Opinion
J-S22045-14 No. 1470 MDA 2013
03-28-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. TRAVIS MICHAEL PATTERSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order July 15, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0007053-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:
Appellant, Travis Michael Patterson, appeals from the July 15, 2013 order denying his "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Enforcement of Plea Agreement." After careful review, we reverse.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural background of this case as follows. On December 12, 2011, the Commonwealth filed an information charging Appellant with one count each of statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors and unlawful contact with a minor. On February 16, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors, and the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining charges. That same day, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nine to 23 months' imprisonment followed by four years' probation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1, 3123(a)(7), 3125(a)(8), 3126(a)(8), 6301(a)(1)(ii) and 6318(a)(1), respectively.
On December 19, 2012, Appellant filed a motion for extraordinary relief, arguing that the retroactive application of Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The trial court held a hearing on this motion on January 28, 2013, at the conclusion of which it entered an order denying the motion. On February 27, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, which was docketed by this Court at 416 MDA 2013. Appellant voluntarily discontinued the appeal on April 24, 2013.
We note that this Court has held challenges to Megan's Law and its processes are not cognizable under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 842 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (concluding that challenges to sexually violent predator determinations under Megan's Law and the processes surrounding said determinations are not cognizable under the PCRA), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 846 (Pa. 2012).
On June 21, 2013, Appellant filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Enforcement of Plea Agreement." The trial court conducted a hearing on this motion on July 15, 2013, at the conclusion of which, it entered an order denying said motion. On August 13, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review.
1. Whether the [trial] court erred in failing to enforce the express and implied terms of Appellant's 2011 negotiated plea agreement that Appellant would not have to register as a sex offender in violation of the fundamental fairness and the state and federal due process doctrines because the term of non-registration was negotiated, understood, material, and relied on by the parties?Appellant's Brief at 7.
2. Whether the [trial] court erred in failing to enforce the express and implied term of Appellant's 2011 negotiated plea agreement that Appellant would not have to register as a sex offender in violation of the Contract Clauses of both U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 and Pa. Const. Art. I, § 17?
In his first issue, Appellant argues that SORNA cannot be retroactively applied to him because it would deprive him of the benefit of the plea bargain he entered into with the Commonwealth. Appellant's Brief at 13. We begin by noting our standard of review. "In determining whether a particular plea agreement has been breached, we look to 'what the parties to this plea agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.'" Commonwealth v. Fruehan, 557 A.2d 1093, 1095 (Pa. Super. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
An en banc panel of this Court recently addressed this very issue in Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). In Hainesworth, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of statutory sexual assault, three counts of indecent assault, and one count of criminal use of a communication facility. Id. at 445. At the time of Hainesworth's guilty plea, none of these offenses were triggering offenses under the version of Megan's Law in effect at the time. Id. at 445-446. "This fact was acknowledged on the record during Hainesworth's plea colloquy." Id. at 446. Like Appellant in this case, while Hainesworth was serving his sentence, the new version of Megan's Law went into effect, along with its new tier-system and registration requirements. Hainesworth filed a motion seeking to terminate his supervision due to the new registration requirements. The trial court denied his motion but entered an order concluding that Hainesworth would not be subject to the new registration requirements. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.
This Court began its analysis by noting that "the issue before [the Court] was properly framed by Hainesworth and the trial court as an analysis of contract law." Id. at 447. This Court then reviewed the transcript of Hainesworth's plea hearing, noting that "the trial court and Hainesworth were assured no less than twice by the Commonwealth that the plea did not obligate Hainesworth to register as a sex offender." Id. at 448. The Hainesworth Court concluded that "the record show[ed] that nonregistration was a term of Hainesworth's plea bargain." Id.
Next, the Hainesworth Court addressed the cardinal legal question of the appeal, that is "whether it was error for the trial court to order specific performance of the terms of [Hainesworth's plea] bargain." Id. This Court concluded it was not erroneous for the trial court to order the bargain's terms be enforced. The Hainesworth Court noted the severity of the registration requirements.
"[R]egistration obviously has serious and restrictive consequences for the offender, including prosecution if the requirement is violated. Registration can also affect the offender's ability to earn a livelihood, his housing arrangements and options, and his reputation." Commonwealth v. Gehris , 54 A.3d 862, 879 (Pa. 2012) (Castille, C.J., Opinion in Support of Reversal). In fact, the requirements of registration are so rigorously enforced, even "[t]he occurrence of a natural disaster or other event requiring evacuation of residences shall not relieve the sexual offender of the duty to register." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.25(e). As noted by Hainesworth, when a defendant agrees to a guilty plea, he gives up his "constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confrontation, to present witness, to remain silent and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Hainesworth's Brief at 22. In negotiating a plea that will not require him to register as a sex offender, the defendant trades a non-trivial panoply of rights in exchange for his not being subject to a non-trivial restriction. Fundamental fairness dictates that this bargain be enforced.Id. at 449.
