Opinion
No. 15–P–523.
10-25-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Jonathan STEWART.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Jonathan Stewart, appeals from the judgments after his convictions on numerous indictments for assault and battery directed against the mother of his daughter and on numerous indictments for sex crimes directed against his daughter, who was five years old at the time of the crimes. The defendant claims that the trial judge erred by giving the jury an instruction on consciousness of guilt, which is reprinted in the margin. We affirm.
The judge instructed:
“You have heard evidence suggesting that Mr. Stewart may have made intentionally false statements to Detective Mercado at the Lowell Police Department after his arrest. If the Commonwealth has proven the defendant did intentionally make false statements, you may consider whether such actions indicate feelings of guilt by the defendant and whether in turn such feelings of guilt might tend to show actual guilt on these charges.
“You are not required to draw such inferences and you should not do so unless they appear reasonable in light of all the circumstances in this case. If you decide that such inferences are reasonable, it is up to you to decide how much importance to give them. You should always remember that there may be numerous reasons why an innocent person might do such things. Such conduct does not necessarily reflect feelings of guilt. Please bear in mind that a person having feelings of guilt is not necessarily guilty in fact, for such feelings are sometimes found in innocent people. And, finally, remember that standing alone such evidence is never by itself sufficient to convict a person of a crime. You may not find Mr. Stewart guilty on such evidence alone, but if you find it reasonable you may consider it in your deliberations along with all the other evidence.”
Detective Carlos Mercado testified that he interviewed the defendant at the Lowell police station after the defendant's arrest, the defendant having waived his Miranda rights. After the defendant answered a number of questions regarding his relationship with the mother, and whether their arguments were physical, Mercado informed the defendant that the mother had made allegations that he had sexually assaulted the child. The defendant repeatedly told Mercado that this was the first time he had heard such allegations, and that the mother had never told him about them.
The judge instructed the jury that to the extent Mercado repeated the mother's allegations, those statements were not admitted for their truth, but only to show the defendant's state of mind while talking to the detective.
In contrast to Mercado's testimony, the defendant's wife (not the mother) testified that prior to his arrest, the defendant told her that he had overheard the mother “on the phone pretty much setting him up” for allegations of sexual assault of his daughter. The mother testified that the defendant screamed at her, saying, “[H]ow could you ever think I touched my daughter,” and also told her that he would never return to her because she had made these allegations.
On this state of the evidence, the judge did not abuse her discretion in giving a consciousness of guilt instruction. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 465 Mass. 733, 738 (2013). A defendant's unequivocal denials of accusations may not serve as the foundation for a consciousness of guilt instruction. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 453 Mass. 266, 273–274 (2009). However, “[f]alse statements to police may be considered as consciousness of guilt if there is other evidence tending to prove the falsity of the statements.” Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 71 (1996). In Robles, much like the present case, in his statements to the police the defendant denied any knowledge of the crime with which he was charged. Id. at 70. Because “[f]urther evidence suggested that the defendant had been told of the [crime] prior to his arrest,” the jury could conclude that his denials of knowledge of the crime “were false and deliberately made to mislead the police,” and an instruction on consciousness of guilt was appropriate. Id. at 71. Here, too, the evidence warranted the instruction.