Opinion
J-A17002-18 No. 1031 WDA 2017
08-31-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TERESA LYNN MANGAN Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004009-2016 BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:
Teresa Lynn Mangan appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on April 25, 2017, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. On December 8, 2016, after a non-jury trial, the trial judge convicted Mangan of two counts of driving under the influence ("DUI") (general impairment/incapable of driving safely) and one count of driving with a suspended license. The court subsequently sentenced Mangan to the following: (1) a term of one to two years' state incarceration followed by 18 months' probation for her DUI conviction; and (2) a consecutive term of 60 days of restrictive intermediate punishment for the driving with a suspended license offense. After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 1543(b)(1), respectively.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/2017, at 2-4. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Mangan raises the following issue on appeal:
I. The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Mangan was incapable of safe driving due to alcohol consumption at the time the accident occurred.Mangan's Brief at 16.
The DUI offense is defined as follows:
(a) General impairment.75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
In order to prove a violation of this section, the Commonwealth must show: (1) that the defendant was the operator of a motor vehicle and (2) that while operating the vehicle, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to such a degree as to render him incapable of safe driving. Commonwealth v. Palmer , 2000 PA Super 123, 751 A.2d 223, 228 (Pa. Super. 2000). To establish the second element, the Commonwealth must show that alcohol has
substantially impaired the normal mental and physical faculties required to safely operate the vehicle. Substantial impairment, in this context, means a diminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing circumstances and conditions. Evidence that the driver was not in control of himself [or herself], such as failing to pass a field sobriety test, may establish that the driver was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of erratic or unsafe driving.
Commonwealth v. Gause , 164 A.3d 532, 541 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 173 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2017).
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant case law, we find the trial court's December 12, 2017, opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented in this appeal:
Our standard of review is well settled:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Brooks , 7 A.3d 852, 856-857 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 21 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2011).
It is clear to this Court that [Mangan] committed this offense. Initially, [Mangan] was seen walking down the road away from the area where her vehicle had been abandoned. [Mangan]'s vehicle was left at the pump at Sheetz, had heavy front end damage, and was leaking fluids. The driver side door was open and the vehicle was unoccupied with the keys in the ignition. [Mangan]'s vehicle smelled of alcohol. When approached by police, [Mangan] had blood shot and glassy eyes, she was slurring her speech and smelled of alcohol. [Mangan] admitted to driving the vehicle, but denied consuming alcoholic beverages or wrecking her vehicle. [Mangan] retrieved her house key from the keys that had been left in the ignition, and the front bumper of her vehicle was located in the yard of another residence on her street. As such, the Commonwealth established that [Mangan] committed the offense of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt.Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/2017, at 5-6. Accordingly, we affirm this issue on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
With regard to establishing the element of being in actual physical control of the vehicle, the [ Commonwealth v. Brotherson , 888 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 2005)] Court stated, "[i]n a majority of cases, the suspect location of the vehicle, which supports an inference that it was driven, is a key factor in a finding of actual control." Brotherson , 888 A.2d at 905. Here, [Mangan]'s vehicle was parked at a gas pump at a gas station with keys in the ignition and the driver's door open. The vehicle had sustained heavy front end damage and was leaking fluids. The bumper to the vehicle was found in the front lawn of another house on her street. Taking all of these factors together, the Commonwealth met their burden regarding [Mangan] being in actual physical control of the vehicle.
We note in its opinion, the trial court addressed additional issues Mangan raised in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/2017, at 3, 6-7. However, Mangan abandoned those arguments for appellate review, as she did not raise them in her brief. Accordingly, we need not address them further.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/31/2018
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