The Court also analogized Hainesworth in part to our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976). In Zuber, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea bargain, "[t]he result of said negotiations was a promise by the Commonwealth to recommend a sentence of seven to fifteen years, and ... that the Commonwealth would join with defense counsel in a request to the State Board of Parole that the new sentence run [c]oncurrently with appellant's 'back time' ...." Id. at 443. Appellant argued and the Commonwealth conceded that its promise was hollow since "under the law of Pennsylvania in effect at the time appellant was sentenced, neither a court nor the Parole Board had the power to order that a back time and a front time sentence be served concurrently." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court concluded that Zuber was entitled to the benefit of his bargain.
[T]here is an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecutor to honor any and all promises made in exchange for a defendant's plea. Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining system, evidencing the concern that a defendant might be coerced into a bargain or fraudulently induced to give up the very valued constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial by jury.Id. at 444, 446. Based on these considerations, the Hainesworth Court rejected the Commonwealth's arguments and concluded "the parties to this appeal entered into a plea bargain that contained a negotiated term that Hainesworth did not have to register as a sex offender." Hainesworth, supra at 450. "As such, it was not error for the trial court to order specific enforcement of that bargain[.]" Id.
...
Appellant Zuber asks this Court to modify his sentence on the murder conviction, reducing it to two and one-half years to fifteen years' imprisonment. By so doing, appellant will then have received the benefit of the bargain made with the Commonwealth and still serve a prison sentence commensurate with the term contemplated by all of the parties to the plea proceedings. We agree that a sentence modification such as that suggested by the appellant affords the most appropriate remedy.
Turning to the case sub judice, we conclude that Hainesworth controls and disposes of this appeal. At his preliminary hearing, both defense counsel and the Commonwealth indicated that non-registration was a key term of the plea agreement being negotiated between the two sides.
[Defense Counsel]: ... By way of background, since we are on the record, the DA's Office has indicated that if [Appellant] did waive all the charges, that in the future they would be willing to withdraw the IDSI count, the aggravated indecent assault and the unlawful contact with minors and that [Appellant] would be pleading to one or some of the remaining three which is statutory sexual assault, corruption of minors and indecent assault and that he would be guaranteed a county sentence and a non Megan's Law sentence. Is that correct?N.T., 11/18/11, at 2. At the hearing below, the Commonwealth stipulated to the fact that "it was [Appellant's] understanding he wouldn't have to register[.]" N.T., 7/15/13, at 15. Based on these considerations, like in Hainesworth, we agree with Appellant that "the Commonwealth, the defense, and the trial court all reasonably understood that [Appellant] would not have to register as a sex offender as a result of his guilty plea ... [and Appellant] knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty based upon this explicit and implied promise." Appellant's Brief at 20. Also, as in Hainesworth, we agree with Appellant that this argument comes down to a basic analysis of contract law. Id. at 13 (citation omitted). In addition, "[t]he application of SORNA to [Appellant] directly abrogates this promise and fundamentally breaches the agreement." Id. at 20. Following the Hainesworth Court's analysis, Appellant is entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain that he negotiated. See Zuber, supra; Hainesworth, supra.
[Commonwealth]: That's correct, Your Honor. I had a lengthy discussion with the complaining witness and her parents, and they are in agreement with that proposal whereby [Appellant] will not be subjected to Megan's Law or a state prison sentence if he enters a plea at the Court of Common Pleas and does not make her take the stand to testify.
The Commonwealth acknowledges that Hainesworth will likely control the analysis and outcome in this case. Commonwealth's Brief at 7. However, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court was nevertheless correct in denying Appellant the benefit of his plea bargain because "the prosecutor cannot control the collateral consequences as associated with convictions[.]" Id. at 9. However, as the Commonwealth fully concedes, Hainesworth dealt with the same issue in this case, and we are required to follow it absent intervening authority. See Commonwealth v. Burkholder, 719 A.2d 346, 352 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating, "[a] panel of this court cannot overrule a prior decision rendered by the court sitting en banc[]") (citation omitted), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1999). In any event, because we agree with the Commonwealth's acknowledgement that Hainesworth does apply to this case, Appellant is entitled to relief on his first issue.
Because we resolve Appellant's first issue in his favor, we need not address his constitutional argument in his second issue. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736, 741 (Pa. 2013) (stating, "when considering matters which raise both constitutional and non-constitutional bases for relief, [courts] attempt to resolve the matter on non-constitutional grounds whenever practicable[]") (citations omitted).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant is entitled to relief insofar as he is entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain he negotiated with the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the trial court's July 15, 2013 order is reversed.
On December 16, 2013, Appellant filed an application in this Court for a Post-Submission Communication pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2501(b), attaching a slip copy of this Court's decision in Hainesworth. We grant Appellant's application.
Order reversed. Application for relief granted. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. __________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary