Opinion
783 EDA 2022
02-15-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ZACKARY PRITCHETT Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 8, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003990-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM
LAZARUS, J.
Zackary Pritchett appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546. After our review, we affirm on the opinion authored by the Honorable Diana L. Anhalt.
On July 12, 2016, Pritchett entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder, attempted murder, and possessing an instrument of crime.
When he was nineteen years old, Pritchett stabbed his mother to death with a butcher knife; he also stabbed his bedridden grandmother, but he stopped when she pleaded with him and told him she loved him, causing Pritchett to cry and flee. Pritchett gave a written and videotaped confession to both stabbings. N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 7/12/16, at 14-19. Pritchett was sexually, physically, and emotionally abused by his mother. He did not attend school (in response to the court's question of how far he went to school, Pritchett stated, "Kindergarten." Id. at 5), and essentially lived like a "caged animal." Pritchett has an IQ of 67 and suffers from mental health issues. During sentencing proceedings, Annie Steinberg, M.D., who was hired by Pritchett's counsel, provided a psychiatric diagnosis, concluding Pritchett suffers from dissociative identity disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, that he developed an alter ego, "Dennis," at the age of 10, and that it was "Dennis" who had "told [him] to kill his mother[.]" Appellant's Brief, at 5. See also Defense Exhibit 2 (Dr. Steinberg Report); N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/13/22, at 41. At the PCRA Hearing, Dr. Steinberg explained the disorder is exclusive to individuals who have experienced "profound trauma, abuse, neglect in childhood, when the personality is still developing and can fracture as an attempt to cope with an untenable situation. . . . but it occurs only really with severe trauma in young years." Id. at 33-34. Doctor Steinberg explained that Pritchett developed an alter ego to respond to his significant trauma. She explained that he was aware of what was occurring when he attacked his mother and grandmother, that he may have lacked "cognitive control" due to his alter ego, but despite his mental condition he was competent. See Commonwealth's Brief, at 3, citing Dr. Steinberg Report, at 26-27. Doctor Steinberg concluded:
Zackary has a capacity to appreciate the charges against him, disclose pertinent facts, provide an account of his own and others' behavior prior to, during, and subsequent to the alleged crime. He has an awareness of the roles of court personnel and the adversarial nature of the proceedings, and he is open to testifying but fearful that Dennis [his alter ego] will emerge. He understands the range and nature of penalties and hopes for treatment for his problems; he feels that his psychological problems should be brought up so that he can receive treatment, to which he has never had access. However, the alter [ego] Dennis, should he emerge, has less capacity to participate in a coherent, rational process in a courtroom and in his own defense. [During the evaluation h]e was incoherent at times, with maniacal laughter, aggressive and threatening, and self-injurious to the body.Dr. Steinberg Report, at 25. Pritchett's grandmother was hospitalized due to her injuries and died a few months later. The PCRA court states that as part of the negotiated plea, the Commonwealth agreed not to pursue murder charges against Pritchett for the death of his grandmother, but the court acknowledges that this agreement was not placed on the record. See PCRA Court Opinion, supra at 11-12, citing N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/13/22, at 117-18, 146-48.
The Honorable Lillian H. Ransom sentenced him to 20 to 40 years' imprisonment. Pritchett did not file a direct appeal. Pritchett filed a timely PCRA petition on January 17, 2017, seeking reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a
The court stated that Pritchett would be housed and supervised in the mental health unit. N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing/Sentencing, 7/12/16, at 22; Sentencing Order, 7/12/16. The Commonwealth states that since his incarceration at S.C.I. Camp Hill, Pritchett "has been seeing mental health professionals for therapy and treatment that have been successful, attending classes, and working." Commonwealth's Response to Defendant's Amended Petition, 7/15/21, at 7-8. At the PCRA hearing, Dr. Steinberg testified that she and Pritchett discussed his experience in prison:
[P]rison was a step up from his life. He got to go out a couple of times a day and walk in the yard. People left him alone there. He had a roommate who he did not mind. And he seemed very grateful for the help that he was getting, even though he complained about not getting medicine enough or fast enough to help take the voices away, but he definitively thought that prison was preferable to his previous life, which really represents . . . how severe an existence he had prior to his incarceration.N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/13/22, at 62-63.
