Opinion
357 EDA 2023 J-S42006-23
01-11-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHRISTOPHER TYREE LAWRENCE Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 13, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006963-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM
BOWES, J.
Christopher Tyree Lawrence appeals from his judgment of sentence of, inter alia, life imprisonment without parole ("LWOP") imposed upon his convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of children ("EWOC"). Although we find no merit to the guilt-phase issue Appellant raises, for the reasons discussed infra, we vacate the two sentencing orders entered by the trial court and remand for resentencing.
The trial court offered the following history of this case:
On Friday, June 16, 2017, at approximately 9 p.m., Ridley Township Police were dispatched to 1847 Constitution Avenue, Apartment #507, Woodlyn, Delaware County, Pennsylvania for a report of a 3-year-old child in cardiac arrest. Upon arrival, Woodlyn Fire Company medics found 3-year-old Malaki Trice lying on his back on the floor and unresponsive. The medics started C.P.R. on Malaki. He did not respond. Ridley medics then transported Malaki to Crozer Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 10:07 p.m. on June 16, 2017.
The Medical Examiner performed an autopsy and determined that the cause of Malaki's death was multiple blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was a homicide. The postmortem report detailed numerous injuries to Malaki's head, chest, abdomen, buttocks and back, numerous abrasions and bruises to his extremities, and damage to several of Malaki's internal organs. There was a liver laceration. There were lung contusions. There was hemorrhaging to the abdominal wall. There was also blood around the spleen and the pancreas. In essence, Malaki bled out internally.
The facts presented at trial confirmed that 3-year-old Malaki Trice was in the exclusive control of [Appellant, who was the romantic partner of Malaki's mother,] on June 16, 2017.Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/23, at 1-2 (some punctuation added).
After a jury convicted Appellant of the crimes listed above on January 13, 2023, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of LWOP for the murder conviction and a consecutive term of three and one-half to seven years for EWOC.However, the court did not address Appellant's entitlement to credit for time served at the sentencing hearing or in its January 13, 2023 written sentencing order. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.
The court concluded that the aggravated assault conviction merged with the murder conviction for sentencing purposes.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 2, 2023. On February 8, 2023, the trial court entered (1) orders allowing for substitute counsel for Appellant on appeal and directing Appellant to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and (2) an amended sentencing order that added a provision for Appellant to receive credit for the time he served from September 13, 2018, to January 13, 2023. Thereafter, both Appellant and the trial court substantially complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The trial court's order did not include the address for service upon the trial judge as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii).
Appellant presents the following questions for our consideration:
1. Did the trial court err by limiting the defense trial counsel during cross examination of the Medical Examiner throughout their testimony?
2. Did the trial court err in deciding that the ten[-]year rule for crimen falsi was not distinguishable in this matter and thereby prevented the appellant from testifying [o]n his own behalf?Appellant's brief at 4 (commentary omitted).
Counsel also lists in this section of his brief a third issue that was included in Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but indicates that "Appellate counsel withdraws this issue for the reasons indicated below." Appellant's brief at 5. In the argument section of the brief, counsel opines that the issue is not supported by the record and "requests [of] the Court permission to withdrawal [sic] this specific issue." Id. at 20. Accordingly, we will review only the two issues advocated by counsel and offer no opinion on the third.
Both of Appellant's issues concern the trial court's evidentiary rulings. In this vein, we observe as follows:
The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.Commonwealth v. Ganjeh, 300 A.3d 1082, 1091 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).
Appellant first complains that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of the Medical Examiner, Bennett Preston, M.D. The following legal principles guide our review of this claim:
Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental right, it is not absolute. The trial court may place reasonable limits on defense counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross- examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.
[There are] two inquiries for determining whether a limitation on cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause. First, we inquire whether the limitation prejudiced the examination of that particular witness. In other words, absent the limitation, would the jury have received a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility? Second, if there was error, we must determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; if so, reversal is not warranted.Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up).
Here, Dr. Preston authored a report and offered testimony detailing his examination of the victim's body and the investigation file. He opined that the victim's death was a homicide caused by multiple blunt force injuries. At four different places within Dr. Preston's report, reference was made to an unattributed statement that the victim's mother and Appellant had recently "fled" from Florida because charges were brought by Children and youth Services ("CYS") there. At trial, both parties acknowledged that this was inaccurate information. See N.T. Trial, 1/11/23, at 54, 144, 154-55.
