Opinion
J-S11018-16 No. 220 EDA 2015
05-03-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. TERRENCE M. LEWIS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009629-2008 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:
Terrence M. Lewis appeals from the order entered December 18, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that dismissed, without a hearing, his first petition filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546. Lewis seeks PCRA relief from the judgment of sentence of 10 to 20 years' incarceration, imposed after a jury convicted him of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. We affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion.
The PCRA court has fully set forth the facts and procedural history in its opinion filed in support of its order. See PCRA Opinion, 4/1/2015, at 1- 4. Lewis contends that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to litigate a motion to suppress evidence based upon a violation of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act ("Wiretap Act"). Police apprehended Lewis with the help of a confidential informant (CI). Lewis alleges police violated the Wiretap Act by listening to the cell phone conversation between him and the CI.
We note that the PCRA court did not direct Lewis to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
The PCRA court has provided a thorough and well reasoned discussion in support of its decision. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/1/2015, at 4-8 (explaining: (1) The facts of the case at bar are virtually identical to Commonwealth v. Spence , 91 A.3d 44, 47 (Pa. 2014), wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "a state trooper does not violate the Wiretap Act when he listens through the speaker on an informant's cellular telephone as the informant arranges a drug deal"; (2) Spence is controlling in the present case; (3) Lewis's argument that Spence is not controlling because that decision did not answer "several questions" regarding the specific origins of the CI's phone fails, as none of these questions are relevant; and (4) Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a frivolous argument.) We agree with the PCRA court that Spence is directly on point and, as such, Lewis's ineffectiveness claim is completely meritless. Accordingly, we adopt the PCRA court's sound opinion as dispositive of this appeal.
We direct the parties to attach a copy of the PCRA court opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed. Motion to Strike Appellee's Brief or, In the Alternative, to Accept Attached Reply Brief is granted in part and denied in part. The motion to strike Appellee's Brief is denied; the motion to accept Lewis's reply brief is granted. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/3/2016
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