Turner/Finley no-merit letter and motion to withdraw. The PCRA court dismissed Pritchett's petition and granted counsel's motion to withdraw.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
On collateral appeal to this Court, we vacated and remanded for appointment of new counsel, the filing of a counseled PCRA petition, and an evidentiary hearing to provide Pritchett "the opportunity to prove his allegation that he requested an appeal." Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 4035 EDA 2017, *3 (Pa. Super. filed October 10, 2018) (unpublished memorandum decision). See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 571-72 (Pa. 1999) (failure to appeal when requested constitutes ineffectiveness per se without regard to merit of issues to be raised); see also Commonwealth v. Stanley, 632 A.2d 871, 872 (Pa. 1993) (where there is any "substantive question concerning the merits of a collateral claim, the trial court should receive evidence on the matter").
On remand, the PCRA court appointed new counsel, Doug Dolfman, Esquire, who filed an amended PCRA petition on July 23, 2019. The Commonwealth filed a response. The court held an evidentiary hearing on January 31, 2020 to determine whether Pritchett had requested trial counsel file a direct appeal. That hearing was subsequently bifurcated to allow Attorney Dolfman to obtain Pritchett's mental health records. Following several continuance requests by the defense, the PCRA court removed Attorney Dolfman and appointed George Yacoubian, Esquire, to represent Pritchett. Attorney Yacoubian filed a second amended PCRA petition, alleging trial counsel was ineffective in causing Pritchett to enter an involuntary guilty plea when counsel knew, or should have known, that Pritchett's mental health history, low IQ, and lack of any formal education precluded any waiver of his trial rights. The Commonwealth filed a response.
The PCRA court held a hearing on January 13, 2022. On March 8, 2022, the court dismissed Pritchett's PCRA petition.
Pritchett filed this timely appeal. Both Pritchett and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Pritchett raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the PCRA court err when it denied Pritchett's claim that trial counsel was ineffective pursuant to subsection 9543(a)(2)(ii) of the PCRA?
2. Did the PCRA court err when it denied Pritchett's claim that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced pursuant to subsection 9543(a)(2)(iii) of the PCRA?Appellant's Brief, at 12.
A petitioner is eligible for relief if he pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction or sentence resulted from "[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
A petitioner is eligible for relief if he pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction or sentence resulted from "[a] plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level." Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court's findings that are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014).
After careful review of the parties' arguments, the record, and the PCRA court's opinion, we affirm based on that court's opinion. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/8/22, at 7-18. The evidence of record supports the court's conclusions that: (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file an appeal where Pritchett failed to show, at two evidentiary hearings, that he made such a request and trial counsel's testimony that he was neither asked nor contacted about filing an appeal, was credible; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective with respect to Pritchett's guilty plea because the record shows Pritchett was competent and his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary;and (3) counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise Pritchett's "mental health history, mental retardation, sexual abuse, and severe psychiatric disorders," where the record belied this assertion; at the guilty plea hearing, Judge Ransom was well aware of Pritchett's mental health conditions, the fact that he had taken his medication for dissociative identity disorder and that he responded "No" when asked if he was hearing voices other than those of the people in the courtroom. Moreover, the court had possession of Dr. Steinberg's report.
See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 892 A.2d 840, 842 (Pa. Super. 2006) (before court will find ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file direct appeal, defendant must prove he requested appeal and that counsel ignored request).
Doctor Steinberg opined that Pritchett "appreciates the charges again him [and] understands the range and nature of penalties." Dr. Steinberg Report, supra at 25. Pritchett acknowledged at the guilty plea hearing that he understood the charges to which he was pleading and understood that he was receiving a penalty of 20-40 years' imprisonment for third-degree murder and no further penalty on the remaining charges. N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 7/12/16, at 7-8.
We conclude, therefore, that the record supports the PCRA court's findings. Rigg, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court's order and direct the parties to attach a copy of the PCRA court's opinion in the event of further proceedings.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
OPINION
ANHALT, J.
Petitioner in the above-captioned matter appeals this Court's judgment regarding its dismissal of his Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. The Court submits the following Opinion in accordance with the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court holds that Petitioner's PCRA Petition was properly dismissed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioner in the above-captioned case was arrested on March 28, 2015, and charged with Murder, Attempted Murder, Aggravated Assault, and Possession of an Instrument of Crime.On July 12, 2016, Petitioner entered into a negotiated guilty plea to the charges of Murder of the Third Degree, Attempted Murder, and Possession of an instrument of crime. The Honorable Lilian H. Ransom sentenced Petitioner to the negotiated sentence of 20 to 40 years of state incarceration on the Murder; he received no further penalty for the other two charges. No post-sentence motions or appeals were filed.
