Commonwealth v. Scott

55 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Janosky, No

    No. CR000468 (Mass. Cmmw. Sep. 21, 2001)

    Mere repetition, though susceptible to criticism, is not unnecessarily suggestive and cannot alone justify exclusion of an identification. Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 826 (1990); Paszko. 391 Mass. at 171. Despite the increased probability of misidentification created by the Peabody Police identification procedure. the procedure is not unnecessarily suggestive.

  2. Commonwealth v. Janosky, No

    No. 00-0468 (Mass. Cmmw. Sep. 21, 2001)

    Mere repetition, though susceptible to criticism, is not unnecessarily suggestive and cannot alone justify exclusion of an identification.Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 826 (1990); Paszko, 391 Mass. at 171. Despite the increased probability of misidentification created by the Peabody Police identification procedure, the procedure is not unnecessarily suggestive.

  3. Commonwealth v. Facella

    478 Mass. 393 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 49 times
    In Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 403-404, 85 N.E.3d 665 (2017), the Commonwealth introduced prior attacks on two unrelated persons to rebut a defense that the charged attack was caused by medication.

    The defendant is correct that, typically, prior bad act evidence must share a relatively close temporal proximity to the charged crime. See, e.g., Butler, 445 Mass. at 573, 575, 839 N.E.2d 307 (approving admission of prior bad acts that occurred three years before charged crime, to show hostile nature of relationship between defendant and victim); Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 819 & n.8, 564 N.E.2d 370 (1990) (same, when prior bad acts occurred two and five days before victim was killed). On the other hand, even a very close temporal nexus does not necessarily render evidence of prior bad acts admissible.

  4. Commonwealth v. Sullivan

    478 Mass. 369 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 53 times
    Agreeing with motion judge that defendant was able to make general point to jury without undisclosed Brady evidence

    In order to prove that a defendant is guilty of felony-murder in the first degree, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was killed during the defendant's commission or attempted commission of a felony with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 821 n.10, 564 N.E.2d 370 (1990). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807โ€“808, 81 N.E.3d 1173 (2017) (prospectively requiring actual malice for conviction of felony-murder).

  5. Commonwealth v. Gomes

    470 Mass. 352 (Mass. 2015)   Cited 109 times
    Concluding that "there are scientific principles regarding eyewitness identification that are โ€˜so generally acceptedโ€™ that it is appropriate in the future to instruct juries regarding these principles"

    Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255, 27 A.3d 872. See Collins, supra at 262 n. 9, 21 N.E.3d 528, citing Study Group Report, supra at 78โ€“79 (โ€œAn eyewitness may recall the defendant's face, but not recall that the source of the eyewitness's memory was the defendant's presence in a pretrial lineup or photographic array rather than the defendant's presence at the scene of the crimeโ€); Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 826, 564 N.E.2d 370 (1990) (โ€œdanger of misidentification is increased if the photograph of the same individual is included in different arraysโ€); Lawson 352 Or. at 784 (Appendix), 291 P.3d 673. When pairs of subjects viewed a crime and discussed who they believed was the culprit, researchers concluded that โ€œpost-identification feedback does not have to be presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g. police officer) in order to affect a witness'[s] subsequent crime-related judgments.โ€

  6. Commonwealth v. Carey

    463 Mass. 378 (Mass. 2012)   Cited 37 times
    Describing our holding in Wallace

    See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 757, 765โ€“766, 877 N.E.2d 260 (2007) (where defendant alleged that touching of child victim's breast was accidental, presence of photographs of fully clothed young girls, photographs of nude adult men and women, pornographic magazines containing pictures of teenage girls and small-sized underwear in his automobile was relevant to and probative of whether touching was intentional). See also Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 820 n. 9, 564 N.E.2d 370 (1990), citing Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 469โ€“472, 441 N.E.2d 248 (1982) (defendant's possession of magazine article about serial killings admissible as evidence of sexual desire and contemplation of modus operandi, where circumstances surrounding manner of death were sufficiently similar). The article similarly relates to the defendant's interestin and research of strangulation murders, even though it reported an incident void of sexual overtones.

  7. Commonwealth v. Barbosa

    463 Mass. 116 (Mass. 2012)   Cited 78 times
    Excluding weapons of different caliber

    The Commonwealth is entitled to question its own witness about inconsistent statements. Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 824 n. 14, 564 N.E.2d 370 (1990). See Mass. G. Evid., supra at ยง 613(a)(1).

  8. Commonwealth v. Bregoli

    431 Mass. 265 (Mass. 2000)   Cited 41 times
    Upholding motion judge's determination that defendants not prejudiced by Commonwealth's failure to produce exculpatory evidence that did not "carry a measure of strength in support" of defendant

    Such evidence may only be admitted when the acts of the other person are "so closely connected in point of time and method of operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of [the] defendant as the person who committed the crime." Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 816 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267 (1979). Whether the evidence sought to be admitted meets that test is in the discretion of the trial judge.

  9. Commonwealth v. Maimoni

    41 Mass. App. Ct. 321 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 12 times

    Further, the evidence could support an inference of a plan or pattern of conduct to bring women aboard for sexual adventure, see Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 672-673 (1981); Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 469-473 (1982); Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 793-794 (1994), and here the house-buying pretext or enticement in Farmer's case could find a counterpart in the defendant's own testimony that the (ostensible) purpose of the agreed meeting with Martha on the boat at Willows pier was to discuss Martha's resume. Still further and most important, the episodes could be taken as illustrative of the defendant's mental state at the time, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 819-820 (1990); see also Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269, 275-276 (1987); Commonwealth v. Phinney, 416 Mass. 364, 375 (1993), here a mood of sexual aggressiveness (probably bred, as the judge suggested, of sexual frustration) leading to his staging sailing trips with women and extending to genital displays and, in Farmer's case, attempts at force aimed at physical seduction (with the woman being in effect imprisoned at the time on a sailboat miles offshore). We note also that as the defendant was himself offering (expert) testimony about his psychological makeup and his mental state at the time to explain and possibly condone his behavior toward Martha, his lies to the police, and his final flight, the Commonwealth was entitled in response to introduce evidence likewise bearing on mental state.

  10. Doe v. Lyons, No

    No. 96-0341 (Mass. Cmmw. Dec. 23, 1996)   Cited 2 times

    It does not follow from the fact that the legislature has designated a particular type of report not to be "public" that the legislature also has circumscribed a litigant's right to access to pertinent police records under the discovery provisons of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Just as c. 41, ยง 97D does not prohibit a defendant in a criminal proceeding from obtaining access to a police report that contains exculpatory and potentially material information, Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 817, n. 4 (1990), so too it does not prohibit disclosure in a civil action pursuant to a court order enforcing a validly issued subpoena upon a non-party. Cf. Boston Police Superior officers Fed'n v. Boston, 414 Mass. 458 (1993) (public records law does not restrict a commission's power to subpeona police files); Martinelli v. District Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1093-1094 (Colo.