Opinion
1489 MDA 2022 J-S21043-23
11-08-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. SAQUANA TAWANE LAYER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered October 13, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005925-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
PELLEGRINI, J.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court) granting the motion to suppress evidence filed by Saquana Tawane Layer (Layer). The Commonwealth challenges the trial court's application of the protective sweep and plain view exceptions to the search warrant requirement. We affirm.
This interlocutory appeal is taken as of right pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
I.
A.
This case arises from the arrest of Layer's co-defendant, Dominique Tashawn-Tyrell Hightower (Hightower), on November 3, 2021, on the front porch of their two-story rowhome on outstanding charges of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. Police conducted surveillance on the property for five days before the arrest and observed only Hightower, Layer and their two young children entering and exiting the house.
During a protective sweep of the residence incident to Hightower's arrest after he had been detained, the arresting officer, York City Police Officer Peter Fouad, observed a small amount of loose marijuana, foil bags, a box of sandwich baggies and gelato resealable bags on top of a dresser located in the second-floor master bedroom. These observations formed the basis for the application of a search warrant for the residence. During execution of the search warrant, police recovered quantities of marijuana, numerous individual packages of crack/powder cocaine, fentanyl packed for sale, a significant amount of cash, packaging material, a digital scale and a key fob for a Honda Accord parked directly in front of the home. A handgun and loaded magazine were later recovered from the Honda Accord after police obtained a warrant to search it. Layer was charged with four counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (PWID) and one count of criminal conspiracy to commit PWID.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). Co-defendant Hightower was charged with four counts of PWID and one count each of criminal conspiracy to commit PWID and person not to possess a firearm. He has filed an appeal at J-S21044-23 and we have issued a nearly identical Memorandum in that case.
B.
Layer filed a motion to suppress the evidence and the trial court held a hearing on April 8, 2022, at which Detective Kyle Pitts and Police Officers Adam Northstein and Peter Fouad appeared as witnesses. Detective Pitts testified that he has worked for the police department for 14 years and that he assisted in arresting Hightower on November 3, 2021. Before the arrest, Detective Pitts had developed information from multiple confidential sources indicating that Hightower was involved in the distribution of illegal narcotics and was likely in possession of a firearm.
The detective advised that the U.S. Marshalls Fugitive Task Force and various city officials were involved in execution of the arrest warrant. The police team knocked and announced their presence and one of the officers observed movement at a second-floor window when someone moved the blinds. They continued to announce their presence for several minutes until Hightower said on the other side of the door that he was coming out. Hightower was taken into custody after a brief struggle where he failed to comply with verbal commands. While he was being taken to the ground and handcuffed, someone from inside the residence attempted to shut the front door.
The police team continued into the residence to conduct a security sweep. Detective Pitts explained that protective sweeps are always conducted when executing an arrest warrant to "look for any other persons within the residence that could potentially harm officers on scene." (N.T. Suppression, 4/08/22, at 9). Layer and two young children were quickly located within the house and they were not handcuffed as they were not considered a safety threat. (See id. at 20-21).
On cross-examination, Detective Pitts explained that police surveillance of the residence before the arrest was limited to the front door and did not include the back door because of positioning and manpower constraints. He clarified that during the arrest, Hightower was pulled out of the residence and was arrested on the front porch. Police used some degree of force to pass through the door to conduct the protective sweep, as someone was shutting the front door from inside the residence. (See id. at 32). Detective Pitts relayed that police immediately encountered Layer on the first floor, that one of the children was with her and another child was coming down the stairs. (See id. at 33). He testified that police proceeded upstairs to look for persons that could cause harm, and while upstairs, another officer pointed out to him loose marijuana on a dresser in the master bedroom.
Officer Northstein testified that he has been a police officer for approximately five years and that during execution of the arrest warrant he was at the front of the residence watching the second-floor windows. He stated that upon the initial knock and announcement, a set of blinds on a second-floor window moved and a person looked out and immediately shut the blinds again. The officer participated in conducting the protective sweep, as was customary when making an arrest "to make sure there are no other threats immediately inside that residence." (See id. at 43).