Appellant sought to cross-examine Dr. Preston about his reliance upon this inaccurate information. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the statements within the report were hearsay, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. Id. at 146-47. Appellant countered that the questioning was relevant since "that's what [Dr. Preston] thought happened when he came to his opinion and wrote his report," and the fleeing-from-CYS statements were not hearsay because they were being offered to show the effect on the listener, which implicated cognitive bias, and not for their truth. Id. at 145-46, 153.
Ultimately, the trial court permitted Appellant to ask Dr. Preston what impact the erroneous factual information had upon his conclusions so long as he did not use the word "fled." Thereafter, the following exchange took place:
Q. Doctor, would you agree with me, sir, that according to your investigator's report and post-mortem report that you had information when you conducted the aut[opsy], when you wrote your report, that Malaki, Malaki's mother and boyfriend had recently left Florida due to CYS charges?
A. Yes, I did have that. Yes.
Q. Okay. And are you now aware or maybe not, do you know now that that's inaccurate information?
A. Yes, I do know.
Q. Okay. And would you agree with me that it appears four times in your report?
A. I wouldn't be surprised.
Q. Okay.
A. I won't deny that, no.
Q. So, it appears in the investigator's initial report, page two, page five, and page eight of your report, you would agree with my statement that's . . .
A. If you say so, yeah, I'll agree too, yeah.
Q. And it's safe to say that when, yeah, the fact that information made it into the report, that you believed that to be accurate information at the time?
A. Oh, sure, but that didn't fill into my findings at all.
Q. Okay. So, your testimony is that that was task[-]irrelevant information?
A. It had no effect on my findings at all.
Q. Right. It's irrelevant?
A. Correct.Id. at 163-64. Appellant then proceeded to question Dr. Preston about cognitive bias and the importance of not possessing irrelevant information in assessing the manner of a victim's death. Dr. Preston acknowledged the risk of such bias but indicated that he "learned how to deal with that a long time ago." Id. at 167.
Despite Dr. Preston's testimony to the contrary, Appellant asserts that "the [m]edical [e]xaminer was clearly prejudiced by these false statements given that on three separate pages the same false information was reported prejudicing [A]ppellant in the eyes of the medical examiner." Appellant's brief at 12. He argues that "the jury should have been able to reflect on the full evidence and not the truncated information as ['fled' and 'left'] have significantly different meanings." Id. at 13. In essence, Appellant complains that his cross-examination was improperly curtailed by the trial court disallowing the use of the word "fled."
We agree with Appellant that he was entitled to question Dr. Preston about the impact the information supplied to him had on his opinion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rounds, 542 A.2d 997, 999 (Pa. 1988) (explaining that knowledge of the facts that informed an expert's opinion is critical to the jury's assessment of the validity of that opinion). Furthermore, we fail to understand the trial court's mandate that "left" be substituted for "fled," as the latter word's suggestion of a consciousness of guilt was still implicated by allowing the jury to hear that Dr. Preston reached his conclusions under the mistaken belief that Appellant and the child's mother left Florida because they faced CYS charges there. In any event, the jury was entitled to learn what facts were before Dr. Preston as he determined the cause and manner of death.
In entertaining the Commonwealth's objection, the trial court initially believed that Appellant wished to ask about the victim's mother leaving Pennsylvania for Florida the day after the victim's death, for which an implication of a guilty conscience arguably would have been more significant. It appears that the court's distaste for the verb "fled" may have carried over even after it was made clear that it was the pre-incident exodus from Florida that was at issue.
However, we agree with the trial court that any error was harmless because "counsel was permitted to make his point [and, therefore, Appellant] suffered no prejudice from the court's ruling." Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/23, at 7. As the above-quoted cross-examination reveals, the jury learned that Dr. Preston had been under the erroneous impression that Appellant and the victim's mother vacated Florida to avoid charges related to their care of the victim. Dr. Preston explained that he often was privy to information suggesting what had happened to the decedent that was belied by the autopsy, and that his opinion that Malakai Trice died from a beating was based upon the type, location, and multitude of injuries he observed on his body. See N.T. Trial, 1/11/23, at 167, 176-78. Upon our examination of the trial testimony, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that requiring Appellant to substitute "left" for "fled" in his cross-examination did not contribute to the verdict. Therefore, no relief is due.
