Opinion
689 MDA 2023 J-A27010-23
01-12-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID ADDISON GRANT MURRAY Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000171-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
LAZARUS, J.
David Addison Grant Murray appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, after the trial court convicted him of one count each of criminal trespass and simple assault - physical menace. After review, we affirm.
Id. at § 2701(a)(3).
The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
On October 24[], 2021, [Murray] texted the [v]ictim, his ex-girlfriend, at around 12:30 a.m.[,] asking if he could come to her apartment. The [v]ictim told [Murray] he could not come over. At trial, the [v]ictim explained that she and [Murray] had dated for approximately three years prior to breaking up. [Murray] proceeded to plead with the [v]ictim through multiple text messages until she finally said, "I'm not going to change my mind," and she went to sleep.
Around two hours later, the [v]ictim was awoken by what she described as the sound of tapping on glass. The [v]ictim then heard her Ring Doorbell alarm going off. Although she was scared, the [v]ictim began to walk down her hallway to see what had set the alarm off. She described seeing the door jamb of her front door being pushed in, and that was why the alarm was set off. She heard whispering and approached the door to try and shut it. It was then that she realized the whispering was coming from [Murray,] who was outside the door. Upon realizing who was trying to open her front door, the [v]ictim asked [Murray] to leave. [Murray] disregarded the [v]ictim and "pushed" his way past her and into her apartment via her front door.
Once in the [v]ictim's apartment, [Murray] sat down at her kitchen table while [the victim] remained standing in the doorway. From her familiarity with [Murray], it was clear he had been drinking, as he was having a hard time getting through sentences. The [v]ictim also testified that [Murray] was slurring his speech and was "clearly very drunk." [Murray] remained seated at the kitchen table for approximately 30 minutes as he repeatedly told the [v]ictim that he "needed to talk to her." [Murray] ignored the [v]ictim's multiple pleas with him to leave; she asked several times, offered to drive him home[,] and also offered to call his parents to come and pick him up.
The [v]ictim repeatedly told [Murray] that he was scaring her and begged him to leave her apartment, to no avail. In an effort to persuade [Murray] to leave, the [v]ictim told him that the police and her dad were coming to the apartment because the alarm had sounded. The [v]ictim testified that[,] after asking if her father was still en route and she responded "yes," [Murray] stood up from the kitchen table and walked to the cutlery drawer. The [v]ictim explained that the drawer was empty because she was in the process of packing to move, but there was a butcher block with knives on the counter. [She] testified that [Murray] deliberately . . . "walked over to the butcher block, grabbed it, and right when he started walking towards the butcher block and made contact with it, I booked[ it.]"
The [v]ictim testified that she jumped halfway off her balcony and made her way to her car to escape [Murray]. The [v]ictim explained that when she turned around, [Murray] was standing on the balcony brandishing a knife. The [v]ictim left and placed a
911 call. The [v]ictim acknowledged that during the 911 phone call she made, she did not indicate that she saw [Murray] holding the knife. Upon leaving her apartment and calling 911, the [v]ictim went to a local Turkey Hill[ convenience store,] where she was met by police officers from the Derry Township Police Department.
The [v]ictim stated that she recorded a video of her altercation with [Murray]. To start this recording without [Murray's knowledge], she told him that she was texting her neighbor regarding the alarm sounding; the [v]ictim testified that she never actually texted the neighbor.
Sergeant Dennis Eckenrode testified that he is employed by the Derry Township Police Department and[,] on October 24, 2021, he was working the night shift when he received a call from dispatch to respond to a residence in Hershey. Sergeant
Eckenrode responded to the residence along with other officers[,] where they encountered [Murray,] who was inside the residence. [Murray] came walking towards the officers from the [v]ictim's bedroom. [Murray] was searched, during which officers found a sex toy, a "large purple dildo," that belonged to the [v]ictim, in [Murray]'s pocket. A second search of [Murray], done at the booking center, revealed he also had another sex toy on his person, [also] belonging to the [v]ictim.
