Opinion
14-P-1532
10-01-2015
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After his convictions of assault and battery and indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years of age or older, the defendant claims error in the denial of his motion under Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), to set aside his sentence as unlawful. We affirm.
The judgments were affirmed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Quadros, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (2012).
The incident giving rise to the charges occurred when the defendant attacked his wife in her home. The defendant had a history of violent and abusive behavior toward his wife prior to the attack. In addition to the crimes of which he was convicted, the defendant was also charged with assault with intent to commit rape stemming from the same incident; he was found not guilty on that charge. At sentencing, the judge explained that he would take into account the context and circumstances of the crime, including the threats made, the victim's fear, and the history of violence by the defendant toward the victim. The judge then imposed a sentence, two to four years in State prison and three years' probation, that the defendant concedes is within the statutory guidelines. The defendant argues that, in so fashioning the sentence, the judge impermissibly punished the defendant for the crime of which he was not convicted. We are not persuaded.
"The judge is permitted great latitude in sentencing, provided the sentence does not exceed statutory limits." Commonwealth v. Celeste, 358 Mass. 307, 310 (1970). See Commonwealth v. Healy, 452 Mass. 510, 515 (2008) ("We have consistently upheld the 'considerable latitude' of sentencing judges," quoting from Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 Mass. 88, 92 [1993]). During sentencing, a judge may consider evidence not relevant at trial, including hearsay, testimony about the defendant's character and background, and evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct. Goodwin, supra at 92-93. This type of information need only be relevant to the "defendant's character and his amenability to rehabilitation" and be "sufficiently reliable." Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 461-462 (2008), quoting from Goodwin, supra at 93-94.
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the judge's sentence did not punish the defendant for the charge of which he was not convicted. Rather, the judge's remarks demonstrated that he understood the limits of the evidence he was permitted to consider at sentencing and abided by those limits. The judge permissibly considered the defendant's prior bad acts, the severity of the crime, and the impact on the victim as context for the sentence imposed. Furthermore, the judge explicitly related those considerations to the purposes of the sentence: to protect the public and the victim and to punish and rehabilitate the defendant. Therefore, the judge's comments indicate that he was operating well within the "considerable latitude" afforded to sentencing judges. Healy, 452 Mass. at 515, quoting from Goodwin, 414 Mass. at 92.
In addition, the judge acted within his discretion when he found the evidence of the defendant's prior assaultive behavior to be reliable and relevant, for the reasons discussed in the Commonwealth's brief on pages thirty-four through thirty-seven.
Order denying motion for relief from unlawful sentencing affirmed.
By the Court (Green, Wolohojian & Hanlon, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: October 1, 2015.