On December 22, 2016, the Philadelphia Court Clerk's Office received pro se correspondence from Petitioner requesting information about his appeal. A copy of the docket sheet was sent to Petitioner on December 28, 2016, which indicated no appeal had been filed. On January 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9541, etseq. On July 19, 2017, this Court appointed PCRA-Counsel, Stephen O'Hanlon. On September 27, 2017, O'Hanlon filed a Finley letter and moved to withdraw. On October 2, 2017, the Court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 907. Petitioner then filed a pro se opposition to the Finley letter on October 11, 2017. The Court dismissed the PCRA petition on November 9, 2017, for lack of merit, and O'Hanlon's Motion to Withdraw was granted. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior Court on November 30, 2017. See Commonwealth v. Pritchett, No. 4035 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 4907781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). Petitioner filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on December 20, 2017.
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
On October 10, 2018, the Superior Court reversed this Court and remanded the case for the filing of a new petition and the appointment of new counsel, specifically to determine whether Petitioner had asked his trial attorney to file a direct appeal. The Superior Court noted that this claim, if true, would constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Pritchett, 2018 WL 4907781, at *1. On July 3, 2019, this Court appointed Doug Dolfman, who filed an Amended PCRA Petition on July 23, 2019. The Commonwealth filed its response to the Amended Petition on November 4, 2019.
On January 31, 2020, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the narrow issue of whether Petitioner had ever requested his trial counsel to file an appeal. The hi aring was bifurcated in order to give Dolfman time to conduct additional investigation and prepare additional documents. On July 30, 2020, Dolfman filed a second Amended PCRA Petition. Hearings were held on July 31, 2020, October 2, 2020, December 4, 2020, and January 29, 2021, all of which were continued for "further filings by the defense." On February 4, 2021, the Court removed Mr. Dolfman and appointed George Yacoubian to represent Petitioner.
It should be noted that his second Amended Petition provided little, if any, additional information for this Court and contained factual inaccuracies.
On April 16, 2021, Yacoubian filed another Amended PCRA Petition. The Commonwealth filed its response on July 15, 2021. On January 13, 2022, this Court held an evidentiary hearing on the additional issues raised in Petitioner's third Amended Petition. On March 4, 2022, the Court dismissed the Petition. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court on March 8, 2022, and this Court issued an Order Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) on March 9, 2022. Petitioner filed a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on March 29, 2022.
FACTUAL HISTORY:
These charges arise from the March 27, 2015 murder of Melizza Wiley, Petitioner's mother. The murder occurred at approximately 6:08 a.m. at 2817 Reynolds Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Police arrived at the residence and found Joan Wiley, Petitioner's grandmother, with multiple stab wounds to her face, neck, and upper chest. N/T, 7/12/16, at 15. Melizza Wiley was similarly found with multiple stab wounds to the face. Id. Paramedics were called, and Melizza Wiley was pronounced deceased at 6:27 a.m. Id. Joan Wiley was taken to the hospital, Id., and she died several months later as a result of her injuries. Petitioner had suffered multiple lacerations to his hands. Id.
The Commonwealth declined to charge Petitioner with the murder of his grandmother.
When the police arrived, Petitioner told them that multiple masked intruders had broken into the house and stabbed his mother and grandmother while committing a robbery. Id. at 15-16. This turned out to be false. Petitioner later gave a Mirandized statement admitting that he had stabbed his mother and grandmother. Id. at 16-17. An argument had occurred around 2:30 a.m., and he stabbed his mother and grandmother a few hours later. Id. at 17. Petitioner panicked after the attack; he took his mother's purse and threw it over a gated fence down the street in an attempt to make the attack look like a robbery. Id. at 18.
