Opinion
J-S48019-17 No. 482 MDA 2017
11-09-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. ALEXANDER RAMOS-PACHECO Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed February 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0005002-2014 BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and PLATT, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant Alexander Ramos-Pacheco appeals from the judgment of sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County imposed on February 1, 2017. Appellant argues the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to account for certain mitigating factors. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.
Appellant's challenge involves the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson , 961 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2008). Our standard for reviewing challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is well-established. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Moury , 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
The factual and procedural background are not at issue here. Briefly, Appellant entered a guilty plea to three counts of simple assault, aggravated assault, use of electronic incapacitation device, terroristic threats, and stalking, in connection with multiple incidents involving Ms. Heather Orlando ("Victim") over an extended period of time. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of incarceration of not less than 13 years nor more than 30 years.
Specifically, Appellant was sentenced to the following terms of incarceration: count 1, simple assault, 6 months to 2 years; count 2, aggravated assault, 8 years to 20 years; count 3, use of electronic incapacitation device, 2½ to 5 years; count 4, terroristic threats, 6 months to 2 years; count 5, simple assault: 6 months to 2 years; count 6, simple assault, 6 months to 2 years; and, count 7, stalking, 2½ to 5 years. The sentences imposed on counts 2, 3, and 7 were made consecutive to one another, whereas the sentences on all other counts were made concurrent. Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/17, at 2.
Appellant argues the sentencing court's failure to weigh more favorably some mitigating factors (i.e., his young age, the absence of a significant adult criminal history, his mild mental retardation, some other unidentified "mental health" issues, and low education) resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence. Appellant's Brief at 8. We disagree.
The circumstances noted above, all of them, were addressed in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, which the sentencing court consulted before sentencing, and/or were addressed at the sentencing hearing. Thus, the sentencing court fully considered the above circumstances, but not as favorably as Appellant was hoping. In other words, Appellant is merely dissatisfied with the way the sentencing court handled the mitigating circumstances. It is well-established, however, that mere dissatisfaction with a sentence is not enough to trigger our jurisdiction. Moury , 992 A.2d at 175 ("court['s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.").
Even if we were to find otherwise, Appellant, in essence, is merely asking us to reweigh the mitigating circumstances and substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court. We cannot do it. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown , 741 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 790 A.2d 1013 (Pa. 2001) ("[W]hen reviewing sentencing matters, we must accord the sentencing court great weight as it is in the best position to view the defendant's character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.") (citation omitted).
Furthermore, to the extent Appellant raised a reviewable question, we find it lacks merit for the reasons stated by the sentencing court in its comprehensive 15-page opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/17, at 7-15. As mentioned above, the sentencing court addressed, inter alia, all mitigating factors raised by Appellant, although not as favorably as Appellant had wished. Id. at 8-9. The sentencing court also considered: (i) the gravity of the offenses, id. at 9; (ii) the impact of offenses on Victim, id. at 9-10; (iii) Appellant's comments at sentencing, which the sentencing court described as "rambling," "show[ing] no remorse, but rather an indifference to the crimes he committed," id. at 11; and (iv) Appellant's rehabilitative needs ("there was little to indicate he had made any attempt to change his lifestyle since committing crimes starting at the age of fourteen." Id. at 12). The sentencing court also identified specific aggravating circumstances supporting a sentence above the standard range of the guidelines, id. at 12-13, and justified the imposition of consecutive sentences in light of "the significant amount of brutal crimes committed by Appellant over a period of years," id. at 15, "lack of remorse", id., Appellant's criminal history, and Appellant's "poor prospects for treatment or rehabilitation." Id. Accordingly, we conclude the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion.
We direct that a copy of the trial court's April 11, 2017 opinion be attached to any future filings in this case. --------
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/9/2017
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Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans , 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
Assuming all the requirements above mentioned are met, we will review the question under an abuse of discretion standard:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.Commonwealth v. Bowen , 55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cunningham , 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 2002)), appeal denied , 820 A.2d 703 (Pa. 2003)).