Opinion
1688 MDA 2022 J-S29025-23
01-11-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. DANIEL MICHAEL TAYLOR Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 14, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-66-CR-0000129-2018
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.[*]
MEMORANDUM
KING, J.
Appellant, Daniel Michael Taylor, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Wyoming County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for burglary and criminal trespass. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i) and 3503(a)(1)(i), respectively.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with burglary, criminal trespass, and various summary offenses. Regarding the burglary charge, the criminal information alleged that Appellant entered an occupied structure and "commit[ed], attempt[ed] or threaten[ed] to commit a bodily injury crime therein, to wit, [Appellant] did break through a door to Mitchell Bly's apartment and began pushing him." (Criminal Information, filed 5/8/18, at 1). On July 27, 2020, the matter proceeded to a jury trial.
State Trooper Joseph Wasko testified that on February 11, 2018, he responded to a call for a disturbance at an apartment building. When he arrived at the scene, he encountered Appellant outside the apartment. Appellant identified himself as the owner of the building and informed Trooper Wasko that he was having issues with a tenant who was not paying rent. Shortly thereafter, Stephen Borel arrived at the property. Mr. Borel stated that he was the true owner of the property, and Appellant was a tenant who occupied one of the apartments. Trooper Wasko then spoke to Mitchell Bly, another tenant in the apartment building. Mr. Bly informed Trooper Wasko that Appellant gained access to Mr. Bly's apartment by kicking in the door. Upon entering the property, Trooper Wasko observed that the door to Mr. Bly's apartment was broken inwards with holes that seemed consistent with Mr. Bly's story. Trooper Wasko further noted that there were fragments of wood on the floor, indicating to him that the damage had occurred recently.
Mr. Borel testified that he owns the subject property and, at the relevant time, Appellant and Mr. Bly were tenants who occupied the two units on the second floor of the building. Mr. Borel stated that he did not authorize Appellant to collect rent from other tenants on his behalf. On the date of the incident, Mr. Borel received a call from Mr. Bly's girlfriend informing him that Appellant had broken into their apartment while Mr. Bly was present. When Mr. Borel arrived at the property, Trooper Wasko was already at the property attempting to calm Appellant. Mr. Borel noted that the door to Mr. Bly's apartment had been kicked in, and both the door and the door frame were broken. Winnie Crawford, Mr. Bly's girlfriend, testified that on the date of the incident, Mr. Bly was alone at their shared apartment. She testified that after receiving a text message from Mr. Bly, she called the police to alert them of the disturbance at their apartment.
Mr. Bly testified that he was sleeping in his apartment when he heard screaming outside and loud banging on his door, which continued for several minutes. Mr. Bly opened the door with the chain lock in place and attempted to talk to Appellant to calm him down. Appellant stated that he owned the building and Mr. Bly needed to pay rent to Appellant. Appellant then walked away from the door for a few minutes, and Mr. Bly shut the door. Mr. Bly texted Ms. Crawford to inform her of the situation and requested that she contact someone to help because he was worried about what Appellant would do. A few minutes later, Appellant began kicking the door to Mr. Bly's apartment unit. The bottom half of the door and the door frame broke, allowing Appellant to access the apartment. Appellant and another male entered the apartment, pushed Mr. Bly against a wall, and repeatedly demanded that Mr. Bly give Appellant money. During this interaction, Appellant held Mr. Bly in place by placing a finger on Mr. Bly's collarbone with one hand and raising his other hand in a fist. Mr. Bly testified that he was scared, and he expected to be harmed. Appellant then demanded that Mr. Bly call Mr. Borel. When Mr. Borel did not respond, Mr. Bly told Appellant that he would text Mr. Borel. Instead, Mr. Bly texted Ms. Crawford and repeated his request for help. Appellant and Mr. Bly then walked downstairs, and Appellant told Mr. Bly to go to the bank to retrieve money to pay him rent. Mr. Bly entered his car and drove away until he saw Trooper Wasko driving toward the apartment, at which point he returned to the apartment to speak with the trooper.
