Opinion
J-S06012-20 No. 1316 EDA 2019
03-03-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM E. NEAL Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 24, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0929151-1993 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
William E. Neal appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing as untimely his sixth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After our review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable case law, we agree with the PCRA court's determination that Neal's petition is untimely and he has failed to allege an exception to the jurisdictional time bar. We, therefore, affirm.
On July 29, 1994, following a bench trial before the Honorable James A. Lineberger, Neal was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery and possession of an instrument of crime. The court sentenced Neal to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in part and remanded for a determination as to whether trial counsel had provided effective assistance of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Neal , 688 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 1996). On remand, the trial court determined that Neal was not entitled to relief. On appeal, this Court affirmed Neal's judgment of sentence and the Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on November 6, 1998. See Commonwealth v. Neal , 724 A.2d 958 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 732 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1998). Neal did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court.
Neal filed the instant petition, his sixth, on November 27, 2017. The PCRA court notified Neal of its intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and, on April 24, 2019, the court dismissed Neal's petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed. Neal raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether Appellant has a constitutional right to challenge the Commonwealth's withholding of favorable evidence from the accused, where the evidence is material to a finding of not guilty and/or creates a lesser punishments/sentence?
2. Should the court have viewed the totality of all the violations shown, and declared that a miscarriage of justice did occur, and should have held a hearing to address the matter on the and for the record, while sitting as a fair, honest, equal, moral, objective factfinder?
3. Will a state criminal statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it fails to meet the standards of Due Process under the U.S. Constitution?Appellant's Brief, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization and punctuation omitted).
4. Concerning the charged statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), (b), (c), does the law give fair notice to those persons potentially subject to it and the punishment that will occur for its violation?
5. Does the law, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a),(b), (c), adequately guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, where a person can be sentenced under the statute, where the statute does not reveal a punishment?
6. Does the law provide sufficient breath space for First Amendment rights to challenge a statute that violates the Void for Vagueness doctrine?
7. Whether a true void judgment, a legal nullity, can be challenged at any time, given that laches and similar finality principles generally have no effect on void judgment; where the court have held the mere passage of time will not convert a void judgment in to a proper one?
Neal's judgment of sentence became final on February 6, 1999, the date on which the 90-day period for seeking a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. See U.S. Sup.Ct.R. 13; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9545(b)(3) (judgment becomes final at conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in Supreme Court of United States and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at expiration of time for seeking review). Neal had one year from that date, until February 6, 2000, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). The instant petition was filed more than seventeen years after his judgment of sentence became final.
Neal's petition is patently untimely, and he has failed to plead and prove an exception to the jurisdictional time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); Commonwealth v. Robinson , 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016) (PCRA time requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor , 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000) ("[W]hen a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the expiration of direct review, or not eligible for one of the three limited exceptions, or entitled to one of the exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date that the claim could have been first brought, the [PCRA] court has no power to address the substantive merits of a petitioner's PCRA claims."). We agree with the sound reasoning of the Honorable Genece E. Brinkley's opinion, and we rely on that opinion to affirm the court's order. See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/19, at 3-5. We direct the parties to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings.
On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended section 9545(b)(2), extending the time for filing a petition from 60 days to one year from the date the claim could have been presented. Section 3 of Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, effective in 60 days [Dec. 24, 2018] provides that the amendment of subsection (b)(2) by that Act shall apply to claims arising on December 24, 2017 or thereafter.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/3/20
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