Opinion
19-P-1751
01-06-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. JAMAL MOLINA.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a conditional guilty plea in the Superior Court, the defendant, Jamal Molina, was convicted of unlicensed possession of a firearm and unlicensed possession of ammunition. On appeal, he contends that a judge erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and motion for reconsideration of the denial of that motion. We affirm.
As part of the plea agreement, the Commonwealth dismissed charges of possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a large capacity feeding device.
Background. We summarize the facts from the judge's findings and ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress, supplemented with unchallenged testimony from the motion to suppress hearing that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited. See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).
On November 22, 2017, an individual called 911 and reported to the Boston Police Department that he had observed an assault and battery in the area of the Brandywine Housing Development, near the vicinity of Bennington Street and Trident Street in East Boston. The individual provided his name and contact information to the police. He also informed them that one of the perpetrators had fled the crime scene in a sedan bearing Massachusetts license plate number 4TF-148.
The judge found that "one of the perpetrators" had fled in the vehicle. At the motion hearing, however, Detective Casallas testified that "three" assailants "jumped into [the] motor vehicle with [Massachusetts plate number 4TF-148]." Under the totality of circumstances in this particular case, the distinction does not impact our analysis.
Boston Police Detective Casallas, assigned to investigate the incident, had sixteen years of experience, had responded to that location for assaults, breaking and entering, and drug-related crimes, and had made "roughly 12 arrests" in that area. During his investigation, Detective Casallas spoke to the sixteen year old victim's grandfather who advised that he had heard conversations between the victim and "maybe friends over the phone." The grandfather stated that he was "concerned for his son's safety because he heard something about a gun, that the people that assaulted him may have possessed a gun."
On a prior occasion, Detective Casallas was attacked by a drug dealer in this area, and sustained damage to his right eye, a fractured rib, and broken teeth.
Four days later, around 5 P.M., Detective Casallas was in the area of Bennington Street and Trident Street, when "[h]is attention was drawn to a young man, later identified as [the defendant], who had just left the Royal Roast Beef restaurant." Royal Roast Beef was located "across the street" from the location of the attack four days earlier. Upon seeing Detective Casallas's police vehicle, the defendant "put his head down and walked briskly away to a black sedan parked in the restaurant's parking lot." The license plate on the vehicle was "attached only at the top and slightly bent up, making it difficult to read." The defendant drove out of the parking lot and Detective Casallas followed in his police cruiser. After following the defendant's vehicle for "a couple blocks," Detective Casallas "was able to read the license plate, MA plate # 4TF-148." Detective Casallas recognized this as the plate number on the getaway car used four days earlier in the assault and battery. Accordingly, he activated his blue lights and stopped the vehicle.
The motion judge found that the assault and battery occurred "around 100 yards" from the restaurant. The record does not contain evidence of that specific distance. That notwithstanding, the record does support the finding that the assault and battery occurred within a close proximity to the restaurant.
As Detective Casallas approached, he observed the defendant moving inside the vehicle, appearing to reach under the seat, and turning his entire body away from him. Shortly thereafter, the defendant "began flailing his arms," began striking the steering wheel, and made repeated statements about wanting to go home. Following a further sequence of events that are not the subject of this appeal, Detective Casallas observed a firearm under the seat of the vehicle in the area "where [the defendant] had been reaching at the beginning of the police stop."
On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of the detective's actions following the initial stop of the motor vehicle. Thus, this case rises or falls on the presence or absence of reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop.
Following the stop and initial interaction with the defendant, Detective Casallas returned to his cruiser and learned that the defendant's father was the registered owner of the vehicle.
In a comprehensive memorandum and order, the motion judge determined that the "slightly bent license plate attached only at the top, standing alone, did not constitute a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 6." However, the judge denied the motion to suppress because the totality of factors combined to establish reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
We discern no error in the judge's determination that the slightly bent license plate, standing alone, did not constitute a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 6.
Discussion. The defendant argues that Detective Casallas acted on a hunch and lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of the motor vehicle. The standard for reasonable suspicion is well settled. We consider whether the police had a reasonable suspicion, "based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences," that the defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 448 Mass. 711, 714 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 (1990). "Although a mere 'hunch' does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause." Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020), quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014).
See note 5, supra.
Here, the judge concluded that the combination of factors known to Detective Casallas at the time of the stop constituted reasonable suspicion. These factors included the defendant's evasive behavior upon seeing the police cruiser; the bent license plate attached "only at the top"; the match between the license plate on the car driven by the defendant and the license plate on the getaway car from the attack four days earlier; the proximity of the defendant and vehicle to the location of the recent attack; the 911 call and description of events from the named eyewitness; and Detective Casallas's experience and familiarity with the high crime area in which the attack and subsequent stop occurred. The evidence supports the judge's determination, as the specific, myriad combination of factors constituted reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 365-367 (2019) (factors including officer's observation based on training and experience, high crime area, anonymous tip, defendant's furtive and evasive behavior, and defendant's flight, taken together, provided reasonable suspicion for stop); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 717-718, 720 (2008) (police had grounds for investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle, which eyewitnesses observed fleeing from crime completed previous day).
The cases relied upon by the defendant are distinguishable or inapposite. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jordan, 469 Mass. 134, 146 (2014) (court declined to address claim of reasonable suspicion for motor vehicle stop).
The defendant responds that there is nothing suspicious about a young man walking briskly toward his vehicle with "takeout" in his hands, and that the defendant's actions are easily explainable and innocent and thus deserve little to no weight in determining whether the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The flaw in the defendant's argument is that it ignores the totality of factors known to Detective Casallas at the time of the stop, as delineated above. Furthermore, police officers do "not have to exclude all the possible innocent explanations for the facts in order to form a reasonable suspicion." Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 450 Mass. 818, 823 (2008). Indeed, "[v]iewed through the eyes of experienced police officers and as a whole, even seemingly innocent activities may take on a sinister cast and give rise to reasonable suspicion." Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 341, 346 (2010). It bears repeating that "reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause," Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass. 490, 492 (1998), and it is measured objectively. See Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 235 (2017). See also Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 140 n.3 (1990) ("[a]n attempt to avoid contact with an observation by the police, while not enough in itself to justify a suspicion, may be considered along with other facts" [citations omitted]). Reasonable suspicion "depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act" (quotations omitted). Navarette, 572 U.S. at 402, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
For the foregoing reasons, the judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman, Henry & Desmond, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: January 6, 2021.