Opinion
No. 1756 C.D. 2014
02-17-2015
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Graterford (DOC) petitions for review of an arbitrator's award of benefits under what is commonly referred to as the Heart and Lung Act. DOC contends the award is outside the confines of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and contravenes public policy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 P.S. §§637-638.
I. Background
The facts of this case are not in dispute. DOC and the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association (Union) are parties to a CBA, which covers the bargaining unit for employees of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (SCI-Graterford). Pursuant to a memorandum of understanding in the parties' CBA, DOC and the Union agreed the resolution of disputes over eligibility under the Heart and Lung Act would be assigned to an arbitrator, who "shall be guided by judicial opinions interpreting the Acts." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 76a (CBA, App. H, Art. II, §2(b) of Memo. of Understanding).
Shalonda Hall (Claimant) is a corrections officer at SCI-Graterford and a member of the bargaining unit. On January 3, 2014, she sustained a hand injury when she slipped and fell in the lobby at SCI-Graterford on her way to work. DOC required corrections officers to report for duty in uniform. On the date of the injury, Claimant arrived at work in her uniform. As she walked through the main lobby area toward a biometric clock to clock in, near her scheduled start time of 6:00 a.m., Claimant slipped and fell and injured her left hand. Because the fall caused her hand to get wet, Claimant was unable to clock in as the biometric clock could not read her wet fingerprint. DOC permitted her to work the day without clocking in. At the time of her fall, Claimant did not have a specific assignment for that day. Although Claimant would have been responsible for any emergency involving inmates when she fell, no inmates are allowed in the lobby, which is a secure area.
As the injury occurred within the scope of Claimant's employment, DOC did not dispute her entitlement to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. Pursuant to a notice of compensation payable, Claimant received two-thirds of her average weekly wage in the form of total disability benefits.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1 -1041.4, 2501-2708.
However, DOC disputed Claimant's eligibility for Heart and Lung Act benefits claiming the injury did not occur in the performance of her duties as she did not yet start her shift. The parties mutually selected Arbitrator Ralph H. Colflesh, Jr., Esq. (Arbitrator) to hear and determine the dispute. The parties agreed the issue before the Arbitrator was whether Claimant was injured in the performance of her duties pursuant to the Heart and Lung Act.
The Arbitrator addressed relevant case law from this Court, but found it not determinative. Based on the facts found and arguments presented, the Arbitrator determined Claimant was in the performance of her duties under the Heart and Lung Act when she slipped and fell in a lobby area before beginning her shift. The Arbitrator reasoned Claimant was in the performance of her duties because she was: within the confines of the interior of SCI-Graterford; directly heading to the clock-in station; uniformed and prepared to exercise "care, custody, and control" of inmates; and, in the event of an emergency, reasonably required to exercise that control in the lobby before officially clocking in. Arbitrator's Op., 9/2/14, at 7.
From this decision, DOC filed a petition for review to vacate the Arbitrator's award on the basis it exceeds the confines of the parties' CBA and contravenes public policy.
DOC also filed the application for stay, which this Court granted. Commonwealth Ct. Mem. & Order, 10/30/14, at 12.
II. Issues
On appeal, DOC argues the Arbitrator's award does not draw from the essence of the CBA because it is not guided by legal precedent. Alternatively, DOC asserts the award must be vacated because it contravenes clear, well-defined public policy, which favors the employer.
III. Discussion
A. Essence Test
First, DOC contends the Arbitrator's award does not draw from the essence of the CBA, which provides arbitrators "shall be guided by judicial opinions interpreting" the Heart and Lung Act in rendering their decisions. Pet'r's Br. at 14 (quoting CBA, App. H, Art. II, §2(b) of Memo. of Understanding). According to DOC, the judicial opinions of this Court are clear that for an injury to be compensable under the Heart and Lung Act, it must occur in the performance of duties. Preparing for work, no matter how close chronologically to the beginning of one's shift, is not the same thing as performing one's duty. Claimant injured her hand before her shift began, not in the performance of her duties. Thus, DOC claims, the Arbitrator's award is not rationally derived from the parties' CBA and must be vacated.