Officer Fouad testified that he has worked for the police department for four years and was part of the entry team in executing the arrest warrant. Because Hightower initially stood at the front door and ignored commands that he come out, the officers pulled him away from the door and took him to the ground to handcuff him. During this time, Hightower appeared to be trying to talk to someone inside the residence to his left. (See id. at 52). Officer Fouad arrested Hightower, patted him down and searched him. Officer Fouad then handed Hightower off to another officer and he entered the residence to join the police team already conducting the protective sweep. Officer Fouad proceeded to the master bedroom to make sure it was clear and observed foil bags, a box of sandwich baggies, gelato resealable bags and loose marijuana sitting on top of a dresser. As a result of the items he observed during the sweep, police obtained a search warrant for the residence.
Officer Fouad also testified that the top drawer of the dresser was open and he observed wads of cash in the drawer in plain view. (See id. at 54). However, the trial court did not find this testimony credible because it was inconsistent with the evidentiary photographs of the dresser showing the drawer closed. (See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/22, at 9). The Commonwealth is not contesting the trial court's finding concerning the cash on appeal. (See Commonwealth's Brief, at 10 n.1).
Officer Fouad testified that he executed the search warrant and that a black hoodie collected in the search held a key fob for the Honda Accord parked in front of the residence. Officer Fouad averred that when standing outside the vehicle, he observed the grip of a handgun sitting under the driver's seat. He seized the firearm and cleared it, but did not perform any other search of the vehicle at that time. A search warrant was obtained for the vehicle after a canine hit on it. (See id. at 57).
On cross-examination, Officer Fouad testified that after Hightower was handcuffed and Layer and the children were located in the residence, he believed there were other potential threats or dangers within the home "based on the movement that they called out when we were outside the house." (Id. at 59-60). He agreed with defense counsel that no person could fit within the drawers of the dresser in the master bedroom and that no one could have positioned themselves behind the dresser because it was against a wall. (See id. at 62). Officer Fouad testified that he believed based on his training and experience that the baggies and other materials he observed alongside the loose marijuana were packaging for marijuana. When asked to identify the marijuana in an evidentiary photograph of the dresser taken at the scene, he circled two small "specks." (Id. at 65).
The trial court deferred ruling on the motion pending the submission of briefs. On October 13, 2022, the court entered an Order and Opinion granting suppression of the evidence seized during the search of the residence and the vehicle. The trial court held as an initial matter that under the circumstances of Hightower's arrest, there was a need for police to conduct a limited protective sweep to ensure officer safety and pointed to police observation of movement in the upstairs window blind, the resistance they faced from Hightower at the front door during his arrest, the attempt of someone within the residence to close the door, and the fact that the officers could not see the back of the house. (See Trial Ct. Op., 10/13/22, at 7-8). However, the court went on to hold that "the protective sweep exceeded the cursory inspection allowed under such conditions as there were not enough articulable facts and inferences to give rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct a more thorough search of the dresser area." (Id. at 8). The court additionally found that because the loose "tiny specks" of marijuana and the wads of cash were the probable cause given to obtain the search warrant for the residence which, in turn, led to the search warrant for the vehicle, the warrants were invalid and the evidence seized must be suppressed. (See id. at 9-10).
See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (outlining parameters for lawful protective sweep).
With regard to the Commonwealth's position that the items on the dresser including the loose marijuana were in plain view, the court indicated in its Rule 1925 opinion that it did not find credible the proposition that "a reasonably cautious man conducting a protective sweep to search for persons would have spotted tiny specks of loose marijuana" among a variety of items. It reiterated that "the cursory inspection allowed under a protective sweep was surpassed because law enforcement overstepped and abused the protective sweep to conduct an evidentiary search." (See Trial Ct. Op., 12/22/22, at 9-10). The Commonwealth timely appealed and it and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).
II.
The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in granting Layer's suppression motion where the protective sweep and plain view doctrine justified the search of her residence and seizure of items therein. (See Commonwealth's Brief, 10-19). It maintains that because the trial court determined that the protective sweep of the residence incident to Hightower's arrest was constitutional, the marijuana detritus and packaging material observed on top of the dresser was admissible pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. (See id. at 11, 15).
