Opinion
14-P-287
11-06-2014
COMMONWEALTH v. SANDRA J. MOINEAU.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Sandra Moineau appeals after her conviction in the District Court of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, fourth offense. Her sole claim on appeal is that the judge abused her discretion by failing to conduct a sufficient postverdict inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was biased based on his failure to answer a question honestly during voir dire. We conclude that the judge properly conducted a limited postverdict evidentiary hearing and correctly determined that the defendant had failed to demonstrate improper bias.
In general, postverdict questioning of jurors regarding their deliberations is impermissible. See Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 195-196 (1979); Mass. G. Evid. § 606(b) (2014). Massachusetts case law permits two narrow exceptions to this rule. The first, recognized in Fidler, permits inquiry when the deliberations are allegedly influenced by "extraneous 'disturbing' influences." Fidler, 377 Mass. at 197, quoting from Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 466 (1871).
Although "[j]uror bias is not an 'extraneous matter' within the Fidler rule," Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991), a second exception permits inquiry into expressed bias against the defendant during deliberations based on impermissible factors such as race, ethnicity, or sexual preference. See Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 494-497 (2010); Commonwealth v. Delp, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 438-440 (1996).
Despite labeling her posttrial request a "Motion for Post Verdict Juror Inquiry Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Fidler," the defendant does not contend that either of these exceptions applies in her case. Rather, she asserts that she should have been given an opportunity to show that one of the jurors "failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 625 (1987), quoting from McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
"[W]hen a defendant raises a reasonable claim of juror misconduct subsequent to the verdict," due process requires a hearing "in which the defendant has the opportunity to show that a juror was actually biased because the juror dishonestly answered a material question on voir dire and that prejudice resulted from the dishonesty." Amirault, 399 Mass. at 625. Here, the trial judge properly held a hearing and gave the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate juror misconduct.
After the evidentiary hearing, at which one juror (Juror A) testified that another juror (Juror B) "made a comment three -- three different times that it was his impression that one -- one sip and he -- he said one sip and she's guilty as far as he was concerned," the judge found that the defendant's showing did not raise an issue of juror misconduct. We agree.
Juror A's testimony did not demonstrate that Juror B held an impermissible bias against the defendant during voir dire. See Commonwealth v. Luna, 418 Mass. 749, 754 (1994) (juror statement during deliberations that he was prejudiced against law enforcement officers was "an expression of the individual juror's personal philosophy, rather than any type of extraneous influence or impermissible personal bias"); Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 253-254 (2001) (juror's midtrial post on an internet mail service, "Just say he's guilty and lets [sic] get on with our lives," did not target a "characteristic, trait, or quality specific to the defendant" and did not warrant postverdict inquiry into juror bias).
Nor did Juror A's testimony show that Juror B was predisposed to disregard the judge's instructions concerning drinking and driving or that he intentionally concealed this attitude during voir dire. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 118, 126 (2014) (no bias shown if "the juror answered voir dire questions mistakenly, but honestly"). Juror B's reported comment, made during the course of deliberations, just as likely suggests that he developed his opinion as trial progressed. The trial judge was properly concerned that further inquiry would trespass into forbidden territory. See Guisti, 434 Mass. at 252, quoting from Fidler, supra at 199 (jury verdict cannot be impeached by inquiry into "the subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies"). The judge properly exercised her discretion to limit the evidentiary hearing as she did.
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for further postverdict juror inquiry affirmed.
By the Court (Rapoza, C.J., Cypher, Grasso, Fecteau & Massing, JJ.),
Clerk Entered: November 6, 2014.