After a preliminary hearing and several pretrial listings, see supra, Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to the Third-Degree Murder of Melizza Wiley, the Attempted Murder of Joan Wiley, and PIC. He was sentenced to 20 to 40 years of state incarceration. During the proceedings, defense counsel had Petitioner evaluated by a psychiatrist, Annie Steinberg, M.D., who produced a report on September 2, 2015. Dr. Steinberg concluded that Petitioner suffers from Dissociative Identity Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. She explained that Petitioner has an "alter-ego" named "Dennis." Id. Dr. Steinberg noted that the Petitioner was aware of what was occurring during the attack of his mother and grandmother, but that he may not have had "cognitive control" over his actions due to his alter-ego taking over. Id. at 26-27. Dr. Steinberg also concluded, however, that Petitioner was competent. She indicated that he "has a capacity to appreciate the charges against him, disclose pertinent facts... He has an awareness of the roles of court personnel and the adversarial nature of the proceedings... He understands the range and nature of penalties." Id. at 25. Further, Petitioner was capable of assisting in his own defense, and was "aware that he [was] being charged with murder and attempted murder." Id.
Report of Dr. Annie Steinberg, 9/2/15, at 27 (hereinafter, "Steinberg Report").
DISCUSSION:
Petitioner's first claim is that his trial counsel failed to file a direct appeal upon his request. Petitioner also raised two additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (2) that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced. It is these two claims that Petitioner has filed an appeal.
Petitioner's Concise Statement of Errors merely recounts that this Court erred in denying relief on the issues of ineffectiveness of counsel and an unlawfully induced guilty plea. His Amended PCRA Petition of April 16, 2021, makes more specific claims. These specific claims are addressed below.
When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it is well-settled that counsel is presumed to be effective. Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011). Our Supreme Court applies the following standard of review for such claims:
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must first determine whether the issue underlying the claim has arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Evans, 489 Pa. 85, 413 A.2d 1025 (1980). If the claim lacks merit, our inquiry ceases, as counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless issue. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 523 A.2d 728 (1987). If, however, the claim has merit, we must then determine whether the course of action chosen by counsel has some reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client's interest. Commonwealth v. Hentosh, 520 Pa. 325, 554 A.2d 20 (1989) (emphasis added).Finally, Appellant must show that counsel's ineffectiveness so prejudiced his case that he was denied a fair trial, or "a trial whose result is reliable." Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973(1987).Commonwealth v. Johnson, 588 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1991).
"The balance tips in favor of finding effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel's decision had any reasonable basis." Pierce, 527 A.2d at 975 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the court must reject an ineffectiveness claim if a Petitioner fails to satisfy any prong of the test. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). It is therefore Petitioner's burden to prove that he is eligible for post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's claims are without merit; thus, he has not met his burden and is entitled to no relief.
1. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file an appeal where Petitioner failed to show that he made such a request.
An attorney who fails to file a requested direct appeal without justification is per se ineffective. See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 572 (Pa. 1999). A Petitioner must prove that such an appeal was requested, "and that counsel disregarded this request." Pritchett, 2018 WL 4907781, at *1 (citing Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).
Petitioner claims that he asked his trial counsel to file an appeal. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 31,2020, to address this claim. Petitioner's trial counsel, Mr. Connor, testified that the Petitioner did not ask him to file a direct appeal. Specifically, in response to the Commonwealth's question, "do you remember whether [sic] Mr. Pritchett wrote to you or called you about filing an appeal?" N/T, 1/31/20, at 5. Mr. Connor replied, "[h]e did not write to me or call me about filing an appeal." Id. PCRA counsel Dolfman then attempted to ask a series of questions unrelated to the issue of whether Petitioner requested a direct appeal. In fact, Dolfman put forth no evidence at the hearing regarding this issue. The Court ultimately continued the evidentiary hearing so that Dolfman could gather more evidence to "incorporate[] in the next hearing." N/T, 1/31/20, at 18. Dolfman never did so. Likewise, Petitioner's subsequent PCRA counsel, George Yacoubian, presented no additional evidence at the hearing held on January 13, 2022 regarding whether Petitioner had requested his trial counsel to file an appeal. See generally N/T, 1/13/22.
Petitioner has presented no evidence that he asked his trial counsel to file a direct appeal. As such, this claim lacks merit, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Because Petitioner failed to file a direct appeal, his subsequent claims concerning the validity of his guilty plea are waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Notwithstanding, evidence related to his subsequent claims was presented at the PCRA hearing held on January 13, 2022. The claims, however, are also without merit, for the reasons set forth in detail below.