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court's legal conclusions.
Further, it is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.Commonwealth v. Ross, 2023 WL 4068547, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed June 20, 2023) (citations omitted).
The Commonwealth's assertion that the trial court found the protective sweep constitutional ignores the court's ultimate conclusion that the scope of the sweep exceeded what is lawfully permissible.
We begin by observing that "both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc), appeal denied, 279 A.3d 38 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). "As a general rule, a warrant stating probable cause is required before a police officer may search for or seize evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "Absent the application of one of a few clearly delineated exceptions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable." Id. (citation omitted). "One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the protective sweep." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2001).
Police may perform a 'protective sweep' as an incident to a lawful arrest, in order to protect the safety of police officers and others. See Buie v. Maryland, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). In such circumstances, officers may look into spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched without any degree of suspicion other than that necessary to support the arrest. A protective sweep beyond such 'immediately adjoining' areas is proper if police can 'articulate specific facts to justify a reasonable fear' for the safety of police officers or others. We consider the information available to police at the time of the sweep from the perspective of a reasonably prudent police officer.Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 959 (Pa. Super. 2018) (some citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Pennsylvania Constitution applies the same standards to protective sweeps as the United States Constitution. See id. at n.3.
In Buie, the United States Supreme Court emphasized:
. . . that such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.Buie, supra at 335 (emphasis added).
In Taylor, supra, our Supreme Court explained:
Buie sets forth two levels of protective sweeps. The two levels are defined thus: [A]s an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.
Pursuant to the first level of a protective sweep, without a showing of even reasonable suspicion, police officers may make cursory visual inspections of spaces immediately adjacent to the arrest scene, which could conceal an assailant. The scope of the second level permits a search for attackers further away from the place of arrest, provided that the officer who conducted the sweep can articulate specific facts to justify a reasonable fear for the safety of himself and others.Id. at 1267 (emphasis added). Thus, "the scope of a protective sweep extends only to a visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding and lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the fear of danger." Id. at 1268 (citation omitted).
"The logic behind a protective sweep or security check is simple and straightforward. Where the safety of the arresting officers can be jeopardized, their safety outweighs the minimal intrusion a properly executed sweep may have upon an individual's privacy." Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 598 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1999). Protective sweeps envision a sweep for persons and "cannot be used as a pretext for an evidentiary search." Id. However, if an officer discovers contraband while conducting a proper protective sweep, he is not required to ignore it and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression. See Commonwealth v. Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Witman, 750 A.2d 327, 336 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating evidence observed in plain view during lawful and appropriate protective sweep is admissible).
As noted supra, in order for the police to conduct a protective sweep incident to arrest beyond the immediate vicinity of the arrest, i.e., a second level sweep permitting a search for attackers further away from the place of arrest, the police must be able to articulate specific facts that would cause a reasonably prudent police officer to believe that there was a danger to the officer's safety on the premises. See Taylor, supra at 1267. In Buie, the Supreme Court emphasized that the duration of the sweep must "last[] no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises." Buie, supra at 335 (emphasis added).
In this case, at the time the officers conducted the second level sweep beyond the immediate vicinity of the arrest, when police entered the master bedroom, Hightower was outside the home in handcuffs and all likely occupants of the residence were secured. Layer and the two children were on the first floor and were not handcuffed because they did not present a safety concern. Although the police witnesses testified that they proceeded to the second floor of the house to check for persons who may have posed a danger, they failed to articulate sufficient facts to justify the second level search beyond the areas immediately adjoining the arrest.
First, the record does not support an inference that someone potentially hiding in the master bedroom presented a threat to the officers' safety, given that Hightower's arrest was complete, he was outside the house and police were free to depart the premises. Second, as the police officers recognized, the Hightower residence had been under surveillance for five days preceding his arrest on the fleeing/eluding charge and the only individuals who had been seen entering or exiting the premises in addition to Hightower were Layer and the two children. The more reasonable inference is that the officers entered the master bedroom to search for the narcotics they believed were at the premises based on information developed through confidential informants in a separate investigation. Accordingly, we conclude that the officers' actions went beyond the scope of conducting a proper protective sweep incident to Hightower's arrest.