Patrol Sergeant Jana Klinger, of Derry Township, testified that as she cleared the [v]ictim's apartment, a "large[-]bladed kitchen knife" and a photograph was found on the [v]ictim's bed. Sergeant Klinger also testified that there was a knife missing from the [v]ictim's butcher block and[,] by looking at the label of the kitchen knives, she was able to identify the missing knife from the set to be the one found on the [v]ictim's bed.
[Murray] testified that[,] on the evening of October 23, 2021[,] he was out with his family celebrating his mother's birthday and consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication where he could not drive but was not "out of control." [Murray] began texting the [v]ictim because he was eager to discuss getting back together with her. [Murray] walked to the [v]ictim's house and arrived at 2:24 a.m. [Murray] began knocking on the door and urged [the] [v]ictim to let him in because it was cold, and he was not wearing a jacket. [Murray] testified that the [v]ictim unlocked the door and let him inside. [Murray] acknowledged that the [v]ictim told
him she did not want him to come inside, but he did anyway. He explained that after the [v]ictim left the residence, he took a butcher knife out to protect himself from the[v]ictim's father, who he believed was coming to the residence. [Murray] testified that he never threatened the [v]ictim with the knife and did not stand on her porch with the knife in his hand as she left. [Murray] acknowledged that he stayed in the residence and went to the [v]ictim's bedroom and that is where he was when the police arrived.Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 3-6 (citations omitted).
On October 24, 2021, Sergeant Eckenrode filed a criminal complaint charging Murray with, inter alia, the above-mentioned offenses. Murray ultimately proceeded to a non-jury trial before the Honorable Edward M. Marsico, Jr., after which he was convicted of the above-mentioned offenses, and found not guilty of the remaining offenses. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report.
Murray was also charged with two counts of burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i), and one count of terroristic threats, id. at § 2706(a)(1).
On March 28, 2023, the trial court sentenced Murray, on both convictions, to 15 months' probation, imposed concurrently. Additionally, Murray was ordered to be monitored by a SCRAM bracelet for 90 days, attend anger management classes and relationship counseling, have no contact with the victim, and complete random urine screenings. On April 4, 2023, Murray filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
Murray filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Murray and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Murray now raises the following claims for our review:
1. Were the [guilty] verdicts of simple assault [-] physical menace . . . and [] criminal trespass . . . not supported by sufficient evidence? Was there conflicting testimony by the alleged victim which resulted in the evidence being insufficient?
2. Were the [guilty] verdicts of simple assault [-] physical menace . . . and [] criminal trespass . . . against the weight of the evidence? Was there conflicting critical testimony of the alleged victim which should shock the conscience of the [c]ourt and result in granting a new trial?
3. Did the [trial court] err in this non-jury trial by allowing testimony by the alleged victim of unrelated prior acts of violence and threats against her . . . and did the [trial c]ourt err in allowing [] Murray to be questioned by the prosecution that the victim's father knew he had gotten physical with the victim in the past? . . . Did the reference to prior bad acts [] taint the fact[-]finder and should a new trial be granted?Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
In his first claim, Murray challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions of simple assault - physical menace and criminal trespass. See id. at 47-62. Regarding his criminal trespass conviction, Murray argues that he reasonably believed he was licensed to enter the apartment because the victim had opened the door. See id. at 53-56, 60-62. Murray acknowledges that, while the victim opened the door when Murray arrived, she nevertheless repeatedly told him not to come to her apartment. See id.
Regarding his simple assault - physical menace conviction, Murray asserts that he never threatened the victim with the knife. See id. at 56-58. Murray further posits that the victim's testimony was unreliable because she did not mention a knife in the 911 phone call and did not mention a knife to police when they initially interviewed her at the Turkey Hill. See id. We disagree.
When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we adhere to the following standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not [re-]weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
Under the Crimes Code, a person commits criminal trespass when, "knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he [] gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i).