2. Trial counsel was not ineffective for allowing Petitioner to plead guilty because the record establishes that Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
The evidence contained in the record and presented over the course of the PCRA establishes that Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Petitioner's Amended Petition raises several specific claims in support of his contention that trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, that trial counsel:
a. Failed to raise the question of Defendant's competency at the Municipal Court level;
b. Ignored the recommendation of Dr. Annie Steinberg with respect to the proper disposition of Defendant's case;
c. Caused the Defendant to enter an involuntary guilty plea;
d. Facilitated if not encouraged the Defendant to plead guilty ... when Mr. Connor knew, or should have known . . . that [the Defendant could not waive] his trial rights. . .
e. Allowed the Defendant to plead guilty to third-degree murder . . . when [mitigation evidence] would have mitigated third-degree murder to, at worst, voluntary manslaughter; and,
f. Failed to bring to the sentencing Court's attention the Defendant's mental health history. . .despite having been given the opportunity to do so.
For the sake of brevity, legal citations and cumulative arguments contained in Petitioner's Amended Petition under claims (c), (d)(i), (d)(ii), and (d)(iii) have been omitted.
Amended PCRA Petition, 4/16/21, ¶ 16.
These claims are discussed below, seriatim.
a. Petitioner's Competency During Municipal Court Proceedings.
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise questions regarding Petitioner's competency while the case was in Municipal Court. A guilty plea waives all claims of procedural deficiencies. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 212 (Pa. 2007). Thus, to the extent that Petitioner may have been incompetent to proceed at the preliminary hearing in Municipal Court, any such defect was cured by Petitioner's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea in the Court of Common Pleas. Petitioner presented no evidence that he was incompetent at the preliminary hearing. To the contrary, Petitioner's trial counsel testified that he did not believe Petitioner was incompetent to proceed. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 126-28. This claim therefore has no merit.
b. The Recommendations of Dr. Steinberg.
Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for ignoring the recommendation of Dr. Annie Steinberg with respect to the proper disposition of his case; specifically, Dr. Steinberg's recommendations that "[c]ontinued confinement via incarceration is not the appropriate intervention for this youth," and Petitioner would "be best served in a forensic unit in one of the state hospitals." While Dr. Steinberg's professional medical opinion was certainly relevant, the opinion itself had no legal impact on the disposition of this case. Petitioner's trial counsel was neither the judge nor an attorney for the Commonwealth. Trial counsel had no power to order Petitioner to serve his time in a state hospital rather than a state correctional institute. There were simply no existing mechanisms for defense counsel to follow Dr. Steinberg's recommendations. Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to follow Steinberg's recommendations is therefore without merit.
Steinberg Report, 9/2/15, at 28.
c. Petitioner's Guilty Plea.
Petitioner's next claim is that his trial counsel caused him to enter an involuntary guilty plea. Petitioner's claim is without merit as his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Plea agreements are governed by Pa. R. Crim. P. 590. The rule requires that the terms of the agreement be provided in open court, see Pa. R. Crim. P. 590(b)(1), and that an on-the-record colloquy be conducted by the trial judge to ensure the defendant "understands and voluntarily accepts the terms of the plea agreement" Pa. R. Crim. P. 590(b)(2). During the colloquy, the judge must determine, at minimum, that the defendant understands: the nature of the charges to which he is pleading; the factual basis for the plea; the right to a trial by jury; the presumption of innocence; the range of sentences and fines he might be exposed to; that the judge is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement; and, if pleading to murder generally, that the Commonwealth has a right to have a jury decide the degree of guilt. Pa. R. Crim. P. 590 cmt.
Petitioner here pled to Third-degree Murder, so this final requirement is inapplicable.
For constitutional validity, the colloquy "must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its consequences." Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa.Super.1998)). This validity is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 446 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa. 1982). Once a guilty plea is entered, "it is presumed that [defendant] was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him." Bedell, 954 A.2d at 1212 (citing Commonwealth v. Stork, 12>1 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa.Super.1999)) (citation and internal brackets omitted). Additionally, "[t]he desire of an accused to benefit from a plea bargain which he requests his counsel to arrange has been viewed as a 'strong indicator' of the voluntariness of the plea." Shaffer, 446 A.2d at 596. A plea which does not comport with the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 590 will not be automatically thrown out, provided the record amply demonstrates the knowingness, voluntariness, and intelligence of the plea under the totality of the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Anthony, 475 A.2d 1303, 1307 n.2 (Pa. 1984) (collecting cases).