Additionally, even if we were to find that police were permitted to conduct a sweep of the second floor for hidden persons, we would conclude that the search of the dresser was outside the scope of a protective sweep. As previously noted, Officer Fouad testified that he observed "cherry gelato, foil bags, a box of sandwich baggies, loose marijuana" on the dresser and the "top drawer of the dresser was cracked open, and I could see inside the drawer wads of cash in plain view." (N.T. Trial, at 54). He further testified that he obtained a search warrant based on these observations. However, the trial court did not find Officer Fouad's testimony as to the wads of cash visible in the top drawer credible because the crime scene photographs depicted the drawer was closed. (See id. at 61-62). Officer Fouad also acknowledged that no one could hide behind the dresser because it was positioned against a wall, nor could anyone fit within the dresser drawers. (See id. at 62). Under these circumstances, we would conclude that a limited protective sweep of the second floor for hidden persons would not have led to police observation of tiny loose specks of suspected marijuana on top of a dresser.
With regard to the Commonwealth's companion argument that the plain view doctrine operates to prevent suppression, it also fails. "The plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant." Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). However, "inherent in the plain view doctrine is the principle the seized object must not have been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct." Heidelberg, supra at 504 (citation omitted). Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of an item is only permissible when "(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object." Id. (citation omitted). Here, since the extended search of Layer's house was an unlawful protective sweep, the officers did not observe the seized contraband from a lawful vantage point nor have a lawful right of access to it. Thus, the plain view doctrine is not applicable.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in granting Layer's pretrial suppression motion and, therefore, affirm its October 13, 2022 Suppression Order.
The Commonwealth originally raised sub-claims regarding the suppression of items seized pursuant to the search warrants for the residence and vehicle. However, the Commonwealth and the trial court acknowledge that the issue of the legality of the warrants is controlled by this Court's disposition of the arguments concerning the protective sweep and plain view doctrine. (See Commonwealth Brief, at 4, 9, 20; Trial Court Op., 12/22/22, at 10). The claims concerning the warrants are rendered moot by our disposition affirming suppression.
Order affirmed.
Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.
Judge Nichols files a concurring memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM
BOWES, J.
Both of my esteemed colleagues agree that Layer's suppression motion was correctly granted because the officers' discovery of the contraband occurred outside the bounds of a legitimate protective sweep. In the lead memorandum, Judge Pellegrini, standing alone, further opines that the police had no valid reason to conduct a protective sweep of the upper floor of the house in the first place. I respectfully disagree with both positions. I would hold that neither basis warranted suppression because the contraband was properly observed in plain view during a justified protective sweep. Therefore, I dissent.
I begin by reiterating our standard of review. If supported by the certified record, we are bound by a suppression court's findings of fact. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 791 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted). "The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts." Id. (citation omitted).
The facts found by the trial court relevant to the decision to conduct a protective sweep are supported by the certified record and are as follows. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/22, at 2-3, 6. When arriving to execute the arrest warrant for Hightower, the police were unsure of the number of people in the house because they had been unable to surveil the rear of the property. Suppression Hearing, 4/8/22, at 28. Initially, when the police knocked and announced their presence, they observed movement in an upstairs window. Id. at 7, 40. The officers encountered physical resistance at the front door while taking Hightower into custody and pushback from the other side of the door after Hightower was outside and handcuffed. Id. at 8-9, 40-41.
Even with Hightower secured, however, the police had an another ten to fifteen minutes of tasks to perform before finalizing the arrest and leaving with him. Id. at 10. Specifically, the arrestee had to be prepared for transportation, which involved addressing "shoes, shirts, phone numbers, medications, things of that nature." Id. In addition, the officers there were required to prepare a receipt inventory considering there was a warrant executed, which alone would take several minutes. Id. Accordingly, with any unknown occupants posing a potential safety threat to the officers while they remained on site, Officer Adam Nothstein and other officers entered the residence to begin performing a protective sweep "immediately" after Hightower was cuffed. Id. at 43.
