Opinion
18-P-686
05-01-2019
COMMONWEALTH v. ANTHONY THAMES.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Anthony Thames, appeals from a conviction after a Superior Court jury trial of unlawfully carrying a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). Concluding that the conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, we affirm.
The defendant was also tried on an indictment charging murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1. The jury could not reach a verdict on this charge, and a mistrial was declared. Two months later, the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13.
When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, "we consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 547 (2017). "The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014).
Here, an eyewitness testified that he heard gunshots and then turned around to look for the source of the shots. The eyewitness observed the defendant holding a gun out of the window of a motor vehicle. The eyewitness said, "It's me T-Rome, it's me." The eyewitness then observed the defendant shooting the gun toward him. This eyewitness evidence, by itself, was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty. See Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 619-620 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016).
The eyewitness testified that the gun was a "pistol." Another witness described it as a "handgun." See Commonwealth v. Sperrazza, 372 Mass. 667, 670 (1977) (description of weapon as "handgun" sufficient to find barrel length less than sixteen inches); Commonwealth v. Naylor, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 525 (2009) ("In light of the circumstances of the shooting described by the victims, including the close proximity of the two vehicles and the absence of any statement by either victim of having seen a barrel, the jury could reasonably infer that the shooter fired a handgun, rather than a shotgun or rifle"). Furthermore, the jury could have credited the ballistics evidence, found that the pistol admitted in evidence was the one used by the defendant, and observed the barrel length for themselves. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 307 (2010).
Furthermore, the eyewitness testified that he talked to the defendant after the shooting. The defendant explained that he "had beef" with "T-Y" and had no issues with the eyewitness. The defendant also said that "he had aim." Such statements may "tip[] the scale in favor of sufficiency." Commonwealth v. Summers, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 265 (2018).
The victim was not "T-Y" but rather, apparently, a bystander.
To be sure, there was significant impeachment of the eyewitness. The eyewitness suffered from schizoaffective disorder aggravated by his drug use. Indeed, the parties stipulated that, approximately two years after the shooting, the eyewitness reported experiencing hallucinations. The eyewitness had smoked "crack" cocaine the day of the shooting and, in fact, was spending the day earning crack cocaine by assisting in drug transactions. The eyewitness had a considerable criminal history, was imprisoned at the time of his testimony, and testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to recommend a reduction in his sentence. These factors may well explain the mistrial, but "[i]t is for the jury to make a determination of credibility, . . . and '[s]uch a determination does not inform whether there was sufficient evidence of the crime.'" Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 819 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 469 n.17 (2007). Accord Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509 (2016) ("It is for the jury to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence").
We discern no deterioration of the Commonwealth's evidence during the defendant's case. "[I]f the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the crime, the fact that the defendant has presented evidence that he did not does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence unless the contrary evidence is so overwhelming that no rational jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty." Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 381 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006). The clinical psychologist's testimony about the nature of paranoid schizophrenic disorder and other psychological conditions provided useful context for the jury to evaluate the eyewitness's credibility in light of his mental illness, but the determination of that credibility remained an issue for the jury. See Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 731 n.3 (2016); Commonwealth v. Halstrom, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 381 (2013).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Massing, Ditkoff & Wendlandt, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: May 1, 2019.