A person commits the crime of simple assault - physical menace when "he [] attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]" Id. at § 2701(a)(3).
The trial court addressed Murray's challenge to his simple assault - physical menace conviction as follows:
[As previously summarized, t]he victim saw [Murray] go to her cutlery drawer, which was empty, and she saw him grab the butcher block containing knives. The [c]ourt accepted the [v]ictim's testimony that she believed [Murray] was holding a knife in his hand when she left her residence. Further, during her flight from [Murray], she saw him on her balcony brandishing the knife. Additionally, [Murray] acknowledged that he did take a knife from the butcher block and the knife was later found on the victim's bed, where [Murray] admitted to being prior to the police arriving. . . . By going to her cutlery drawer, grabbing a butcher knife from the butcher block, and holding the knife, he clearly placed the victim in fear of serious bodily injury. Viewing all of the circumstances of the incident, we can certainly infer his intent was to place the victim in such fear.Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 7-8.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Murray's convictions. First, we agree with the trial court's determination regarding Murray's conviction of simple assault - physical menace. See id. at 7-8. The record reflects that Murray was not welcome in the victim's home, but he nevertheless entered. See id. at 3-6. The record further reflects that the victim repeatedly told Murray that he was scaring her, and that, shortly thereafter, Murray picked up a kitchen knife. See id. Viewing all of the above circumstances of the incident, "we can certainly infer his intent was to place the victim in such fear." Id. at 7-8; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3).
Likewise, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain Murray's conviction of criminal trespass. Murray was repeatedly told he could not enter the victim's apartment. Nevertheless, Murray walked to the victim's home, knocked on her door, and attempted to force his way into the home to the extent that he set off the victim's Ring Doorbell alarm. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 3-6. Then, after gaining entry to the home, the victim repeatedly told Murray that he was unwelcome, he was scaring her, and that he needed to leave. See id.; see also id. (detailing victim's offers to call Murray's parents to pick him up, or to drive him home herself). Still, Murray remained in the victim's home and disregarded her pleas. Id. Further, after Murray brandished the kitchen knife and the victim had fled, he remained in the home until police arrived. See id. These facts reflect that Murray knew he was not "licensed or privileged" to gain entry or remain in the victim's home. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). Consequently, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain both of Murray's convictions, and we afford him no relief. See Smith, supra.
In his second claim, Murray argues that his convictions were against the weight of the evidence. See Brief for Appellant, at 62-69. Murray asserts that the verdict should shock our conscience because his convictions "have been made out of a simple dispute between a boyfriend and a girlfriend where the evidence does not suggest or support a finding of criminality. Foolish drama between a boyfriend and girlfriend should not result in a criminal charge." Id. at 65. Murray reiterates that the victim's failure to tell the 911 dispatcher, and the police at Turkey Hill, that Murray had a knife, should compel a finding that the victim lied about the knife. Id. at 65-66. Further, Murray posits that the victim's testimony was unreliable because the victim let Murray into the apartment by undoing the deadbolt. Id. at 66. We disagree.
Our standard of review related to a challenge to the verdict as against the weight of the evidence is well settled.
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,] who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the . . . verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice.Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 672-73 (Pa. 1999). Additionally, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim, an appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; rather, our appellate review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003). The issue is whether the trial court's decision that the verdicts did not shock its conscience overrode the law; was manifestly unreasonable; or the result of bias, prejudice, or ill will. As this Court has often reminded appellants, our "standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Winslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (to allow appellant "to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the [trial] court.").
After our review of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling against Murray on his weight claim. See Champney, supra; Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 7-8. Consequently, Murray is afforded no relief on this claim.
In his third claim, Murray contends that the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to question him about a previous altercation in which Murray had "gotten physical" with the victim. See Brief for Appellant, at 69-77. Murray asserts that this questioning was wholly improper as evidence to establish motive, intent, malice, or ill will because there was no notice from the Commonwealth; there was no evidence as to when this prior altercation had occurred; and, in the instant case, there was no evidence that Murray had touched or threatened the victim. Id. at 70-71, 74. Murray argues that this testimony prejudiced him by improperly eliciting a prior bad act. Id. at 74-77.
Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence. Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008). Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 401, evidence is relevant if "it has the tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and [] the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Pa.R.E. 401. "Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact." Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002). "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible." Pa.R.E. 402. "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Pa.R.E. 403.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows:
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
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(b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2).
"[E]vidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant's propensity to commit crimes." Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2004). Nevertheless, "[e]vidence may be admissible in certain circumstances[,] where it is relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the defendant's character." Id. Specifically, other crimes evidence is admissible if offered for a non-propensity purpose, such as proof of an actor's knowledge, plan, motive, or identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 534 (Pa. 2005). When offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of prior crimes is admissible if its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 664-65 (Pa. 2014).
Unfair prejudice "means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the [fact-finder]'s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially." Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007).
Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. This Court has stated that it is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the [fact-finder]'s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.
Moreover, we have upheld the admission of other crimes evidence, when relevant, even where the details of the other crime were extremely grotesque or highly prejudicial.Id.
Generally, in domestic abuse cases, evidence of prior abuse between the parties is "admissible to establish motive, intent, malice, or ill-will." Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover, "a trial court, acting as the finder of fact, is presumed to know the law, ignore prejudicial statements, and disregard inadmissible evidence." See Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (citing Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Instantly, during his direct testimony, Murray explained that he grabbed the knife when he knew the victim's father was on his way in order to protect himself from the father. See N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 12/1/22, at 82-83. The exchange on direct examination, in relevant part, was as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: There was reference to a concern about her father coming and you were expressing some concern about that. What was that all about?
[Murray]: Yeah. Her dad[,] when she said her dad was coming, he intimidates me physically. He's kind of a gritty guy. He bartends at a biker bar. So[,] I was concerned about him coming over and physical and the interaction with me [sic].
[Defense Counsel]: At some point-let me ask it this way. Did you ever take a knife from the kitchen?
[Murray]: I did.
[Defense Counsel]: When you took the knife, where was [the victim,] in the apartment or out?
[Murray]: She had left. She was outside the apartment.
[Defense Counsel]: Why did you go to get the knife?
[Murray]: In the event her dad was coming. I wanted to, you know, have a way to protect myself if he were to come after or be like, you know, I'll get out of here. Please don't attack me.Id.
On cross-examination, Murray testified that the victim's father had been aware that Murray had previously been violent with the victim. Id. at 92. That exchange, in relevant part, was as follows:
[Commonwealth]: [Y]ou then get a knife out of the butcher block?
[Murray]: After she left the apartment . . . [a]nd as I testified to, I am scared[,] physically intimidated by him. So[,] if he were on his way, I wanted a way to have a distance between he and I.
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[Commonwealth]: And you said about her father. Her father was aware of the fact that you put your hands on her before?
[Defense Counsel]: Objection.
[Commonwealth]: We talked about him being gritty and all of this animosity. I think we should [] put it into context. I didn't bring this up.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection. No relevanc[e].
[Commonwealth]: It absolutely has relevance. And he's made it an issue.
[Defense Counsel]: If you give notice, if you're going --
[Commonwealth]: I didn't expect that he would say he took the knife to protect himself from the gritty father.
[Trial] Court: All right. We'll allow limited. Answer the question.
[Commonwealth]: You're aware of the fact that her father knows that you've gotten physical with her[?]
[Murray]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection. [Trial] Court: All right. Move on.Id. at 91-93.
Our review of the record reveals that Murray opened the door to this single question during his direct examination. See id. at 82-83. Further, we observe that the trial court allowed only one question and directed the parties to "move on" immediately afterwards. Id. at 91-93. Moreover, the trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, is presumed to know the law, ignore prejudicial statements, and disregard inadmissible evidence. See Smith, supra. Our review of the record reveals nothing that would overcome this presumption. Accordingly, Murray's claim is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.