We review an appeal from an arbitration award under the deferential essence test. See Pa. State Corr. Officers Ass'n v. Dep't of Corr., 102 A.3d 1045 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (PSCOA). Pursuant to the essence test, an arbitrator's award must be upheld if it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l Assoc. (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1999); PSCOA. Pursuant to the essence test, a reviewing court must conduct a two-prong analysis:
First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement.Cheyney Univ., 743 A.2d at 413; accord PSCOA.
Given the great deference to be accorded the arbitrator's decision, in the vast majority of cases, the arbitrator's award will be final and binding on the parties, except where the award "indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement." Cheyney Univ., 743 A.2d at 413; accord Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v. Teamsters Local Union No. 77, 45 A.3d 1159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). An arbitrator's award must be upheld if it represents a reasonable interpretation of the agreement between the parties. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n.
"However, a court may vacate an arbitration award if the ... interpretation of the agreement was totally unsupported by principles of contract construction or if it is manifestly unreasonable." Id. at 1166 (citations and internal quotations omitted). "An arbitrator's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it contradicts the plain language of the CBA." Id.
As our Supreme Court admonished "courts should not become embroiled in the merits of an arbitration, but rather, must only determine if the award is indisputably and genuinely without foundation in or fails to logically flow from the collective bargaining agreement." Westmoreland Intermed. Unit # 7 v. Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. Ass'n, PSEA/NEA, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2007). In other words, the essence test is "not whether the reviewing court agrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement but whether the arbitrator's interpretation and application of the agreement can be reconciled with the language of the agreement." Dep't of Corr. v. Pa. Corr. Officers Assoc., 38 A.3d 975, 980 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). "Although a court may differ in its interpretation of the CBA, this does not constitute grounds to vacate the award. In short, the parties bargained for the arbitrator's construction of the CBA, not the court's interpretation of it." Snyder Cnty. Prison v. Teamsters Local Union 764, 95 A.3d 957, 962 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted).
Applying the essence test here, the parties do not dispute satisfaction of the first prong because the issue of whether an injury occurs in the performance of duties for Heart and Lung Act benefits clearly falls within the scope of the CBA. Our focus is on whether the award satisfies the second prong, i.e., whether the award is rationally derived from the CBA.
The parties' CBA grants authority to an arbitrator to determine eligibility under the Heart and Lung Act. In reaching this determination, the parties agreed the arbitrator "shall be guided by judicial opinions interpreting the Acts." R.R. at 76a (CBA, App. H, Art. II, §2(b) of Memo. of Understanding). Although the CBA does not define the term "guided," when read within the context of the CBA, the parties did not intend for the term to mean "bound." Indeed, the CBA provides in the succeeding provision that "[t]he Arbitrator is not bound by, but should be guided by, prior decisions of members of the Arbitration Panel ...." Id. Recently, in PSCOA, we held where an arbitrator provides a "thoughtful analysis" of the cases interpreting the Heart and Lung Act, his decision is "guided" by judicial opinions, and it falls within the confines of the collective bargaining agreement. 102 A.3d at 1048.
The Heart and Lung Act provides benefits for public safety personnel injured in the performance of their duties. Section 1 of the Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. §637; City of Erie v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Annunziata), 838 A.2d 598 (Pa. 2003). To recover Heart and Lung Act benefits, the injured employee must prove she was "injured in the performance of [her] duties." 53 P.S. §637. As the Heart and Lung Act does not define what constitutes the performance of duty, the Arbitrator turned to the judicial opinions of this Court for guidance pursuant to the parties' CBA. In this regard, the Arbitrator examined Allen v. Pennsylvania State Police, 678 A.2d 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), McLaughlin v. Pennsylvania State Police, 742 A.2d 254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), and Justice v. Department of Public Welfare, 829 A.2d 415 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). We summarize these opinions.
Notably, we did not review any of these cases under the essence test. Rather, our review of decisions of the Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner in Allen v. Pennsylvania State Police, 678 A.2d 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) and McLaughlin v. Pennsylvania State Police, 742 A.2d 254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), and of the Department of Public Welfare in Justice v. Department of Public Welfare, 829 A.2d 41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), was limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, errors of law were committed, or whether the necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. See Justice; McLaughlin; Allen. --------
First, in Allen, a police officer arrived early for work and changed into his uniform in the locker room located in the state police facility. While in the process of preparing for work, prior to his shift, the officer injured his hand. The officer argued the injury qualified for Heart and Lung Act benefits because he is required to be fully dressed, and properly groomed, at the beginning of his shift. He also asserted the state police derives a benefit of having officers available not only for their regular shifts, but for emergency situations as well, by preparing for work at the facility. Benefits were denied. On appeal, a divided panel of this Court affirmed the denial of benefits. The Court opined that "preparing for work, no matter how close chronologically to the beginning of one's shift, is not the same thing as performing one's duty." 678 A.2d at 438. The panel majority determined the term "duty" must be strictly construed, and the officer's case did not fall within the parameters of that term. Id. Thus, the officer's pre-duty injury was not compensable under the Heart and Lung Act. Id.
