Opinion
J-A20004-17 No. 1683 MDA 2016
10-13-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JEFFERY LLOYD ROHRBAUGH Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered September 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000422-2015 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Jeffery Lloyd Rohrbaugh, appeals from the order entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. We affirm.
Appellant's first name is spelled variously throughout the certified record as both "Jeffery" and "Jeffrey." --------
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE FORMER OFFENSE AND THE CURRENT OFFENSE WERE NOT BASED ON THE SAME CRIMINAL CONDUCT OR DID
NOT ARISE FROM THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE FOR THE PURPOSES OF DISMISSAL UNDER [18 PA.C.S.A § 110]?(Appellant's Brief at 4).
A claim regarding compulsory joinder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, although interlocutory, is immediately appealable. Commonwealth v. Barber , 940 A.2d 369, 376 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 599 Pa. 686, 960 A.2d 835 (2008). This type of claim raises a question of law, thus, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Id .; Commonwealth v. Vargas , 947 A.2d 777 (Pa.Super. 2008).
Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides, in relevant part:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court
ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. Section 110(1)(ii) contains four requirements that would preclude a subsequent prosecution based upon a prior prosecution:(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or conviction;Commonwealth v. Fithian , 599 Pa. 180, 191, 961 A.2d 66, 72 (2008). "Each prong of this test must be met for compulsory joinder to apply." Id.
(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution;
(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the commencement of the trial on the former charges; and
(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution.
The determination of a single criminal episode must not be approached in a rigid or hypertechnical manner. Commonwealth v. Miskovitch , 64 A.3d 672 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 702, 78 A.3d 1090 (2013). Rather:
[W]e consider (1) the temporal relationship between the acts in question and (2) the logical relationship between the acts. In determining whether a number of offenses are "logically related" to one another, a court should inquire into whether there is a substantial duplication of factual and/or legal issues presented by the offenses; if there is substantial duplication, then the offenses are logically related and must be prosecuted at one trial.Id. at 686.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Richard K. Renn, we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed February 14, 2017, at 2-5) (finding: offenses at issue were neither based on "same criminal conduct" nor arose from "same criminal episode"; Appellant committed offenses at different locations on different dates, and different witnesses would be required for prosecution of each offense; no logical relationship exists between facts of each incident; there was "clear break" between offenses; Appellant is sole common thread between two criminal incidents; Appellant's acts do not constitute part of same criminal episode, therefore, Appellant's issue is meritless). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/13/2017
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