Opinion
No. 12–P–1985.
2013-12-18
COMMONWEALTH v. Shawn D. MULLINS.
By the Court (RUBIN, MILKEY & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant appeals from his conviction of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He argues that the evidence of his intoxication was derived from an unlawful stop of his motor vehicle.
A motor vehicle stop may be justified by a police officer's reasonable suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that a violation has been committed. Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 39 n. 4 (2011). In this case, Sergeant Connors of the Bourne police department confirmed using radar that the defendant's vehicle was traveling at thirty-six miles per hour after it entered Beach Street. He then made a second observation of speed using his radar, confirming that the defendant's vehicle was accelerating and that it was now traveling at forty-six miles per hour.
The information available to Sergeant Connors provided articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was traveling at a rate of speed that was greater than what was reasonable and proper. This is so regardless of the language of G.L. c. 90, § 17, that sets out certain facts, including a minimum fixed distance at which a speeding vehicle must travel, that amount to “prima facie evidence of a rate of speed that is greater than is reasonable and proper.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Whynaught, 377 Mass. 14, 21–22 (1979).
Judgment affirmed.