Opinion
J-S59031-16 No. 982 EDA 2015
09-09-2016
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 20, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0114201-1980 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J. JUDGMENT ORDER BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Kerry McNeil, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition based upon untimeliness. We affirm.
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the PCRA court's opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 9/9/15, at 1-5. Appellant argues that a manifest injustice occurred when the court denied him an evidentiary hearing with regard to his Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986) claim. Appellant's Brief at 30. Appellant avers his PCRA petition was timely following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in McQuiggin v. Perkins , 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). Id. at 29. He notes that he filed the instant Petition for Habeas Corpus/Post Conviction Relief within sixty days of May 28, 2013, the date the Supreme Court rendered its decision in McQuiggin. Id. Appellant contends "that three recent cases further support his long standing argument that his case was wrongly decided[,]" citing McQuiggin , Martinez v. Ryan , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler , 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). Id. at 32.
As a prefatory matter, we note that "the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA and that any petition seeking relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year of final judgment." Commonwealth v. Peterkin , 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998). Furthermore, "the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite." Commonwealth v. Turner , 73 A.3d 1283, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
After careful review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the decision by the Honorable Steven R. Geroff, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 5-10 (holding (1) Martinez , Trevino , and McQuiggin are inapplicable to the case at bar as they are limited to federal habeas review, (2) they do not render Appellant's PCRA petition timely, and (3) Martinez does not affect the PCRA time bar, citing Commonwealth v. Saunders , 60 A.3d 162 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
Moreoever, in Commonwealth v. Brown , ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 3690602 (Pa. Super. July 11, 2016), this Court recently addressed the applicability of McQuiggin to the timeliness provisions set forth in the PCRA. The Brown Court opined:
Our jurisprudence, however, has already deemed such decisions pertaining to federal habeas corpus law irrelevant to our construction of the timeliness provisions set forth in the PCRA. See [ Saunders , 60 A.3d at 165] ("While Martinez . . . represents a significant development in federal habeas corpus law, it is of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the plain language of the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA."). While McQuiggin represents a further development in federal habeas corpus law, as was the case in Saunders , this change in federal law is irrelevant to the time restrictions of our PCRA.Id. at ___, 2016 WL 3690602 at *3. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the PCRA court dismissing Appellant's petition as untimely.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 9/9/2016
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