Opinion
J-S67003-19 No. 720 MDA 2019
01-10-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JORDAN ADONIS RAWLS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 5, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000089-2017 BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Jordan Adonis Rawls, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on April 5, 2019, following his jury and bench trial convictions. We affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On October 31, 2016, two victims, Kristine Kibler and Shane Wright, were shot and killed in their residence on Poplar Street in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. On November 10, 2016, law enforcement authorities filed a criminal complaint against Appellant, charging him with two counts of criminal homicide and other, related crimes arising from the aforementioned incident. The next day, Appellant voluntarily reported to the Williamsport Police Department after learning of media reports linking him to the Poplar Street homicides. N.T. Pre-Trial Hearing, 4/26/18, at 14. At the time Appellant reported to the Williamsport Police Department, he was unaware that he was criminally charged. Id. The Williamsport police arrested Appellant upon arrival. Id. at 13-14. The police then took Appellant to an interview room, read him his Miranda rights, and asked that he sign a waiver form, which he did. Id. at 15. After five and one-half hours of questioning, Appellant gave a statement to police admitting his involvement with the incident at Poplar Street. Id. at 36.
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Thereafter, on April 2, 2018, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which included a motion to suppress his November 11, 2016 statement to police. Appellant's Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 4/2/18, at 1-31. In his motion, Appellant asserted that his statement was obtained in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The trial court, however, denied Appellant's motion to suppress on August 13, 2018. Trial Court Order and Opinion, 8/13/18, at 1-13.
The Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion for discovery requesting Appellant to disclose any experts he intended to use at trial. Commonwealth's Motion for Discovery, 11/21/18, at 1-3. The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion on December 6, 2018. Trial Court Order, 12/6/18, at 1. On February 7, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion to preclude Appellant's expert, Dr. Richard Ofshe, from testifying. Commonwealth Motion, 2/7/19, at 1. The Commonwealth alleged that Dr. Ofshe would proffer opinions on the "phenomenon of false confessions" and "police interrogation techniques" which "[are] not admissible in Pennsylvania" as they "constitute[] an invasion of the jury's role as the exclusive arbiter of credibility." Id. On February 27, 2019, Appellant filed a motion in limine also seeking, inter alia, to preclude the Commonwealth's expert, Sergeant Elwood Spencer, from testifying at trial. Appellant's Motion in Limine, 2/27/19, at 3-4. Appellant contended that Sergeant Spencer's testimony regarding firearms and toolmark examination did not "possess the general acceptance to warrant admission" or the "reliability required under the structure of [Pa.R.E.] 403." Id. On March 29, 2019, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, but denied Appellant's motion in limine. Trial Court Order, 3/29/19, at 1.
Appellant's trial commenced on April 1, 2019. On April 5, 2019, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, criminal attempt to commit robbery, and possession of an instrument of a crime. Appellant then waived his right to a jury trial for the remaining charges. Following a brief, ensuing bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of persons not to possess firearms and firearms not to be carried without a license. On that same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive life sentences for his first and second-degree murder convictions. Trial Court Opinion, 7/5/19, at 1. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 29, 2019. On May 8, 2019 the trial court filed an order directing Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). After securing an extension from the trial court, Appellant timely complied. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 5, 2019.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
I. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying [Appellant's] pre-trial motion to suppress [] where [certain challenged] statements were unlawfully obtained [in violation of Appellant's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights?]
II. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by granting the Commonwealth's motion to preclude the expert testimony of Dr. [Richard] Ofshe[?]
III. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying [Appellant's] motion in limine to preclude the
Commonwealth from introducing [the testimony of Sergeant Elwood Spencer] where such evidence lacked [the] general acceptance necessary to warrant admission [and, as such, its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Pennsylvania] Rule of Evidence 403?Appellant's Brief at 4 (superfluous capitalization omitted) (footnote added).
IV. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to hold a Frye hearing regarding the admissibility of [Sergeant Elwood Spencer's testimony?]
V. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give a "consciousness of innocence" instruction[?]
Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant case law, the certified record, the notes of testimony, and the opinion of the able trial court judge, the Honorable Nancy L. Butts. We conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief in this case and that Judge Butts's July 5, 2019 opinion, which also incorporates her August 8, 2018 opinion, adequately and accurately disposes of Appellant's issues on appeal. Specifically, we agree that the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant's November 11, 2016, statement to police because Appellant executed a valid waiver of his Miranda rights and in turn, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/18, at 2-7. We further agree that the trial court properly precluded Dr. Ofshe's proffered expert testimony because it violated the province of the jury, that the trial court did not err by admitting Sergeant Spencer's expert testimony on firearm and toolmark examination without a Frye hearing, and correctly concluded that the circumstances of this case did not warrant a consciousness of innocence instruction. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/5/19, at 1-4. Therefore, we affirm on the basis of Judge Butts's opinions and adopt them as our own. In any future court filings that address this ruling, the filing party shall attach copies of Judge Butts's opinions filed on August 8, 2018 and July 5, 2019.
While we adopt Judge Butts's opinions, we note the following. Herein, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police obtained his statement in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Appellant's Brief at 18-25. A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at "the initiation of adversary proceedings" which includes the filing of a criminal complaint. Commonwealth v. McCoy , 975 A.2d 586, 590 (Pa. 2009). A defendant, however, may waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Indeed, if "a defendant [] is admonished with the warnings set forth in Miranda " he "has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of [his] Sixth Amendment rights, and thus, a waiver of [his] Miranda rights may [also] constitute a waiver" of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Montejo v. Louisiana , 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). Nonetheless, a defendant must execute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Id. "The determination [of] whether [a defendant] has knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the facts of each particular case." Commonwealth v. Kunkle , 79 A.3d 1173, 1182 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing Fare v . Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979). "These circumstances include the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Kunkle , 79 A.3d at 1182. Herein, Appellant's chief complaint is that, because the police failed to specifically inform him that he was criminally charged with the Poplar Street homicides, his Miranda waiver was invalid, i.e., it was made unknowingly and unintelligently. We disagree. At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth demonstrated that, at the time Appellant entered the Williamsport Police Department, he knew that law enforcement was "looking for him" because "his picture [was] in the media in an attempt to identify him in relationship to the homicide on Poplar Street." N.T. Pre-Trial Hearing, 4/26/18, at 14. The Williamsport police then advised Appellant that there was an arrest warrant for him, took him into custody, and read him his Miranda rights. Id. at 13. Before Appellant waived his Miranda rights and before police commenced any questioning, police also specifically informed Appellant that the arrest warrant was issued in conjunction with a police investigation of a criminal homicide. Id. at 33. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's determination that the mere fact that the police did not inform Appellant that he was criminally charged did not render his subsequent Miranda waiver unknowing or unintelligent. See Riddick v. Edmiston , 894 F.2d 586, 591 (3d. Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant executed a valid waiver of his Miranda rights, and in turn, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, even though law enforcement failed to specifically advise the defendant that he had been indicted on a murder charge); See Commonwealth v. Carr , 580 A.2d 1362, 1365-1366 (Pa. Super. 1990) (explaining that a suspect "need not have knowledge of the 'technicalities' of the criminal offense involved" to execute a valid waiver of his Miranda rights, "rather, it is necessary only that he be aware of the 'transaction' involved."). Thus, while Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached upon the filing of the criminal complaint, the trial court correctly found a valid waiver of that right after Appellant received Miranda warnings and executed a waiver form.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 01/10/2020
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