In contrast, in McLaughlin, a divided panel determined a state trooper injured while returning to his patrol car following a meal break was entitled to Heart and Lung Act benefits. Pursuant to the parties' CBA, members on continuous duty for a period of at least eight hours were "permitted to suspend patrol or other assigned activity, subject to immediate call at all times, for the purpose of consuming a meal." 742 A.2d at 255. After consuming his meal, the trooper left the restaurant and headed to his patrol car. While approaching his car, he fell and broke his arm.
The panel majority held the dispositive inquiry is "whether the [employee] was engaging in an obligatory task, conduct, service, or function that arose from his or her position as [an important public safety employee] as a result of which an injury occurred, irrespective of whether the [employee] was on duty at the time." Id. at 257. The panel majority determined the injury occurred in the performance of his duties because the trooper was making a mandatory return to work following a permitted break during his shift. Therefore, he was entitled to Heart and Lung Act benefits.
Notwithstanding, the McLaughlin majority construed "the statutory phrase, 'in the performance of his duties' to exclude those activities necessary to arrive at work on time and in appropriate attire." Id. at 258. Further, the Court opined whether an officer is on or off duty is not necessarily dispositive of whether an injury occurred in the performance of duties, but it is certainly one factor to be considered. Id.
Later, in Justice, this Court considered Allen and McLaughlin, as well as other cases, in determining whether a forensic security worker sustained an injury when he tripped going up a stairway "on his way" to a training session. 829 A.2d at 416. Whether an injury occurs in the performance of duties requires two considerations: whether the employee was on or off duty, and what the employee was doing at the time of the injury. We recognized the demarcation between preparing for duty and actually being on duty is somewhat tenuous, and "[e]ach case involves a fact-sensitive weighing of the relevant considerations." Id. at 417.
Applying these considerations, we determined the forensic worker's injury was not compensable under the Heart and Lung Act. Although the training was mandatory, the Court, relying on Allen, determined the worker was "not yet on duty" when the injury occurred. 829 A.2d at 418. We distinguished the case from McLaughlin, explaining the officer in that case "was injured while on duty, returning to his official vehicle after completing a regulation-permitted mid-shift meal." Id.
The Arbitrator here provided a careful and thoughtful analysis of each of the above cases and compared them to the facts before him. The Arbitrator observed Justice did not expressly overrule McLaughlin, which was decided three years after Allen. The Arbitrator stated there is "no way Claimant's case can be any more controlled by Allen or Justice than it can be by McLaughlin," rendering the "legal precedent useless." Arbitrator's Op. at 6. Thus, the Arbitrator found the law not determinative. Id.
Nevertheless, based on his evaluation of the facts and review of the law, the Arbitrator determined Claimant was injured in the performance of her duties entitling her to Heart and Lung Act benefits. The Arbitrator reasoned Claimant could have been required to take action in the SCI-Graterford lobby had an inmate unexpectedly breached the area, before clocking in. He explained:
Claimant was within the confines of the interior of the SCI, she was directly heading to the clock in station, she [was] uniformed and prepared to exercise 'care, custody, and control' of inmates, and—in the event of an emergency she would reasonably be required to exercise that control in the lobby even before officially checking in.Id. at 7. Significantly, the Arbitrator found Claimant was prepared to work, not preparing for work when the injury occurred. See id.
Given our deferential review of arbitration awards, we believe the Arbitrator's award was not outside the confines of the CBA. Although the Arbitrator ultimately found the legal precedent not determinative, the Arbitrator was nevertheless "guided" by judicial opinions interpreting the phrase "injured in the performance of duty." As this Court recognized, the demarcation between preparing for duty and actually being on duty is somewhat tenuous and is fact sensitive. Justice; Allen. Although we may not agree with the Arbitrator's determination on the merits, it was not manifestly unreasonable for the Arbitrator to conclude Claimant was in the performance of her duties when the injury occurred. See Westmoreland (appellate role is not to assess the merits, but is limited to determining whether the award draws its essence from the CBA and is rationally derived therefrom). Thus, we conclude the award draws its essence from the CBA.