In the present case, the oral colloquy requirements were not fully met, as the trial judge failed to inquire into all the areas specified by Pa. R. Crim. P. 590 during Petitioner's guilty plea hearing. As an initial matter, there was a factual basis for the plea. The Commonwealth put on the record the circumstances of the homicide, including the fact that Petitioner gave a Mirandized confession to the police. See generally N/T, 7/12/16, at 14-19. The trial judge also explained that the defendant had a right to a jury trial. See N/T, 7/12/16, at 8-9. The trial judge however failed to explain the nature of the charges to which Petitioner was pleading. This lack of explanation will not result in manifest injustice where "the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea indicate that the defendant understood the nature of the charge against him." Commonwealth v. Schultz, 411 A.2d 1328, 1330 (Pa. 1984). Part of this understanding may come from the factual basis underlying the plea. See id. Here, there was a written guilty plea colloquy that was signed by the Petitioner acknowledging that "[m]y lawyer told me what the elements of the crimes(s) are that the District Attorney must prove to convict me." Further, the trial court asked Petitioner if he was pleading guilty to Murder of the Third Degree, Attempted Murder, and Possession of an Instrument of crime, to which Petitioner replied "yes." N/T, 7/12/16, at 7. Later in the hearing, the Commonwealth put the full factual allegations on the record, setting forth the charges to which Petitioner pled. See N/T, 7/12/16, at 14-19. After hearing these allegations, Petitioner pled guilty. See N/T, 7/12/16, at 19-20. Thus, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea indicate that the Petitioner understood the nature of the charges against him.
The court first noted that "your attorney and the Commonwealth attorney would be able to be [sic] pick 14 people." N/T, 7/12/16, at 9. Immediately thereafter, the court discussed that "all 12 of the jurors would have to agree." Id. at 9. Petitioner did not express any confusion over this difference. The record indicates that Petitioner understood this part of the colloquy.
The trial judge also failed to explain the presumption of innocence to the Petitioner during the oral colloquy. However, the written colloquy, signed by Petitioner, did explain this right. Further, the trial judge did not explain the permissible range of sentences for all the crimes to which Petitioner pled, nor the potential fines. Once again, however, this information was contained within the written colloquy form signed by the Petitioner. In addition, the trial judge neglected to inform the Petitioner that his negotiated sentence would have no binding effect on the court; although, the judge did indicate that once Petitioner's guilty plea was accepted, he would be sentenced to a term of 20 to 40 years. N/T, 7/12/16, at 7. This was the negotiated sentence; the maximum sentence; and the sentence that Petitioner ultimately received. The written guilty plea colloquy form acknowledged Petitioner's right to withdraw his guilty plea if the judge did not agree with its terms: "I know if the judge does not agree with the plea bargain or agreement, I can withdraw my plea." This demonstrates Petitioner's understanding that the judge was in no way required to agree with the terms of the plea agreement. Moreover, the Petitioner suffered no prejudice as a result of the judge's failure to inform him that she was not required to abide by the terms of the negotiation - he received the sentence he expected based on the negotiations.
The maximum sentence for Third-degree Murder.
All of the terms of a plea agreement should be put on the record. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 590(b)(1). That did not occur in this case. Per trial counsel's testimony, there was an agreement that if Petitioner pled guilty to Third-degree Murder for the death of his mother, the Commonwealth would not pursue a homicide charge for the death of his grandmother. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 117-118. This agreement was never placed on the record. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 146- 148. However, to date, Petitioner still has not been charged with homicide in connection to his grandmother's death. The Commonwealth therefore held up its end of that bargain, and Petitioner has suffered no prejudice despite the absence of this agreement on the record.
The evidence adduced at the January 13, 2022, PCRA hearing further confirms that Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Petitioner's trial counsel, Daniel Connor, testified that based on his conversations with the Petitioner, he believed Petitioner was competent and understood the proceedings. N/T, 1/13/22, p. 112. Connor also testified that Petitioner requested him to get the best deal possible, and that Petitioner had made this same request during his psychiatric evaluation. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 112-13. That Petitioner requested his counsel to obtain the "best possible deal" is a strong indicator of the voluntariness of his plea. See Shaffer, 446 A.2d at 596.
Also, during the January 13, 2022 PCRA hearing, Petitioner's counsel played excerpts from the psychiatric interview conducted by Dr. Steinberg. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 43-61. While there were obvious moments on the video where Petitioner's personality seemed to "shift," often dramatically, trial counsel testified that he saw no evidence of these shifts during Petitioner's guilty plea. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 118. Trial counsel further testified that he "would have never pled this guy if he was hearing voices." N/T, 1/13/22, at 121. This Court found trial counsel's testimony to be credible. It is therefore clear that Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, especially in light of Petitioner's request that his trial counsel get him the best possible deal under the circumstances.
