Opinion
J-S07027-20 No. 1030 EDA 2019
03-27-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. FLINT STATON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000671-2013, CP-39-CR-0000681-2013 BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Flint Staton, appeals from the order entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.
In its opinion, the PCRA court accurately set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises five issues for our review:
WHETHER [THE] APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED GIVEN THE BRIGHT-LINE DIRECTIVE OF COMMONWEALTH V. WALKER , [646 PA. 456, 185 A.3D 969 (2018)] BECAUSE ONE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED FOR TWO DOCKET NUMBERS?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR BY CONCLUDING THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY AND MOTIVE OF THE VICTIM BY CROSS-EXAMINING HER ON AN EXTRA-MARITAL AFFAIR?(Appellant's Brief at 6-7).
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR BY CONCLUDING THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO VOLUMINOUS EXHIBITS THAT WERE IRRELEVANT AND MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE AND BY FINDING TRIAL COUNSEL'S STRATEGY TO HAVE BEEN REASONABLE?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR BY CONCLUDING THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBTAIN OR INTRODUCE A RECEIPT THAT WOULD HAVE CORROBORATED [APPELLANT]'S TESTIMONY?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR BY CONCLUDING COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SEEK REVIEW ON DIRECT...APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON A MOTION IN LIMINE; THE COURT'S RULING PERMITTED PRIOR BAD ACTS TO BE INTRODUCED TO THE JURY[?]
In his first issue, Appellant concedes the Commonwealth filed charges against him at two separate criminal docket numbers. Nevertheless, Appellant asserts that all charges were heard together at the preliminary hearing and at every subsequent judicial proceeding, including his jury trial. Appellant maintains he filed a single direct appeal from the judgment of sentence at both underlying docket numbers, which this Court disposed of at one Superior Court docket number. Appellant contends he filed the current PCRA petition listing both underlying docket numbers, and the PCRA court denied relief at both underlying docket numbers in a single order. Appellant highlights the court's explanation of appellate rights in the order denying PCRA relief, which states: "The defendant is advised that he has the right to appeal this order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania by filing a notice of appeal with the Clerk of Courts of Lehigh County." (Appellant's Brief at 11) (emphasis in original). Appellant emphasizes that this Court has found a breakdown in the operations of the court, where the trial court misinformed an appellant of his right to file a notice of appeal even though that appellant had been sentenced at two criminal docket numbers. Appellant insists there would be no prejudice to the Commonwealth by allowing the appeal to proceed, and he claims the Commonwealth has no objection to merits review. Appellant concludes this Court should decline to quash the appeal under Walker , and review the merits of his appeal. We agree.
On June 1, 2018, our Supreme Court held in Walker , supra , that the common practice of filing a single notice of appeal from an order involving more than one docket will no longer be tolerated, because the practice violates Pa.R.A.P. 341, which requires the filing of "separate appeals from an order that resolves issues arising on more than one docket." Walker , supra at 469, 185 A.3d at 977. The failure to file separate appeals under these circumstances generally "requires the appellate court to quash the appeal." Id. Absent extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or some breakdown in the processes of the court, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely appeal. Commonwealth v. Patterson , 940 A.2d 493 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 599 Pa. 691, 960 A.2d 838 (2008).
In Commonwealth v. Stansbury , 219 A.3d 157 (Pa.Super. 2019), this Court declined to quash an appeal under Walker , where the PCRA court had misinformed the appellant about the manner in which to take an appeal. This Court explained:
In the case sub judice, the PCRA court advised [a]ppellant that he could appeal the dismissal of his PCRA petition by filing within thirty days a notice of appeal from its order. The court, still referring to its order that disposed of a PCRA petition pending at two separate docket numbers, again utilized the singular in advising [a]ppellant where to file "Said notice of appeal." Order, 1/4/19 (emphasis added). Hence, while Walker required that [a]ppellant file separate notices of appeal at each docket number, the PCRA court informed [a]ppellant that he could pursue appellate review by filing a single notice of appeal.Id. at 160 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
We conclude that such misstatements as to the manner that [a]ppellant could effectuate an appeal from the PCRA court's order amount to a breakdown in the court operations such that we may overlook the defective nature of [a]ppellant's [otherwise] timely notice of appeal rather than quash pursuant to Walker. Therefore, we shall proceed to address the substance of this appeal.
