Opinion
20-P-1378
03-23-2022
COMMONWEALTH v. Karel MANGUAL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a bench trial in the District Court, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (motor vehicle). See G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b ). The defendant appeals, challenging the denial of both his motion to dismiss and motion for a required finding of not guilty. We affirm.
The defendant was also charged with trespass and disturbing the peace. The judge allowed the defendant's motion for required finding of not guilty on the charge of trespass. The defendant was acquitted of disturbing the peace.
Background. While on routine patrol in Worcester at about midnight, uniformed police officer Michael Hall saw the defendant and another individual walk out of a "7-Eleven," keeping their eyes on him. The two got into a Nissan Altima (Altima) with the defendant in the driver's seat. Officer Hall followed in his marked cruiser as the Altima took two left turns within a short distance. Officer Hall could see the defendant looking back at him through his rear and side view mirrors. After taking a third left turn, thereby circling back towards the original starting point, the defendant immediately and abruptly turned the wheel to the right and pulled over, without using a blinker. This caused the officer to have to hit his brakes. Officer Hall then activated his blue lights, called in the stop and pulled over behind the Altima. Officer Daniel Dyson arrived within seconds and pulled in behind Officer Hall.
Officer Hall then approached the Altima's driver's side while Officer Dyson approached the passenger side. After getting information from the two occupants, Officer Hall returned to his cruiser to run computer checks while Officer Dyson remained with the Altima. Officer Hall then called Officer Dyson to the back of the Altima where the two observed the defendant in the driver's seat of the Altima, looking back at the officers. Officer Hall informed Officer Dyson that he was going to remove the defendant from the vehicle. The two officers then re-approached the Altima, with Officer Hall at the driver's side and Officer Dyson at the passenger side.
The computer checks revealed no warrants and no issue with the defendant's license and registration. In the complaint application, Officer Hall noted that, once identified, he recognized both occupants of the Altima as gang members with violent history including firearms charges.
Officer Hall asked the defendant to shut off the vehicle and step out of the car. The defendant then moved his right hand to the shifter and said "Why? What for?" Officer Hall then reached into the car through the driver's side window to prevent the defendant from fleeing; he kept asking the defendant to get out of the car. The defendant then shifted into drive, turned the wheel left to get back on the road and slammed on the gas, accelerating the car forward. As part of Officer Hall's body was still in the car at the time, his right elbow was struck by the vehicle and he "kind of bounced off."
A few houses up the road, the vehicle came to a stop and the reverse lights engaged. The driver's side door then opened and the defendant got out of the car and ran. The vehicle then began reversing towards the officers, who were able to place the car into park to stop it. The passenger remained in the vehicle.
Discussion. The defendant raises two issues on appeal, both revolving around the issue of the defendant's intent. He argues that his motion to dismiss was wrongly denied because the application in support of the complaint failed to establish the required intent for the crime. See Commonwealth v. Orbin O., 478 Mass. 759, 762 (2018) (motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause decided from four corners of complaint application which must contain information to support each essential element of the offense). He also argues that his motion for required finding of not guilty was wrongly denied because evidence at trial failed to establish the required intent element of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979) (motion for required finding views evidence in light most favorable to prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found essential elements of offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
Here, the Commonwealth proceeded on an intentional, rather than a reckless, theory of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Thus, the essential elements of the offense are that (1) the defendant touched the victim, (2) the defendant intended to touch the victim and (3) the touching was done with a dangerous weapon. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 711 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 306-307 (1980). See also Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court, Instruction 6.300 (2019). On appeal, the defendant does not dispute that the complaint application and the evidence at trial both established that the defendant touched Officer Hall with the Altima and that the Altima, as used by the defendant, constituted a dangerous weapon.
The sole claim on appeal is that both the complaint application and the evidence at trial failed to establish that the defendant intended to touch Officer Hall with the Altima. With respect to the complaint, the supporting application alleged that, after Officer Hall asked the defendant to shut off the car and get out, the defendant "reached towards the shifter and put the car in drive," that Officer Hall then "reached in the car," and then the defendant "accelerated rapidly striking [Officer Hall's] right elbow with the vehicle." Similarly, at trial, Officer Hall testified that, after he asked the defendant to shut off the car and get out, the defendant "immediately moved his right hand to the shifter," and that Hall then "immediately reached in," and then the defendant "shifted into drive, and he accelerated," and that Hall's "right elbow was struck during the incident."
Thus, both the complaint application and the trial evidence allowed for the reasonable inference that the defendant intentionally put the car in motion, knowing that the officer's arm was still in the car, and therefore he intended to strike Officer Hall with the Altima. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 544-545 (2017) (knowledge and intent to be inferred from circumstances when determining probable cause); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 761, 767-768 (2015) (knowledge and intent to be inferred from circumstances when determining motion for required finding of not guilty).
The defendant nevertheless contends that, by all accounts, the defendant's intent was to flee the scene. It appears undisputed that the defendant was, in fact, intending to flee the scene. However, this does not preclude an inference that the defendant also intended to strike Officer Hall in the process. See Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 807-808 (2009) (evidence sufficient to support charge of intentional assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon [Honda automobile]) where defendant was attempting to drive away with stolen motor vehicle as victim held on to door of car). Commonwealth v. Garuti, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 561, 563 (1987) (evidence sufficient to support charge of intentional assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon [motor vehicle] where "defendant, having seen the officers, intentionally hit them in the process of effecting his escape").
The motion to dismiss the complaint and the motion for a required finding of not guilty were both properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.