Opinion
14-P-1974
04-01-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. EDUAN S. RUIZ.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant was convicted, after a bench trial, of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute heroin, and a school zone violation for each possession charge. On appeal, he argues that his motion to suppress was erroneously denied because the search was based on information from a confidential informant who did not meet the requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). We affirm.
"When reviewing a motion to suppress, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error,' but 'independently review the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'" Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 628 (2015), quoting from Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 682 (2010). For statements of confidential informants to be used in the assessment of probable cause under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, "the Commonwealth must demonstrate some of the underlying circumstances from which (a) the informant gleaned his information (the 'basis of knowledge' test), and (b) the law enforcement officials could have concluded the informant was credible or reliable (the 'veracity' test)." Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 896 (1990). Both prongs "must be separately considered and satisfied." Commonwealth v. Parapar, 404 Mass. 319, 321 (1989).
The Aguillar-Spinelli test was easily met here. The level of detail given by the confidential informant was similar to that found sufficient in Commonwealth v. Parapar, supra at 321-322, and Commonwealth v. Allen, 406 Mass. 575, 578 (1990), to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. Those details were "consistent with personal observation, not mere recitation of a casual rumor." Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 301 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 438 Mass. 372, 374 (2003). Moreover, the details provided by the confidential informant were in all respects corroborated by the police. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 403 Mass. 163, 166 (1988). The veracity prong was satisfied by the evidence (and findings) that the confidential informant had previously provided information leading to arrests and convictions. See Commonwealth v. Avery, 365 Mass. 59, 62-64 (1974); Commonwealth v. Perez-Baez, 410 Mass. 43, 45-46 (1991); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 300 (1991). Moreover, the confidential information was not an anonymous tipster. See Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 515 (2007) ("[W]e accord more weight to the reliability of those who are identified").
For these reasons, we conclude that the judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Wolohojian, Carhart & Kinder, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: April 1, 2016.