Lastly, counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to object to a deficient guilty plea colloquy where the record and totality of the circumstances indicate that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). A decision by trial counsel not to object to an otherwise deficient guilty plea colloquy where a favorable bargain was negotiated and agreed to by the defendant is a reasonable one. See id, Here, trial counsel negotiated an undeniably favorable deal for the Petitioner - 20 to 40 years for what truly amounted to two First-degree homicides. His decision not to object to the deficient guilty plea colloquy was reasonable given that Petitioner clearly understood and agreed to the bargain.
Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's guilty plea and the evidence presented during the course of the PCRA, Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. It is Petitioner's burden to prove otherwise, and he has failed to satisfy this burden.
d. Petitioner's Waiver of His Trial Rights.
Petitioner claims his trial counsel knew that he could not have possibly waived his trial rights based on his mental health issues. However, trial counsel testified that, based on his conversations with the Petitioner, he believed Petitioner was competent. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 112. And Dr. Steinberg's report indicates that Petitioner understood what was happening. Specifically, she noted:
He has a capacity to appreciate the charges against him, disclose pertinent facts, provide an account of his own and others' behavior prior to, during, and subsequent to the alleged crime. He has an awareness of the roles of court personnel and the adversarial nature of the proceedings. . . He understands the range and nature of penalties.Dr. Steinberg did note, however, that Petitioner's alter-ego, Dennis, "has less capacity to participate in a coherent, rational process in a courtroom and in his own defense." Id. at 25.
Steinberg Report, 9/2/15, at 25.
As noted above, the excerpts from the psychiatric interview showed a clear shift between Petitioner and his alter, "Dennis." Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he saw no evidence of these shifts during the guilty plea. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 118. At the PCRA hearing, Dr. Steinberg testified that Petitioner only switched to his alter, "Dennis," when being asked about his childhood, specifically the "isolation and deprivation" of his childhood. N/T, 1/13/22, at 56-57. But this topic was not raised during Petitioner's guilty plea, so there was no trigger for "Dennis" to appear. Thus, the evidence indicates that, at the time of his plea, Petitioner himself was in control as opposed to his alter, "Dennis." And, according to Dr. Steinberg and Petitioner's trial counsel, Petitioner was both competent and capable of assisting in his own defense.
Moreover, a defendant is bound by statements he makes under oath during a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 798 A.2d 497, 501-02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Throughout the guilty plea colloquy, Petitioner responded affirmatively that he understood what was happening, that he was waiving his rights, that he was pleading guilty, that he knew what his sentence was, and that he had no further questions. See generally'N/T, 7/12/16. Petitioner's own statements indicated that he understood the proceedings; hence, he is bound by them and may not now assert the contrary.
Petitioner has presented no evidence that he was unable to waive his trial rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Petitioner's contention as to this issue is therefore is without merit.
e. The Potential Effect of Mitigation Evidence.
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to Third-degree Murder, because the facts of Petitioner's case and his history "would have mitigated Third-degree Murder to, at worst, voluntary manslaughter." Amended PCRA Petition, f 16(e). A defendant does not need to be pleased with the outcome of a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103,1107 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Just because a defendant believes that he might, in the present time, get a better deal than he did when he pled guilty, does not render that plea invalid. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 503 (Pa. 1998).
PCRA counsel is of the apparent belief that he may have secured a better deal for Petitioner than trial counsel did. Trial counsel noted at the PCRA hearing that, "[u]nder the current regime, it might have been a little different. But back then, I don't know who the DA was but - he couldn't take that risk." N/T, 1/13/22, at 117. This does not render trial counsel's conduct ineffective. A person may not succeed in a claim of ineffectiveness simply because the District Attorney has changed since the case was active.
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that "[i]f I was confident that we could win this case, we would have tried this case. . . a lot of variables go into play when you try one of these cases." N/T, 1/13/22, at 142. Trial counsel testified that he considered and discussed many options with the Petitioner, including going to trial and the likelihood of obtaining either a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict, or a guilty verdict on the First-degree Murder charge. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 115-118. He also noted that "Petitioner has the sympathies on his side when you look at the facts of the case," but that, regardless of this mitigation, going to trial was a "risky proposition." N/T, 1/13/22, at 119-20. Trial counsel further testified that Petitioner understood these conversations and understood what pleading guilty meant. See N/T, 1/13/22, at 118. Trial counsel's testimony indicating that he considered several options was credible. Without taking the case before a jury, this Court cannot speculate on Petitioner's contention that he would have been convicted of "at worst, voluntary manslaughter." Further, it would be absurd to find that trial counsel was ineffective when he succeeded in obtaining a Third-degree Murder bargain for what would have likely been two First-degree Murder convictions, and where the defendant specifically requested that his counsel get the best deal possible. Petitioner presented no evidence that his trial counsel failed to consider any mitigating factors. Petitioner's claim on this point is therefore meritless.
f. The Court's Awareness of Petitioner's Mental Health Conditions.
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Petitioner's "mental health history, mental retardation, sexual abuse, and severe psychiatric disorders, despite having been given the opportunity to do so." Amended PCRA Petition, 4/16/21,f 16(f). This claim is belied by the record. During the guilty plea colloquy, the court asked Petitioner if he had ever had a mental health diagnosis. When he responded in the negative, trial counsel corrected Petitioner, saying "[w]ell, that's not true, Judge." N/T, 7/12/16, at 5-6. Later in the hearing, the judge inquired into Petitioner's specific diagnosis, and trial counsel informed the court that Petitioner had been diagnosed with Dissociative Identity Disorder. N/T, 7/12/16, at 25. Finally, the notes of testimony from the guilty plea indicate that the judge had a copy of Dr. Steinberg's report, dated September 2, 2015, in her file. See N/T, 7/12/16, at 25. That report contained information regarding Petitioner's mental health history, sexual abuse, and psychiatric conditions.
When a pre-sentence investigation is done, it is presumed that the trial judge is aware of the factors in the pre-sentence report which are relevant to sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). There was no PSI done in Petitioner's case, as he was sentenced the same day that he entered his plea. However, the sentencing judge had a copy of Steinberg's psychiatric report and was aware of its contents. Thus, we may presume that the court was apprised of Petitioner's mental health conditions. In addition, the notes of testimony directly support the presumption that the judge had this knowledge.
Petitioner has presented no evidence that the sentencing court did not have adequate knowledge of Petitioner's mental health conditions. Petitioner's claim that the court did not have this information is therefore without merit.
3. Petitioner's Guilty Plea Was Not Unlawfully Induced.
Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced. A person may be eligible for relief for "a plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the person is innocent." 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). While failure to plead innocence will bar such a claim, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 731-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), it is not enough merely to claim innocence. A petitioner must still show that the plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, and that such deficiency was caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
Petitioner has failed to present any evidence indicating that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced. While he contends that he is legally innocent of the underlying charges to meet the innocence threshold, this is insufficient. See Amended PCRA Petition, 4/16/21, f 20(d). Petitioner has failed to set forth any facts which would establish that he was induced by his trial counsel. Nor has Petitioner provided any explanation as to why he would have pled guilty if he believed he was legally innocent. To the contrary, the record shows that Petitioner understood his options and made a choice to plead guilty. Trial counsel specifically evaluated the possibility of Petitioner being found legally innocent. In his testimony at the January 13, 2022, PCRA hearing, trial counsel discussed his evaluation of Petitioner's case in terms of the mens rea and mental state elements. When working with Dr. Steinberg, he took the case before a panel of twenty-two psychiatrists. N/T, 1/13/22, at 111. These psychiatrists considered the case and evaluated the facts under the M'Naghten standard. Of the twenty-two psychiatrists, only one believed that the standard could be met. N/T, 1/13/22, at 111. Therefore, presentation of an actual innocence defense was considered by counsel and discussed with Petitioner. Given that 21 out of 22 psychiatrists did not believe Petitioner could obtain a NGRI verdict, Petitioner advised his counsel that he wanted to get "the best deal possible." See N/T, 1/13/22, at 112-18. Merely having the choice between two unpleasant options will not render an otherwise valid plea unlawfully induced. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 464 A.2d 1327, 1336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
See 18 Pa. C.S. §§314-15.
As more fully recounted supra, Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He has presented no evidence of unlawful inducement, and therefore this claim, similar to the others raised in Petitioner's Amended PCRA, is without merit.
CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving that postconviction relief is merited. After review of the applicable statutes, testimony, and case law, this Court's denial of Petitioner's PCRA should be affirmed.