Opinion
J. S42033/15 No. 2471 EDA 2014
07-31-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. JEFFREY PETER THOMPSON, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 28, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division No(s).: CP-15-CR-0000964-2005
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Pro se Appellant, Jeffrey Peter Thompson, appeals from the order entered in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his second Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition as untimely. He alleges his mental and physical disability should excuse the untimeliness of his petition, PCRA counsel was ineffective and the PCRA court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing or setting aside his negotiated guilty plea. We affirm.
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the PCRA court's decision. See PCRA Ct. Op., 10/21/14, at 1-2, 8-10. Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea on October 3, 2006, and did not file a direct appeal.
On June 12, 2014, pro se Appellant filed his second PCRA petition, which the court docketed on June 20, 2014. On June 25, 2014, pro se Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition, which the court docketed on June 30, 2014. Appellant alleged his petition is timely because his claim is based on facts previously unknown to him. Appellant's Pro se Amended PCRA Pet., 6/25/14, at ¶ 2. Appellant claims he has been mentally disabled since 1992, id. at ¶ 17, and thus his petition should be construed as timely filed. Id. at ¶ 22.
On July 3, 2014, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, and Appellant filed a response raising no new issues. On July 28, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition. Appellant timely appealed and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises the following issues:
The PCRA Court was remiss when it failed to make a credible determination on the "Newly Discovered Evidence", failed to develop any reasons for dismissal and for dismissing the petition without a hearing. Did this failure deny . . . Appellant the right to an appeal, correct any defects or supplement the record in support of the exception to the timebar?Appellant's Brief at 4.
The PCRA Court denied . . . Appellant his right to effective counsel when it became clear that the PCRA attorney was not advocating on Appellant's behalf, but instead was attempting to prove that . . . Appellant's claims were meritless in order to be granted to [sic] withdraw. Did this failure deny . . . Appellant the effective assistance of counsel on his first petition?
The PCRA Court erred when it failed to consider the limitations of a mentally and physically disabled pro se
Appellant and placed excessive burdon [sic] on . . . Appellant. Did the PCRA Court violate . . . Appellant's rights as a protected class when it; [sic] failed to broadly interpret . . . Appellant's right to relief and raised the stadard [sic] of due diligence and competency?
The PCRA Court was remiss for failing to set aside . . . Appellant's guilty plea that was motivated by a consitutionally [sic] defective confession, intimidated by threats to . . . Appellant and his family and was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Is . . . Appellant entitled to withdraw his guilty plea where . . . Appellant claims actual innocence, the evidence shows the guilty plea is tainted, not factual and violated his constitutional rights?
Before addressing the merits of Appellant's claims, our Supreme Court has required this Court to examine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the underlying PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Fahy , 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999). "Our standard of review of a PCRA court's dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Wilson , 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted). A PCRA petition "must normally be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final . . . unless one of the exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies and the petition is filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented." Commonwealth v. Copenhefer , 941 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa. 2007) (internal citations and footnote omitted).
Jurisdictional time limits go to a court's right or competency to adjudicate a controversy. These limitations are mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute permits. Unlike a statute of limitations, a jurisdictional time limitation is not subject to equitable principles such as tolling except as provided by statute. Thus, the filing period is only extended as permitted; in the case of the PCRA, the time limitations are extended upon satisfaction of the exceptions found in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) and timely filing pursuant to (b)(2). As it has been established that the PCRA's time restrictions are jurisdictional, we hold that the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, save to the extent the doctrine is embraced by § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).Fahy , 737 A.2d at 222 (citations omitted).
The three timeliness exceptions are:
(i) The failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
"[S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner to allege and prove a claim of 'after-discovered evidence.' Rather, it simply requires petitioner to allege and prove that there were 'facts' that were 'unknown' to him and that he exercised 'due diligence.'" Commonwealth v. Bennett , 930 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Pa. 2007) (footnote omitted). "If the petitioner alleges and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection." Id. at 1272. "The focus of the exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts." Commonwealth v. Marshall , 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Instantly, we review whether the PCRA court erred by holding Appellant's second PCRA petition was untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Fahy , 737 A.2d at 222. Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on November 2, 2006, thirty days after the trial court sentenced Appellant. Appellant filed the instant petition on June 12, 2014, almost eight years later. Thus, this Court must discern whether the PCRA court erred by holding Appellant did not plead and prove one of the three timeliness exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); Copenhefer , 941 A.2d at 648.
In this case, Appellant has not pleaded and proved any of the timeliness exceptions, particularly as he was aware of his mental disability in 1992, and thus this was known to him. Appellant's Pro se Amended PCRA Pet. at ¶ 17; Bennett , 930 A.2d at 1270. Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court's determination that Appellant has not properly invoked one of the three timeliness exceptions. See Copenhefer , 941 A.2d at 648; Fahy , 737 A.2d at 223. Thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition. See Fahy , 737 A.2d at 223. Having discerned no error of law, we affirm the order below. See Wilson , 824 A.2d at 333.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/2015
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