Opinion
J-S02021-17 No. 3715 EDA 2015 No. 3716 EDA 2015
04-13-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. CARLOS RIVERA Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-51-CR-0014762-2013, CP-51-CR-0014763-2013 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and MOULTON, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Appellant, Carlos Rivera, appeals from the November 12, 2015 judgment of sentence imposing two consecutive terms of life imprisonment for two counts of first-degree murder and concurrent sentences for arson and related offenses. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1).
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts:
On December 31, 2012, [Appellant] lived in the second floor apartment of 6200 Rising Sun Avenue with his girlfriend Atlanta Deveney and her twelve-year-old son Elijah Rosado, both decedents in this case. At approximately 3:00 p.m. that day, Shaun Harris, Deveney's brother-in-law and downstairs
neighbor, overheard a domestic dispute between [Appellant] and Deveney. Harris saw Rosado descend the stairwell, tending a cut to his hand. Once downstairs, Rosado told Harris that his young friend was still upstairs. Harris rushed upstairs to retrieve the boy and escorted him downstairs to safety. Moments later, Harris returned to the top of the stairs to demand that [Appellant] leave, or else he would call the police. At the top of the stairs, [Appellant] punched Harris in the right eye. As Harris retreated back downstairs, [Appellant] threw a kitchen knife at him, prompting Harris to call the police. Police arrested [Appellant] for simple assault and related charges[.]
While imprisoned awaiting trial for the assault charge, [Appellant] sent Deveney a series of letters urging her to attend the April 5, 2013 preliminary hearing before the Honorable William A. Meehan and testify that Harris instigated the assault. Deveney did not attend the hearing. Afterwards, [Appellant] sent Deveney a letter demanding that she post his bail and warning her that 'what goes around comes back 20 times harder.'
On April 25, 2013, [Appellant] posted bail. On July 17, 2013, [Appellant] rejected the Commonwealth's plea offer and the Honorable Donna M. Woelpper scheduled trial for October 3, 2013.
At or around 4 a.m. on October 3, 2013, [Appellant] visited Deveney and Rosado in their new apartment at 4261 Howell Street. While in the apartment's bathroom, [Appellant] asked Deveney to testify on his behalf later that morning. Deveney told [Appellant] that she previously spoke to the court, would not testify for him, and would not accompany him to court later that morning. Upset, [Appellant] restrained Deveney and tortured her by pricking her neck with a knife eleven times. Moments later, [Appellant] strangled Deveney to death.
[Appellant] entered the adjacent bedroom where Rosado was asleep in the bottom bunk bed. Using a kitchen knife, [Appellant] stabbed Rosado in his left chest five times, breaking the blade of the knife inside him. While [Appellant] stabbed him, Rosado unsuccessfully attempted to shield against [Appellant's] attacks by raising his left arm, suffering additional cuts and slashes. As Rosado lay bleeding on the bed, [Appellant] retrieved a second knife from the kitchen. Armed once again, [Appellant] resumed his assault in the bedroom, and stabbed
Rosado in the neck eight times. After the final thrust, [Appellant] left that knife sticking out of Rosado's neck.
While the two knives remained embedded in Rosado's body, [Appellant] wrapped Rosado in the bunk bed's bloody bedsheets and carried him into the bedroom closet. [Appellant] carried Deveney's body from the bathroom and dumped her atop Rosado inside the closet. [Appellant] blocked the closet with a mattress and fled the scene.
On the morning of October 3, 2013, Appellant failed to appear in court. On that date, Judge Woelpper revoked bail and issued a bench warrant.
At some point before 9 a.m. on October 5, 2013, [Appellant] returned to 4261 Howell Street. [Appellant] removed the apartment's smoke detectors and doused both the mattress blocking the closet and linens in the bathroom with cooking oil. With a lighter, [Appellant] ignited the mattress and the linens. Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. that morning, smoke emanating from 4261 Howell Street woke neighbors Walter Pommer and Freddie Rivera. The two individually encountered [Appellant], who requested a fire extinguisher. As the fire began to engulf the apartment, [Appellant] insisted that no one call 911, and told the crowd of neighbors that 'I've got this,' and 'I have it under control.' Upon obtaining a fire extinguisher, [Appellant] briefly reentered the apartment, cursorily sprayed the flames, and absconded.
In response to a 911 call, emergency personnel arrived at the scene. Paramedics treated two neighbors for smoke inhalation and transported both to the hospital. After firefighters brought the fire under control, EMT Kristen Baitzel entered 4621 Howell Street and discovered the decedents' charred remains in the bedroom closet.