Following the presentation of evidence, the court instructed the jury on the elements of burglary as follows:
The elements being that in order to find the defendant guilty of [burglary], you must find that the following elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant in this matter entered 114 2nd Street, Apartment 1 in Laceyville. Two, that 114 2nd Street, Apartment 1 in Laceyville was a building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof that was adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time of the offense that any person was present. And third, that the defendant threatened to commit a bodily injury crime therein. A bodily―the bodily injury crime as applicable here would be the threat to commit simple assault.(N.T. Trial, 7/27/20, at 194) (emphasis added). The court did not instruct the jury on simple assault, and neither Appellant nor the Commonwealth objected to the instructions.
The jury found Appellant guilty of burglary and criminal trespass. On July 14, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of of 36 to 120 months of incarceration. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence on Monday, July 26, 2021. On August 4, 2021, the court granted the motion in part and reduced the amount of restitution. The court denied all other parts of the motion. Following reinstatement of his appellate rights, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc on October 26, 2022. On October 31, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. Appellant complied on November 18, 2022.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the Commonwealth fail, as a matter of law, to sustain its burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant committed, attempted to or did threaten to commit a bodily injury crime under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i) against the complainant, Mr. Bly?(Appellant's Brief at 2).
Although the Commonwealth did not charge Appellant with simple assault, Appellant contends that the court instructed the jury that it must find that Appellant threatened to commit simple assault as an element of burglary. Appellant asserts Mr. Bly's testimony established that Appellant did not physically harm Mr. Bly, and Appellant only touched Mr. Bly's body with one finger. While Appellant acknowledges that he raised his other hand in the form of a fist, Appellant argues that he did not swing his fist at Mr. Bly or attempt to hurt Mr. Bly in any other manner. Appellant further asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant's actions placed Mr. Bly in fear of imminent serious bodily injury because Appellant did not verbally threaten Mr. Bly or wield any weapon. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he attempted to cause bodily injury to Mr. Bly or acted in a physically menacing manner as to put Mr. Bly in fear of serious bodily injury. Appellant concludes "because the Commonwealth failed to establish that [Appellant] engaged in what amounted to simple assault, and simple assault was an element of the burglary charge as a result of the jury instruction, the Commonwealth failed to establish an essential element of burglary." (Id. at 19). We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is as follows:
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's convictions will be upheld.Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 2013)).
The version of Section 3502 of the Crimes Code that was in effect at the time of Appellant's offenses defined burglary, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 3502. Burglary
(a) Offense defined.-A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the person:
(1)(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present and the person commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein;
* * *18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i) (effective Jan. 3, 2017 to Sept. 8, 2022).
"[I]n order to secure a conviction for burglary, the Commonwealth is not required to allege or prove what particular crime Appellant intended to commit after his forcible entry into the private residence." Commonwealth v. Alston, 539 Pa. 202, 207, 651 A.2d 1092, 1094 (1994). Nevertheless, "[w]hen the Commonwealth does specify, in the information or indictment, the crime defendant intended to commit, the Commonwealth must prove the requisite intent for that particular crime in order to prove a burglary or attempted burglary." Commonwealth v. Brown, 886 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 743, 902 A.2d 969 (2006) (emphasis added).
A bodily injury crime is defined, in relevant part, as "[a]n act, attempt or threat to commit an act which would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under…Chapter 27 (relating to assault)." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e). In this case, the trial court specified in its jury instruction that the bodily injury crime in question was the threat to commit simple assault. Simple assault is defined, in relevant part, as:
§ 2701. Simple assault
(a) Offense defined.-Except as provided under section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
* * *
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; []
* * *18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a).
Instantly, Appellant concedes that the Commonwealth did not charge him with simple assault or specify an underlying crime in the criminal information as it related to the burglary charge. Nevertheless, Appellant claims that because the court's instructions to the jury specified that the bodily injury crime in this case was the threat to commit simple assault, the Commonwealth was required to establish the elements of simple assault to prove burglary.
Appellant cites to our Supreme Court's recent holding in Commonwealth v. Baker-Myers, __Pa.__, 255 A.3d 223 (2021) to support his claim. In Baker-Meyers, the appellant was charged with rape, sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors. When instructing the jury on the elements of corruption of minors, the court instructed the jury that it must find "any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31, relating to the other sexual offenses being rape, sexual assault, indecent assault, corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor…." Id. at _, 255 A.3d at 226. The jury returned a verdict finding the appellant guilty of corruption of minors but not guilty of the other sexual offenses charged. In holding that the appellant's corruption of minors conviction could not stand, our Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Superior Court properly determined the language "in violation of Chapter 31" is an essential element of a felony corruption of minors offense under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). Although the Commonwealth is not required to formally charge or secure a conviction for a predicate Chapter 31 offense, where, as here, the jury is specifically instructed on the predicate offense or offenses pertaining to the corruption of minors charge, and the jury then renders an acquittal on all such predicates, a conviction for felony corruption of minors cannot stand.Id. at _, 255 A.3d at 235.
Appellant's reliance on Baker-Myers is misguided. Our Supreme Court did not conclude that the jury instruction expanded the Commonwealth's burden of proof. Rather, the Court determined that the corruption of minors statute required the Commonwealth to establish that the appellant engaged in a course of conduct in violation of an offense under Chapter 31 as an element of corruption of minors. The Court also reinforced the notion that the Commonwealth was not required to formally charge or convict the appellant of the predicate offense to support a corruption of minors conviction. The Commonwealth, however, did charge the appellant with the predicate sexual offenses specified by the court. Because the jury was instructed on those predicate offenses, and the jury specifically acquitted the appellant of those charges, the appellant's corruption of minors conviction could not stand.
Here, the Commonwealth did not charge Appellant with simple assault. The jury was not instructed on the elements of simple assault, and the jury did not specifically acquit Appellant of simple assault. As such, Baker-Myers does not support Appellant's contention that his burglary conviction cannot stand because the Commonwealth failed to establish sufficient evidence of the elements of simple assault.
Additionally, this Court considered a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Jones, 276 A.3d 206 (Pa.Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, __ Pa. __, 284 A.3d 880 (2022). In Jones, the appellant argued that the Commonwealth was required to establish as an element of burglary that the appellant entered the home with the specific intent to assault the victim. The appellant based his argument, in part, on the fact that the court, in its instructions to the jury regarding the elements of burglary, stated that the Commonwealth was alleging that the appellant entered the structure with the intent to assault the victim. Citing Alston, supra, this Court held that regardless of the trial court's jury instruction, the Commonwealth was not required to prove that the appellant entered the home with the intent to commit a specific crime unless it had specified the crime in the indictment or information. Similarly, in the instant case, the Commonwealth did not specify simple assault in the criminal information or charge Appellant with simple assault. As such, the trial court's statement in the jury instructions is not sufficient to expand the Commonwealth's burden by requiring proof of simple assault to sustain the burglary conviction. See Alston, supra; Jones, supra. To the extent that Appellant is arguing that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellant committed, attempted to, or threatened to commit a bodily injury crime, the court determined that the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Appellant threatened to commit simple assault after entering the residence. The jury heard testimony that Appellant kicked in Mr. Bly's door after loudly banging on the door for several minutes. Appellant entered the residence with a friend, pushed and crowded Mr. Bly against a wall, held Mr. Bly against the wall with a finger against his collarbone, and raised his fist in a position to strike while demanding money from Mr. Bly. Mr. Bly testified that he was intimidated, and he expected to be struck during this encounter.
See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (stating non-precedential decisions of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Appellant threatened to commit a bodily injury crime. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i); Sebolka, supra. Appellant's menacing actions and the surrounding circumstances were sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant threatened to cause bodily injury to Mr. Bly while in his residence. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a). As such, Appellant has failed to establish that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his burglary conviction, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.