Opinion
J-S57006-19 No. 149 MDA 2019
11-25-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MICHAEL DAVID MARCHALK Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 22, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001407-2017 BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:
Michael David Marchalk appeals from the judgment of sentence of twenty-four and one-half to forty-nine years of imprisonment imposed after a jury convicted him of third-degree murder, theft by unlawful taking, access device fraud, and possession of an instrument of crime. We affirm.
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. During the whole of his life, Appellant, a drug addict, had a strained relationship with his father, who, while supportive financially, was allegedly verbally abusive. While staying at his father's home the night before beginning rehab, Appellant beat his father to death with a baseball bat, took his father's wallet and car, and stopped several times to get cash out of ATMs while fleeing to Philadelphia. Appellant was arrested in Atlantic City, New Jersey a few days later. In addition to the counts listed above, Appellant was charged with murder in the first and second degrees.
The Commonwealth's theory of the case, supported by, inter alia, the testimony of Appellant's brother that Appellant in the past had spoken about killing his father, was that Appellant murdered him for the purpose of obtaining drug money. Appellant testified that he went into his father's room that night complaining about being unable to sleep, his father twice took swings at Appellant with the bat, and Appellant took the bat from him and killed him in the heat of passion.
Based upon Appellant's testimony, the trial court granted his request that the jury be instructed as to voluntary manslaughter. During the jury charge, the trial court explained that "a killing is without malice if the perpetrator acts under circumstances that reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter." N.T. Trial Vol. II, 12/13/18, at 569. The court went on to instruct the jury that it was permitted to find Appellant guilty of murder only if it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from the victim's serious provocation, and elaborated on the relevant concepts. See id . at 574-76.
Upon receiving questions from the jury several hours into their deliberations, the trial court repeated its instructions as to the various degrees of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Id . at 601-05. One hour after the jury was sent back out, Appellant expressed concern that the most recent instructions had not included a particular section of the suggested instructions, and requested that the court clarify to the jury that, when considering whether the Commonwealth proved malice, it "must take into account any evidence that the Defendant acted in the heat of passion." Id . at 607-08. The trial court declined the request, opining that it had conveyed the information to the jury albeit "[n]ot in those exact words." Id . at 608. Approximately three hours later, the jury returned with the guilty verdicts detailed supra, acquitting Appellant of murder in the first and second degrees.
On January 22, 2019, Appellant was sentenced as indicated above, and this timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents one question for our determination: "Whether [Appellant] was prejudiced after the court gave the 'progression' charge but failed to sufficiently clarify that the jury must initially consider evidence of 'heat of passion' with regard to malice in relation to any conviction for any level of murder?" Appellant's brief at 6.
We begin with our standard of review:
In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. We must view the charge as a whole; the trial court is free to use its own form of expression in creating the charge. Our key inquiry is whether the instruction on a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations.Commonwealth v. Soto , 202 A.3d 80, 98 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).
The Suggested Standard Jury Instruction on voluntary manslaughter provides that: "(1) when the defendant kills in a heat of passion following serious provocation, the killing 'may be voluntary manslaughter, but never murder;' and (2) the jury can find malice and murder only if it is satisfied that the defendant was not acting 'under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the victim.'" Commonwealth v. Patton , 936 A.2d 1170, 1177-78 (Pa.Super. 2007), aff'd following grant of appeal on other issues, 985 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 2009) (citing Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) 15.2503A).
Appellant concedes that the trial court's instructions "correctly [set] forth the elements and requirements of [v]oluntary [m]anslaughter[.]" Appellant's brief at 12. However, he contends that the court did not make clear "that whether or not the defendant was acting under the 'heat of passion' must be considered at the outset and not only after deliberating and reaching a verdict on" the murder counts. Id .
After a thorough review of the certified record, the parties' briefs and the pertinent law, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court as to Appellant's issue, and we affirm the judgment of sentence on the basis of the cogent and well-reasoned opinion that Honorable William E. Baldwin entered on April 26, 2019. Specifically, Judge Baldwin extensively detailed the instructions given to the jury, supporting his opinion that he, on at least four occasions, clearly informed the jury that "the malice necessary for murder could not be found unless the jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in the heat of passion as provoked by the victim." Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/19, at 10. As the trial court's determination is the product of neither an error of law or other abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/25/2019
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