B. Public Policy
Alternatively, DOC asserts, even if the award draws from the essence of the CBA, it must be vacated because it contravenes clear, well-defined public policy. According to DOC, the Heart and Lung Act must be strictly construed in favor of the employer, not liberally applied in favor of Claimant. DOC contends the award improperly bestows benefits to an ineligible employee because the injury occurred prior to her shift, not in the performance of her duties. In so doing, DOC claims the award obliterates the distinction between eligibility for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act and the Heart and Lung Act.
The essence test is subject to a narrow exception by which an arbitrator's award will be vacated if it is violative of the public policy of the Commonwealth. Phila. Housing Auth. v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. and Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 33, Local 934, 52 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2012); Westmoreland. A court may not enforce an arbitration award that contravenes public policy. Westmoreland. "Such public policy, however, must be well-defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Id. at 866.
The purpose of the Heart and Lung Act is to provide important public safety personnel with full compensation while temporarily disabled from an injury incurred in the performance of duty. Shaw v. Twp. of Aston, 919 A.2d 303 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). The Heart and Lung Act must be strictly construed, which is in stark contrast to the liberal, pro-employee construction afforded by the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Annunziata; see Williams v. GEICO Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 32 A.3d 1195 (Pa. 2011). As our Supreme Court explained:
In Annunziata, we recognized that the [Heart and Lung Act] was enacted to protect the municipality rather than the responder by enticing the most qualified individuals to undertake such employment. We stated, 'Efficient firemen and police officers must take chances; the performance of their duties are hazardous. The prospect of uninterrupted income during periods of disability well may attract qualified persons to these vocations.' 838 A.2d at 603 (quoting Kurtz v. City of Erie, 389 Pa. 557, 133 A.2d 172, 177 (1957) (citation and quotation omitted)). Stated differently, we concluded that the legislature intended to incentivize employment in the enumerated occupations to ensure the highest qualified persons would accept the positions, therefore benefitting the municipality. Based on our prior interpretation of the Heart and Lung Act, we cannot conclude that it represents a public policy decision by the legislature to protect first responders.Williams, 32 A.3d at 1201-02. In other words, the Heart and Lung Act must be strictly construed to the benefit of the employer, not the injured employee. See id.
While recognizing the Heart and Lung Act must be strictly construed to the benefit of the employer, we do not agree that the Arbitrator's award in this case contravenes that public policy. The Arbitrator fully recognized the Heart and Lung Act must be narrowly applied but not "so pinched that it precludes otherwise worthy claims." Arbitrator's Op. at 6. The Arbitrator determined Claimant was injured in the performance of her duties because she was "uniformed and prepared to exercise 'care, custody, and control' of inmates" in the interior of SCI-Graterford. Id. at 7.
The Arbitrator limited his award, stating benefits would not be appropriate where "a pre-shift injury occurs outside the interior of an SCI or forensic facility except if inmates or patients are in such proximity to a properly equipped employee that the employee would reasonably be expected to take action in his or her role as a custodian, care-giver, and controller." Id. In addition, the Arbitrator opined benefits would not apply "where an employee—whether before or during his or shift—is injured when not directly headed to assume duties." Id. Finally, he declared Heart and Lung Act "coverage should be withheld where an employee—whether or not before or after clocking in—is injured while engaged in unauthorized activities that are not part of his or her duties, even where such activities are expressly or tacitly condoned by supervision or management." Id.
Upon review, the Arbitrator narrowly interpreted the Heart and Lung Act. Having determined the Arbitrator's interpretation of the Heart and Lung Act was guided by judicial precedent, and recognizing the tenuous demarcation between preparing for duty and being on duty, we cannot conclude the Arbitrator's award contravenes public policy.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Arbitrator's award is rationally derived from the CBA as the Arbitrator's conclusion that Claimant was injured in the performance of her duties was guided by judicial precedent. The Arbitrator's award did not contravene public policy.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of February, 2015, the arbitration award is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge