Commonwealth v. Stone

Full title: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. DONALD JAMES STONE

Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: May 30, 2017

J-S19022-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. May. 30, 2017)

Opinion

J-S19022-17 No. 1657 MDA 2016

05-30-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. DONALD JAMES STONE

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001762-2015 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. and STEVENS, P.J.E.^* DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. --------

I respectfully dissent, as I would find Dr. Stone freely volunteered his self-incriminating statement to Captain Waltman during a break in his interrogation. No question had been put to Dr. Stone when he asked to add to his written statement, as Trooper Wool, who was conducting the investigation, was outside of the prison performing a consent search of Stone's car at the time. In this regard, Trooper Wool's request to search Dr. Stone's vehicle and the consent search that followed were not the functional equivalent of an interrogation, as neither was likely to elicit an incriminating response from Stone. See United States v. Bustamante , 493 F.3d 879, 892 (7^th Cir. 2007) (holding that "though all interrogation must cease once a defendant in custody has invoked his right to counsel, a request to search a vehicle or home is not likely to elicit an incriminating response and is therefore not interrogation."). Without questioning, there could have been no response, and Dr. Stone's statement is, thus, better understood as a spontaneous, voluntary utterance outside the scope of Miranda than it is the product of an interrogation.

While the better practice may have been to provide Dr. Stone with Miranda warnings, the setting was not so inherently coercive to require them. Dr. Stone had been advised that his status as a contracting physician placed him beyond the reach of a Department of Corrections policy subjecting employees to adverse employment decisions if they failed to comply with investigations. Captain Waltman also told Stone he was not under arrest and would probably be free to go home by the end of the day. Furthermore, Dr. Stone was an educated person, a physician who was at his place of employment at the time in question, and there is no evidence that Captain Waltman or Trooper Wool engaged in misleading or intimidating tactics designed to elicit an incriminating statement.

The facts, therefore, indicate that Dr. Stone offered his self-incriminating statement independently of official questioning or conduct such that it should not be subject to suppression. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.