[***]
The Philadelphia Fugitive Squad arrested [Appellant] at 8:45 p.m. on October 7, 2013. Between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. on that date, Detective Brian Peters read [Appellant] his Miranda
rights and interviewed him. During this conversation, [Appellant] admitted to setting the fire at 4261 Howell Street. At 12:46 a.m. on October 8, Detective Peters gave [Appellant] written Miranda warnings and took a written statement, wherein [Appellant] maintained that he did not kill the decedents, that he discovered their bodies on October 3, 2013, and had only set the fire because he did not want anyone else to find them. During the interview, [Appellant] claimed that he had smoked PCP five hours before the interview commenced. Detective Peters testified that [Appellant] was not intoxicated at the time, as he coherently answered questions and lucidly conversed throughout the interview. At 2 a.m., Detective Peters printed the interview and read it to [Appellant], who signed at the end.Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/2016, at 2-7 (record citations omitted).
At the conclusion of this interview, Detective Peters told [Appellant] that he did not believe that he was being truthful. After over an hour of conversation, [Appellant] indicated that he wanted to tell the truth. At 3:50 a.m., Detective Peters and [Appellant] relocated to the Sergeant's office, where Detective Peters gave [Appellant] his second written Miranda warnings. During the second interview, [Appellant] admitted that on October 3, 2013, he strangled Deveney to death and fatally stabled the sleeping Rosado. [Appellant] claimed that he was high on [PCP] during the murder. [Appellant] said that he lit the October 5 fire to draw attention to the decedents' bodies. At the conclusion of the interview, [Appellant] wrote 'I miss them they was [sic] all I Had Peters. [Appellant's signature] Im [sic] Sorry' on the printed copy. At 5:20 a.m., [Appellant] signed a Statement of Adoption Attestation and a Non-Consent to Videotape Statement.
Shanie Rutherford of the Police Detention Unit examined [Appellant] after the interview. Rutherford observed that [Appellant] was coherent and did not exhibit slurred speech or glassy eyes. Rutherford did not smell alcohol on [Appellant].
On September 3, 2015, at a suppression hearing before the Honorable J. Scott O'Keefe, [Appellant] testified that prior to his arrest, he ingested eight Xanax pills, smoked PCP, and drank half a bottle of brandy. [Appellant] further testified that he was intoxicated during each interview, that his statement was coerced, and that Detective Peters failed to read him his Fifth Amendment rights.
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). --------
At the conclusion of the September 3, 2015 suppression hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress his statement. Appellant proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the trial court found him guilty of the aforementioned offenses. The trial court imposed sentence on November 12, 2015, and on December 11, 2015 Appellant filed this timely appeal. He raises one issue: "Did the trial court err by denying Appellant's motion to suppress his two statements?" Appellant's Brief at 3.
We conduct our review mindful of the following:
[An appellate court's] standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.Commonwealth v. Jones , 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied , 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016). We confine the scope of our review to the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1089 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant argues that his voluntary intoxication, the duration of his interview, and promises of preferential treatment from Detective Peterson rendered his confession involuntary. "The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a conclusion of law, and as such, is subject to plenary review." Commonwealth v. Roberts , 969 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa. Super. 2009). We must consider the totality of the circumstances, including "the duration and means of the interrogation; the physical and psychological state of the accused; the conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and all other factors that could drain a person's ability to withstand coercion." Id.
The suppression court credited the detective's testimony that he did not engage in any coercive tactics, and that Appellant was coherent and did not appear intoxicated during his interview. Pursuant to our standard of review, we may consider Appellant's evidence only insofar as it is uncontradicted in the suppression record. Jones , 121 A.3d at 526. Further, we must accept the suppression court's findings of fact if the record supports them. Instantly, the suppression court was entitled to credit Detective Peters' testimony. The suppression court did not err in finding no factual basis for Appellant's intoxication or his assertions of coercive tactics. Furthermore, as the trial court explains in its opinion, the length of time between a defendant's arrest and confession does not render a confession involuntary absent evidence of an effort to coerce a confession or overcome the defendants' will. See Commonwealth v. Sepulveda , 855 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006).
Having reviewed the record, the parties' briefs, the applicable law, and the trial court opinion, we conclude that the trial court's February 9, 2016 opinion accurately addresses Appellant's argument. We therefore affirm the judgment of sentence based on the trial court's opinion. We direct that a copy of the trial court's opinion be filed along with this memorandum.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/13/2017
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