized sentencing set forth in Miller ." Commonwealth Response, p. 3. However, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has ruled otherwise, and admitted that, based on the current applicable law, the Court had no alternatives but to deny the Appellant's PCRA Petition. Commonwealth Response, p. 1.
On September 24, 2018, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss. Appellant did not respond, and on October 22, 2018, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. Did the lower court err in denying defendant's PCRA petition on the ground that the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment is unconstitutional in light to the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana , ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016)?Appellant's Brief at 3.
II. Did the lower court err in denying defendant's PCRA petition on the ground that the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment violates the constitutional mandate of proportionality?
III. Did the lower court err in denying defendant's PCRA petition on the ground that the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment is unconstitutional since it deprives him of a meaningful opportunity for release and to be free of supervision based upon demonstrated maturity?
IV. Did the lower court err in denying defendant's PCRA petition on the ground that the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment is unconstitutional since defendant can be sentenced to no more than 20-40 years for third degree murder since the only existing sentencing scheme in Pennsylvania for juveniles convicted prior to 2012 of first or second-degree murder has been invalidated?
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level." Commonwealth v. Stultz , 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel , 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard , 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court's findings that are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg , 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover, "When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Seskey , 170 A.3d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the certified record before us on appeal, and the PCRA court opinion filed on January 15, 2019. It is our conclusion that the PCRA court's opinion adequately and accurately addresses each of the challenges to the legality of his sentence presented by Appellant and properly concluded that each lacks merit. PCRA Court Opinion, 1/15/19, at 8-23. Consequently, Appellant's contrary arguments fail. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion and adopt its analysis as our own.
We conclude that Appellant's challenges to the legality of his sentence were resolved by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Batts , 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (" Batts II "). Since Batts II , this Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that the imposition of a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of first or second-degree murder is illegal. See Commonwealth v. Olds , 192 A.3d 1188, 1197-1198 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding imposition of mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment for juvenile defendant convicted of second-degree murder prior to Miller was constitutional), appeal denied, 199 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2018); Seskey , 170 A.3d at 1109 (holding trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it resentenced juvenile defendant convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller to term of 13 to 26 years of imprisonment; court was required to impose mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment); Commonwealth v. Battles , 169 A.3d 1086, 1089-1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding trial court's imposition of mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment upon resentencing of juvenile defendant convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller was legal).
Nevertheless, Appellant and the Commonwealth have essentially urged this Court to reconsider our holdings in Olds and Seskey. However, we must follow the decisional law established by our own Court. Blumenstock v. Gibson , 811 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2002). Moreover, we observe that, following our decision in Olds , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a subsequently filed petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Olds , 199 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2018). Therefore, unless or until Olds and Seskey are overturned by an en banc panel of this Court, or by a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, they continue to be viable precedent for this Court and for the courts of common pleas. See also Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 881, 882 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that, even though petition for allowance of appeal was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, decision remains binding precedent as long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court). Hence, we cannot grant Appellant and the Commonwealth the relief sought.
We note further that, to the extent Appellant and the Commonwealth rely upon Songster v. Beard , 201 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D.Pa. 2016) for support of their argument, in Olds we expressly rejected an appellant's reliance on Songster. See Olds , 192 A.3d at 1197 n.18 ("[W]e do not agree with Songster and hold that it is not binding authority in Pennsylvania.").
The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/12/19
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