The lead memorandum, by maintaining that the sweep was not warranted on the ground that officers had secured the suspected occupants in the building, appears to oversimplify the arrest procedure and disregard the trial court's factual findings. Since the sustainable findings of the court amply demonstrate that the officers articulated "specific facts to justify a reasonable fear for the safety of [the] police officers," the subsequent sweep was legally justified. Commonwealth Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 95 (Pa.Super. 2018). Accordingly, I would not disturb the trial court's determination in this regard.
Likewise, I cannot agree with the combined Majority's alternative holding that even if the protective sweep of the second-floor bedroom was proper, Officer Fouad nonetheless exceeded the scope of the sweep at the time he observed the marijuana and packaging materials on the dresser. I believe that this rationale, which essentially adopts the trial court's basis for granting suppression, misapplies the law to the facts surrounding the execution of the sweep. I would find that suppression was not warranted because the marijuana and other contraband discovered on the dresser were properly observed by Officer Fouad in plain view.
It is well-settled that, since "[t]here can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an object that is in plain view," there is no constitutional violation for "the warrantless seizure of an object when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object." Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 504 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en banc) (cleaned up). "To judge whether the incriminating nature of an object was immediately apparent to the police officer, reviewing courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. In viewing the totality of the circumstances, the officer's training and experience should be considered." Id. (cleaned up).
In their discussion, my colleagues properly disregard the fact that the officer observed wads of cash in the top dresser drawer because the trial court determined that, as a matter of fact, the dresser was closed at the time of the sweep. See Lead Memorandum at 13-14; Concurring Memorandum at 2-3. However, they then proceed to state as follows:
Officer Fouad also acknowledged that no one could hide behind the dresser because it was positioned against a wall, nor could anyone fit within the dresser drawers. Under these circumstances, we would conclude that a limited protective sweep of the second floor for hidden persons would not have led to police observation of tiny specks of suspected marijuana on top of a dresser.
Lead Memorandum at 14. By making this determination, I believe that the Majority either applies an improper and overly restrictive interpretation of the plain-view doctrine or disregards it entirely.
This Court has defined a protective sweep as "a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others." Commonwealth v. Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2013). Consistent with that purpose, we have stated that a search for persons "cannot be lengthy or unduly disruptive." Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 598 (Pa.Super. 1999). Nonetheless, an officer conducting this search is not required to avert his gaze from contraband visible from his lawful vantage point. See Commonwealth v. Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2013) (concluding that "officers were not required to ignore the marijuana they saw in [the a]ppellant's bedroom while conducting [a protective] sweep").
Here, the door to the master bedroom could not be fully opened to be flush with the wall, as the dresser in question was behind it. See Defendant's Exhibit 6. Therefore, to ascertain whether someone was hiding in the corner of the room behind the door, Officer Fouad was required to partially close the door and look behind it. As he did so, the top of the dresser was immediately present before him, in plain view and close proximity. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/8/22, at 81 (Officer Fouad testifying that the top of the dresser was about the same height as his shoulders). From his vantage point, without manipulation of any items, he was able to see loose marijuana, a box of sandwich bags, and a stack of resealable packets containing cartoon depictions of colorful anthropomorphic fruit with bloodshot eyes smoking marijuana cigarettes. The bundle of resealable packets sat on the corner of the dresser that was next to the hinge of the bedroom door, closest in point to where any reasonable officer would look to see if someone was hiding behind the door. See Defendant's Exhibit 4. The bits of marijuana leaf, while not particularly large, appeared vibrant in color and were close to the other contraband in the center of the dresser. See Defendant's Exhibit 5.
From these uncontroverted facts, I cannot agree with my learned colleagues that Officer Fouad exceeded the scope of the sweep at the moment he observed these items. The evidence does not suggest that he engaged in any lengthy or disruptive search while preforming the sweep, nor is there any support for a contention that Officer Fouad's observations entailed closely looking at the dresser in a way that exceeded the scope of the protective sweep. Concerning the loose marijuana, while certain photographs of the dresser from a distance made it difficult to discern the specks, Officer Fouad was clear in his testimony that his point of view at the time of the sweep was not as far away as the perspective in most of the photos. See N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 4/8/22, at 66. Additionally, while the Majority cursorily notes the small size of the marijuana leaves, it seemingly overlooks the readily apparent box of marijuana paraphernalia on top of the dresser inches away. The officer testified that based on his training experience, these other items found are used as "packaging for weed, for marijuana." Id. at 65.