Instantly, the PCRA court denied relief by order entered March 22, 2019. The order listed both underlying criminal docket numbers in the caption. The order states:
AND NOW, this 22nd day of March 2019, upon consideration of [Appellant's] petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (PCRA), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said petition is DENIED and DISMISSED.
[Appellant] is advised that he has a right to appeal this order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania by filing a Notice of
Appeal with the Clerk of Courts of Lehigh County—Criminal Division, within 30 days of the date of this order. The Clerk is directed, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(E), to forward a copy of this order to [Appellant] by certified mail, return receipt requested.(Order, filed 3/22/19, at 1). Here, the PCRA court misinformed Appellant about the manner in which to take an appeal, by using the singular when referring to Appellant's ability to file "a" notice of appeal. The court's misstatement in this regard constitutes a breakdown in the operations of the court such that we may overlook the defective nature of Appellant's otherwise timely notice of appeal. See Stansbury , supra. Therefore, we decline to quash the appeal under Walker , and will review the appeal on the merits.
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the record evidence supports the court's determination and whether the court's decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ford , 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 A.2d 319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd , 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). If the record supports a post-conviction court's credibility determination, it is binding on the appellate court. Commonwealth v. Dennis , 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297 (2011).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable James T. Anthony, we conclude Appellant's issues two through five merit no relief. The PCRA court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of those questions. ( See Opinion in Support of Order, filed March 22, 2019, at 2-8) (finding: (issue 2) at PCRA hearing, Appellant testified that he told trial counsel Victim was having affair with ex-employee of Appellant's seafood business; trial counsel testified that Appellant did not mention any affair with that person, but told trial counsel Victim was having affair with Sergeant Hoats, who was affiant in this case; trial counsel testified that Appellant provided counsel no evidence of alleged affair besides Appellant's observation that Sergeant Hoats touched Victim's arm after one court proceeding in this matter; trial counsel did not have reason to believe Victim was having affair with Sergeant Hoats based solely on Appellant's suspicions; further, Appellant failed to demonstrate outcome of trial would have differed if counsel had questioned Victim about alleged affair; thus, trial counsel was not ineffective on this ground; (issue 3) counsel had reasonable trial strategy for declining to object to admission of numerous exhibits which depicted various items in trunk of Appellant's car; Appellant contended that he did not know gun was in his car; counsel testified at PCRA hearing that allowing jury to view so many random, innocuous items in Appellant's trunk would support Appellant's position; thus, counsel was not ineffective on this ground; (issue 4) trial counsel testified he could not recall if Appellant had told him about Wawa receipt prior to trial, but counsel did not believe receipt would have been helpful at trial in any event; Appellant testified that he went to Wawa at approximately 4:00 a.m., one hour before police pulled him over; thus, Wawa receipt would not have disproved allegation that Appellant was following Victim when police stopped him; further, Appellant did not raise alibi defense alleging he was somewhere else at time police reported seeing Appellant following Victim; Appellant cannot establish prejudice to succeed on this ineffectiveness claim; (issue 5) trial counsel testified that he did not raise on direct appeal trial court's denial of Appellant's motion in limine to preclude "prior bad acts" evidence because after researching issue, trial counsel believed court properly admitted that evidence to establish course of conduct; trial court properly admitted evidence of prior bad acts in this case (namely, PFA and non-consensual sexual encounter between Appellant and Victim that occurred in 2011), so underlying claim lacks arguable merit; trial counsel was not ineffective on this ground). Accordingly, we affirm based on the PCRA court's opinion.
Appellant claims the affair gave Victim a motive to fabricate the allegations against Appellant, and Appellant wanted trial counsel to cross-examine Victim about the affair to undermine her credibility.
We direct the parties to attach a copy of the PCRA court's March 22, 2019 opinion to all future filings pertaining to our disposition of this appeal.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/27/2020
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