Opinion
J. A10006/17 No. 3563 EDA 2015
05-31-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ALEKSANDE SHWARZ, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0004424-2011 BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:
Appellant, Aleksande Shwarz, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following his convictions after a jury trial of Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, Unsworn Falsification to Authorities, False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities, Official Oppression, and False Imprisonment. After careful review, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's August 31, 2016 Opinion.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5101; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4906; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5301; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2903, respectively.
The underlying facts, as gleaned from the certified record and the trial court's 1925(a) Opinion, are as follows. On March 4, 2010, the general manager of a U-Haul in Philadelphia ("Complainant"), contacted the Philadelphia Police Department about a previously stolen company vehicle. A towing company had returned the stolen vehicle from Delaware County to the Philadelphia U-Haul, and company protocol required the Complainant to report this information to police in order to remove the vehicle from the database of stolen vehicles. The Complainant had previously called police when this had happened and each time the police officers would quickly resolve the issue.
U-Haul could not rent out the vehicle while it was on the stolen vehicle list because customers would be subject to potential police stops.
When Philadelphia Police Officers Aleksande Shwarz ("Appellant") and John Loisch responded to the U-Haul, they informed the complainant—incorrectly—that they could not help him because the vehicle had been recovered in another county. The officers then told the Complainant to contact Delaware County police instead.
The Complainant grew frustrated and asked for a supervisor and for both Appellant and Officer Loisch's badge numbers so that he could include this information in a formal complaint. While Officer Loisch complied, Appellant refused to provide his badge number. The Complainant obtained Appellant's badge number by looking at Appellant's uniform, and then left the building to record the patrol car number. Appellant and Officer Loisch followed the Complainant outside. While Officer Loisch entered the patrol car, Appellant stood near the Complainant as he recorded the officers' patrol car number. Appellant and the Complainant exchanged sarcastic comments, and an altercation ensued, as follows:
Complainant then began walking back towards the front door of U-Haul when [A]ppellant stated "hey" and reached for [C]omplainant's arm. While [A]ppellant went to grab [C]omplainant, [C]omplainant dropped his right shoulder in a ducking motion and stated[,] "don't touch me." Complainant continued to make his way back to the front door of U-Haul while [A]ppellant repeatedly stated "hey, hey." As [C]omplainant opened U-Haul's front door, [A]ppellant took control of [C]omplainant by the neck and slammed [C]omplainant against the door. Appellant instructed [C]omplainant to get down on his stomach and stated that [C]omplainant had "hit a police officer." Complainant complied with [A]ppellant's request to get down, at which time [C]omplainant was taken into police custody.Trial Court Opinion, dated 8/31/16, at 4 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Complainant was transported to a police station two (2) miles from the U-Haul location and placed in a holding cell. Detective Lawrence Grimm of the Philadelphia Police Department Northeast Detectives Division (hereinafter "Detective Grimm") subsequently took statements from both [C]omplainant and [A]ppellant regarding what had transpired at U-Haul. On the basis of the interviews, [C]omplainant was charged with [S]imple [A]ssault and [R]ecklessly [E]ndangering [A]nother [P]erson. Approximately twenty-two (22) hours after the instant incident began, [] [C]omplainant [] was [] released [and police dropped all charges.]
Appellant was then charged with Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, Unsworn Falsification to Authorities, False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities, Official Oppression, and False Imprisonment. On May 18, 2015, a jury found Appellant guilty of the above-stated offenses.
On July 21, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of time-served to 23 months' imprisonment with immediate parole. Appellant timely filed a Post-Sentence Motion, which the trial court denied on November 16, 2015.
On November 24, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Did the lower trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the Appellant that any contact however slight between the complainant and the Appellant police officer could be sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the complainant for the offense of simple assault?Appellant's Brief at 3.
Our standard of review in assessing a trial court's jury instruction is as follows:
When evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We further note that[] it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.Commonwealth v. Antidormi , 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014). "The trial court is not required to give every charge that is requested by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal." Commonwealth v. Sandusky , 77 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2013).
The Honorable Edward C. Wright, sitting as the trial court, has authored a comprehensive, thorough, and well-reasoned Opinion, citing to the record and relevant case law in addressing Appellant's claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/31/16, at 5-9 (concluding it properly rejected Appellant's jury instruction because: (1) Appellant requested a jury instruction on irrelevant civil principles of tort law, which "would have misled the jury regarding a material issue[;]" and (2) the trial court provided additional instructions on probable cause at Appellant's request where appropriate, including supplementing the standard jury instruction defining Official Oppression). The record supports the trial court's conclusions and we discern no abuse of discretion or inaccurate statement in the jury instruction. We affirm on the basis of the trial court's August 31, 2016 Opinion.
Appellant strategically decided not to request that the trial court provide the jury with a definition of Simple Assault using the standard criminal jury instruction. That standard criminal jury instruction includes additional elements regarding criminal intent, which Appellant carefully omitted from his nonstandard civil instruction that he submitted to the trial court. This transparent request for a nonstandard instruction shows the underlying strategic decision, which had little to do with clarifying relevant legal principles for the jury. --------
The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial court's August 31, 2016 Opinion to all future filings.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/31/2017
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