To the extent the Majority's holding relies upon a finding that the officer was only permitted to scan the limited area behind the door without physically observing any items on top of the dresser, this is not the law. See Potts, supra at 1282. In my view, that interpretation of the plain-view doctrine would unreasonably require a police officer who sees drug-packing items in plain view on a bedroom dresser to close his eyes and disregard other incriminating items nearby simply because it is smaller in size. I cannot condone such a restrictive interpretation.
Accordingly, I would hold that the Officer Fouad's observations of the contraband and marijuana on the dresser were proper under the plain-view doctrine and, consequently, the evidence obtained from execution of the search warrant was not excludable as fruit of the poisonous tree. Therefore, I believe the trial court erred in suppressing the items ultimately seized from the residence.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM
NICHOLS, J.
I agree with the Majority, except with respect to the conclusion concerning the protective sweep of the second floor. See Majority Mem. at 13 (stating that the police "failed to articulate sufficient facts to justify the second level search beyond the areas immediately adjoining the arrest" on the first floor).
In its opinion, the trial court recognized that the protective sweep permitted the police officers to look for a person or persons on the second floor of the house. See Rule 1925(a) Op., 12/22/22, at 8. However, the trial court concluded that the officers exceeded the permissible scope of the sweep, which authorized a search for a person who could pose a danger to the officers, and instead the officers unreasonably discerned specks of suspected marijuana "amongst a variety of other items" sitting on top of a dresser. Id. at 9. I agree with the trial court's conclusion.
In my view, police had sufficient basis to conduct a protective sweep of the second floor including places such as bathrooms, closets, and spaces where a person could hide based on the movement of the blinds at the front window on the second floor observed by Officer Adam Nothstein. See Buie v. Maryland, 494 U.S. 325, 335 (1990); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2001). However, I agree that the search of the dresser was outside the scope of a protective sweep.
See N.T., 4/8/22, at 40.
The record reflects that Officer Pete Fouad stated as follows:
During the service of the [arrest] warrant [for Hightower], I observed loose marijuana on a dresser along with "Lemon Cherry Gelato" resealable bags, and a box of clear sandwich baggies. The top drawer of the dresser was slightly opened, and it contained wads of cash. All items were in plain view. Based on the above information, I obtained a search warrant for the residence.
Complaint (Affidavit of Prob. Cause), 11/3/21. Further, Officer Fouad testified that he saw wads of cash in the open drawer. See N.T., 4/8/22, at 54. However, the trial court concluded that Officer Fouad's testimony concerning the open drawer was not credible, as crime scene photos revealed that the drawer was closed. See Trial Ct. Op., 10/13/22, at 4-5, 9. Because the search warrant was based, in part, on the "wads of cash" Officer Fouad allegedly saw, and because the trial court did not credit this testimony, the only remaining information supporting the search warrant were "specks" of suspected marijuana allegedly observed during the protective sweep. See id. at 8.
Protective sweeps are limited, and they must be swift and target areas where a person could reasonably be expected to hide. Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 598 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis added). Further, a protective sweep "must be supported by articulable facts and inferences giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to the police." Id. The trial court noted that Officer Fouad admitted that a person could not fit behind the dresser or in the dresser drawers. See Rule 1925(a) Op., 12/22/22, at 9. On this record, I agree with the trial court that a search for persons hiding on the second floor would not have led a reasonably prudent officer to observe loose specks of suspected marijuana on top of a dresser. See Trial Ct. Op., 10/13/22, at 8. Therefore, although I conclude that police were permitted to conduct a protective sweep of the second floor for hidden persons due to the movement of the blinds, because the trial court found Officer Fouad's testimony not credible concerning the open dresser drawer, I agree that there was insufficient cause to search the interior of the dresser based on the observation of small specks of marijuana on top of the dresser during the sweep. For these reasons, I agree with the Majority that suppression is warranted, and I concur in the result.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.