Commonwealth v. Miranda

89 Citing cases

  1. Miranda v. Mendonsa

    Civil Action No. 12-cv-11957-IT (D. Mass. Apr. 11, 2017)

    At trial, the Government presented theories of principal and joint venture liability to the jury. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 934 N.E.2d 222, 224 n.1 (Mass. 2010) ("Miranda I"). Petitioner asserted a defense of misidentification. Id. at 227.

  2. Commonwealth v. Molina

    81 Mass. App. Ct. 855 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 7 times

    A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree, G.L. c. 265, § 1, and two firearm violations, G.L. c. 269, §§ 10( a ) and 12E. He argues on appeal (a) a violation of Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 105–113, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011), concerning a cash reward to a witness; (b) improper denial of his motion to suppress statements made to the police; and (c) insufficient instruction with respect to “honest but mistaken identification.” We affirm.

  3. Commonwealth v. Hughes

    82 Mass. App. Ct. 21 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    The narrow question before us is whether the defendant was entitled to a specific jury instruction that testimony from a witness who is paid by the government in return for her participation in the case should be subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny than testimony from other witnesses. We begin by reviewing two of the cases on which the defendant relies: Commonwealth v. Luna, 410 Mass. 131, 571 N.E.2d 603 (1991), and Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011). Miranda was issued after the trial in this case, so the trial judge did not have the benefit of its teachings.

  4. Commonwealth v. Miranda

    474 Mass. 1008 (Mass. 2016)   Cited 18 times

    Wayne Miranda was convicted of murder in the second degree and other offenses in 2008, and this court affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011). Miranda has filed a petition in the Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus.

  5. Commonwealth v. Simon

    481 Mass. 861 (Mass. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    "[A] prosecutor shifts the burden of proof when, for example, he or she calls the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to call a witness or witnesses, or when the prosecutor offers ‘direct comment on a defendant's failure to contradict testimony.’ " Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787, 940 N.E.2d 871 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 117, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011). In such cases, the prosecution lessens the Commonwealth's burden of proof by signaling to the jury that the defendant has an affirmative duty to present evidence of his or her innocence.

  6. Webster v. Gray

    39 F.4th 27 (1st Cir. 2022)   Cited 7 times

    In its opinion, the court observed that although the Commonwealth's case was circumstantial, such evidence can be "sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 388 (quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 934 N.E.2d 222, 233 (2010) ). The court went on to conclude that such evidence was sufficient in the petitioner's case.

  7. Miranda v. Mendonsa

    Civil Action No. 12-cv-11957-IT (D. Mass. Sep. 3, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    In July 2008, Petitioner Wayne Miranda was convicted of second-degree murder, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and carrying an unlicensed firearm. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 934 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Mass. 2010). At trial, the Government presented theories of principal and joint venture liability to the jury, which returned a general verdict finding Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder.

  8. Commonwealth v. Tillis

    486 Mass. 497 (Mass. 2020)   Cited 5 times
    Declining to exercise § 33E discretion where "defendant’s active participation in the joint venture included identifying a drug dealer to target, coordinating with an accomplice conducting reconnaissance, planning the robbery, and entering the apartment building"

    In Commonwealth v. Green, 302 Mass. 547, 555, 20 N.E.2d 417 (1939), we held that withdrawal requires "at least an appreciable interval between the alleged termination and [the commission of the crime], a detachment from the enterprise before the [crime] has become so probable that it cannot reasonably be stayed, and such notice or definite act of detachment that other principals in the attempted crime have opportunity also to abandon it." See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 118, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011), S.C., 474 Mass. 1008, 49 N.E.3d 675 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 202, 644 N.E.2d 203 (1994) (same). See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 18-19 (2018).

  9. Commonwealth v. Webster

    480 Mass. 161 (Mass. 2018)   Cited 13 times

    Even so, "circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011), S.C., 474 Mass. 1008, 49 N.E.3d 675 (2016). Inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence "need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable."

  10. Commonwealth v. Barbosa

    477 Mass. 658 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 66 times
    Concluding defendant's flight from scene and subsequent calls to coventurers allowed reasonable inference of participation and shared intent

    "[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[, and t]o the extent that conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the jury to decide which version to credit" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Miranda , 458 Mass. 100, 113, 934 N.E.2d 222 (2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 396 (2011), S .C ., 474 Mass. 1008, 49 N.E.3d 675 (2016). From the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant was motivated by anger at the ongoing feud between the Woodward Avenue gang and the Wendover Street gang, especially after the altercation at the gasoline station between the defendant, Lopes, and Montrond, and members of the Wendover Street gang, which occurred two months prior to the murder, resulted in the injury to the defendant and Lopes. The jury also could have found that the defendant's threat, "You don't belong here," was evidence of his motivation to kill because the victim, an associate of the Wendover Street gang, was present in Woodward Avenue gang "territory."