Opinion
J-S12042-17 No. 1437 MDA 2016
04-13-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANDREW CHRISTOPHER TEATS, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 31, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-21-CR-0002469-2015 BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Andrew Christopher Teats ("Teats") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
Teats was charged with the above-mentioned crime as a result of a police search of an inoperable vehicle that Teats had parked in a residential neighborhood. Teats filed an omnibus pretrial Motion to suppress the drug paraphernalia obtained by police as a result of the search. The suppression court denied the Motion. Subsequently, Teats waived his right to a jury trial, and moved for a "stipulated trial" wherein the trial court would reach a verdict based on a set of stipulated facts and the transcript of the suppression hearing. On August 23, 2016, the trial court granted Teats's Motion, found him guilty of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and sentenced him to one year of probation. Teats filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
The vehicle was owned by Teats's father. --------
On appeal, Teats raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court err in denying [Teats's] Motion to suppress physical evidence found during a warrantless search of [Teats's] vehicle[,] when there was no probable cause of evidence of a crime being found in the vehicle, nor any other exigent circumstances present to justify a search without a warrant?Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted).
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion,
[w]e may consider only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the suppression court's conclusions of law.Commonwealth v. Arter , 151 A.3d 149, 153 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). In reviewing questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id.
Teats contends that the police search of the vehicle was unconstitutional because it was conducted without a warrant or probable cause. Brief for Appellant at 9. Teats asserts that he had a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle because his father gave Teats permission to drive the vehicle, and Teats had paid his father for the vehicle. Id. at 10. Teats claims that the only evidence that police officers had prior to searching the car was (1) a call from concerned homeowners where the vehicle had been left, and their subsequent description of the driver; (2) three flat tires observed on the vehicle; and (3) the fact that the description of the driver did not match the photograph of the individual to whom the vehicle was registered. Id. at 11. Teats argues that the police officers "had no knowledge as to anything in [] Teats'[s] vehicle which by law would be subject to seizure and destruction." Id. at 11-12. Teats points out that the Commonwealth did not argue that Teats had constitutionally abandoned the vehicle as justification for the search. Id. at 13. Teats additionally argues that the initial search was conducted before the vehicle had been impounded, thereby rendering the search illegal. Id. at 16. Teats cites to the trial court's suggestion that police officers might have believed that exigent emergency circumstances justified the vehicle search, and contends that there was no evidence Teats needed emergency medical treatment. See id. at 18-19 (noting that the homeowners merely described a young man walking away from his vehicle). Teats asserts that the three flat tires on the vehicle did not provide the police with a basis to conclude that an emergency existed. Id. at 19. Finally, Teats challenges the trial court's reliance on 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746, which (1) imposed upon Teats a duty to report an accident to police, as his vehicle was inoperable; and (2) required police to conduct an investigation. Brief for Appellant at 19-20 (referencing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746(a)(2) and (c)). Teats claims that, while section 3746(c) authorizes police to conduct an investigation, it does not authorize police "to perform a warrantless search on a legally parked vehicle with no probable cause of a crime, no emergency circumstances, and without properly impounding the vehicle." Brief for Appellant at 20.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Teats's issue, set forth the undisputed facts of record and the relevant law, and determined that the issue lacks merit because the police "not only had probable cause to search the vehicle[,] but also had an investigative duty that was imposed by statute." See Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/16, at 1-4; see also id. at 2 (wherein the trial court noted that the police had searched "the unlocked vehicle at the driver's seat to look for identification and found none, looked in the center console and found drug paraphernalia, a pipe, and then looked in the back of the vehicle and found [Teats's] work identification."). We agree with the reasoning of the trial court, which is supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis. See id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Panella joins the memorandum.
Judge Ott concurs in the result. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/13/2017
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