Opinion
J-S44014-17 No. 37 EDA 2016
12-01-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. RAHEIM RIGGINS, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011009-2013 CP-51-CR-0012347-2013 CP-51-CR-0012349-2013 CP-51-CR-0012351-2013 CP-51-CR-0012352-2013 CP-51-CR-0013662-2013 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:
Appellant, Raheim Riggins, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 36 to 72 years' incarceration, imposed after he was convicted of numerous offenses in six separate cases, including, inter alia, rape, aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, indecent assault, burglary, criminal conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a license. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions, as well as discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we find no merit to these claims. However, we sua sponte determine that the trial court's November 6, 2015 order that deems Appellant a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, is illegal. Therefore, we vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court set forth a lengthy summary of the facts and procedural history of Appellant's case, which we need not reproduce herein. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/11/17, at 1-17. We only briefly note that Appellant was charged with various offenses in six separate cases that were ultimately consolidated for trial. On February 4, 2015, a jury convicted him of multiple counts of robbery and conspiracy, as well as single counts of rape, aggravated assault, burglary, unlawful restraint, indecent assault, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia. For these offenses, Appellant was sentenced to the aggregate term stated supra. He was also determined to be an SVP, which carries a mandatory lifetime registration requirement under SORNA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(6).
Following Appellant's conviction and sentencing, he filed timely post-sentence motions in each case. Those motions were ultimately denied, and Appellant filed timely notices of appeal in each case. The trial court then directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Problematically, Appellant chose to file six different (albeit very similar) Rule 1925(b) statements in each of his cases. Apparently, the trial court did not realize that Appellant was filing multiple concise statements. While the court ultimately drafted a well-reasoned and detailed opinion, see Trial Court Original Opinion (TCOO), 10/5/16, it inadvertently erred by concluding that Appellant had waived his sufficiency of the evidence claim(s) based on the single Rule 1925(b) statement the court assessed. More significantly, the court also did not address two weight-of-the-evidence issues raised by Appellant in the cases pertaining to victims J.H. and Earle Wilson.
To avoid such confusion in the future, Appellant's counsel should consolidate all claims in one post-sentence motion and one Rule 1925(b) statement. --------
Consequently, we were constrained to issue a judgment order remanding Appellant's case for the trial court to draft a new opinion. We directed the court to address the following five issues raised by Appellant on appeal (which we determined were preserved through our examination of Appellant's six post-sentence motions and six Rule 1925(b) statements):
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty [in the cases involving Ms. Hawkins, Mr. Wilson, and J.B.K.,] where the victims were unable to identify [Appellant] as the person who committed the crimes[?]
2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence where[,] although a statement was read into the record from Appellant regarding his supposed involvement in the robbery of Earle Wilson, there was no other valid independent or corroborating evidence[?]
3. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence in that[,] although a statement was read into the record from [Appellant] regarding his supposed involvement in the robbery and assault of J.B.K., there was no DNA analysis, no identification or other independent or corroborating evidence[?]
4. The verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence in that[,] although a statement was read into the record from [Appellant] regarding his supposed involvement in the sexual
assault of Ms. Hawkins, the lack of identification along with the DNA evidence at trial showed otherwise.Appellant's Brief at 7-8.
5. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal, excessively punitive sentence where [the] aggregate sentence (36 to 72 years) amounts to a life sentence for [] Appellant and Appellant received an illegal sentence on the indecent assault[?] The [c]ourt failed to consider the guidelines in fashioning an appropriate sentence and failed to provide adequate reasons on the record.
On October 11, 2017, the trial court filed a new Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the above-stated claims. Preliminarily, the trial court "observed that, notwithstanding the Superior Court's Judgment Order, ... the above [sufficiency and weight of the evidence] issues - which were never presented to the [c]ourt at any point - are waived on appeal." TCO at 18 (emphasis in original). According to the trial court, only one of Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statements was properly served on the court and, thus, the issues raised in his other five Rule 1925(b) statements are waived. Id.
After carefully examining the six certified records before us (one for each of Appellant's six consolidated cases), we are compelled to reject the trial court's waiver decision. We stress that our appellate review is always limited to the certified record before us. See Bennyhoff v. Pappert , 790 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating "[i]t is black letter law in this jurisdiction that an appellate court cannot consider anything which is not part of the record in [the] case"). Nothing in the records in this case confirms that Appellant only served the trial court with one Rule 1925(b) statement; rather, each certified record contains a unique Rule 1925(b) statement (pertaining to the specific victim in the case), and each concise statement has attached to it a Certificate of Service indicating that the document was served on the trial court on June 8, 2016. Notably, in drafting our previous Judgment Order, we had no way of knowing that only one Rule 1925(b) statement was actually served on the trial court; accordingly, given the fact that Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement, and a Certificate of Service, in each separate case, we deemed the above-stated issues preserved for our review. Based on this record, we will not now, in hindsight, change our determination that Appellant's above-stated issues were adequately preserved pursuant to Rule 1925(b).
Notwithstanding the trial court's decision that Appellant's sufficiency and weight-of-the-evidence claims are waived on this basis, the court provides a well-reasoned, alternative analysis of the merits of those issues. See TCO at 19-24. Having reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's discussion of those claims is sound, and we adopt the court's rationale as our own in rejecting Appellant's weight and sufficiency issues.
Additionally, we conclude that the analysis set forth by the trial court in its original opinion filed on October 5, 2016, appropriately and completely addresses the sentencing arguments that Appellant presents on appeal. See TCOO at 21-25. Therefore, we adopt that portion of the court's October 5, 2016 opinion as our own in rejecting Appellant's discretionary aspects of sentencing claim.
However, we are compelled to sua sponte vacate an illegal aspect of Appellant's sentence, namely, the November 6, 2015 sentencing order deeming him an SVP. See Commonwealth v. Butler , No. 1225 WDA 2016, *6 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 31, 2017) (concluding that the issue discussed, infra, implicates the legality of a defendant's sentence). In Commonwealth v. Muniz , 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), our Supreme Court held that the registration requirements under SORNA constitute criminal punishment, thus overturning prior decisions deeming those registration requirements civil in nature. Id. at 1218. On October 31, 2017, this Court ruled that,
since our Supreme Court has held [in Muniz ] that SORNA registration requirements are punitive or a criminal penalty to which individuals are exposed, then under Apprendi [ v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000),] and Alleyne [ v. United States , 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013)], a factual finding, such as whether a defendant has a "mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him or her] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses[,]" 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9799.12, that increases the length of registration must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the chosen fact-finder. Section 9799.24(e)(3) identifies the trial court as the finder of fact in all instances and specifies clear and convincing evidence as the burden of proof required to designate a convicted defendant as an SVP. Such a statutory scheme in the criminal context cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.Butler , No. 1225 WDA 2016, at *11. Accordingly, the Butler panel held that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e)(3) is unconstitutional. Id. at *11-12.
In light of Butler , we are compelled to conclude that the portion of the November 6, 2015 sentencing order deeming Appellant an SVP is illegal. See id. at *12. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the sentencing order, and remand Appellant's case for the trial court to determine under what tier of SORNA Appellant must register, and to provide him with the appropriate notice of his registration obligations under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.23. See id. at *13.
Portion of sentencing order deeming Appellant an SVP vacated. Judgment of sentence affirmed in all other respects. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/1/2017
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