In his remaining issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to preclude use of his prior conviction for robbery if he elected to testify in his defense. Our review of this matter is governed by Rule 609 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, which provides as follows in pertinent part:
(a) In General. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years. This subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:
(1) its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.Pa.R.E. 609. The ten-year look-back period is calculated from the date of the trial at which the witness testifies. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1226 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Randall, 528 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1987) (indicating that prior crimes of dishonesty are admissible where "the date of conviction or the last date of confinement is within ten years of the trial date") (emphasis added)).
The parties agree that robbery is considered a crimen falsi that is per se admissible pursuant to Rule 609(a) if less than ten years has elapsed between the trial and either the date of the robbery conviction or the last date of confinement for the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 199-200 (Pa.Super. 2007). The dispute is whether use of the conviction is governed by subsection (a) or (b) of Rule 609 and, if the latter controls, whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling it admissible.
Appellant acknowledges that he was convicted of robbery in Florida in October 2010, sentenced to three years of confinement, and released in September 2012. See Appellant's brief at 17. Since the instant trial took place in 2023, and he was not convicted of any new crimen falsi charges in the interim, Appellant argues that subsection (b) controls such that he could have been impeached with the 2010 conviction only if its probative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect. Id. at 18.
However, the trial court and the Commonwealth observe that Rule 609(b)'s limitation is founded upon the notion that maintaining ten years of uninterrupted freedom nullifies the automatic presumption that a crimen falsi conviction is relevant. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/23, at 10; Commonwealth's brief at 9-10 (citing Commonwealth v. McEnany, 732 A.2d 1263, 1270 (Pa.Super. 1999)). If the witness does not maintain ten years of uninterrupted freedom, then subsection (a) applies. Since Appellant was taken into custody in 2018 in the instant matter, he did not spend ten uninterrupted years of freedom following his 2012 release from confinement on the robbery conviction. Therefore, the Commonwealth advocates the per se admissibility of Appellant's the crimen falsi.
We agree with the trial court and the Commonwealth. Appellant spent only six years of uninterrupted freedom between his 2012 release from incarceration in Florida and his 2018 arrest on the instant murder charges. Consequently, if Appellant had elected to testify at trial, Rule 609(a) required the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to impeach him with his prior robbery conviction. See McEnany, supra at 1270 (holding the defendant's 1986 crimen falsi conviction was per se admissible to impeach him at his 1997 re-trial because his confinement on the pending murder charges tolled Rule 609(b)'s ten-year period for the two years between his initial conviction in 1993 and his successful direct appeal in 1995). As such, Appellant's second issue merits no relief.
Although it is not addressed by the parties or the trial court, we are compelled to consider the trial court's action of filing an order amending the January 13, 2023 judgment of sentence after Appellant had filed the instant appeal. A trial court may modify any final order within thirty days so long as "no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed." 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. "Once an appeal is taken, the trial court loses jurisdiction to modify its sentence." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 860 A.2d 146, 152 (Pa.Super. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc).
However, "[a]n exception to this general rule exists to correct 'clear clerical errors,'" which are patent mistakes "obvious on the face of the sentencing transcript." Commonwealth v. Kremer, 206 A.3d 543, 548 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). Our Supreme Court has indicated that "it is the obviousness of the illegality, rather than the illegality itself, that triggers the court's inherent power." Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 66- 67 (Pa. 2007).
Here, the trial court made no mention at the January 13, 2023 sentencing hearing, or in its original written sentencing order, to the amount of credit to which Appellant was entitled for time served. After Appellant filed his notice of appeal from that sentence, the trial court appears to have recognized that that the failure to do so resulted in an illegal sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1167 (Pa.Super. 2018). The trial court subsequently entered an order on February 8, 2023, adding the time credit to the sentence.
The amount of credit Appellant was due was not in this instance a clear clerical error that the court retained jurisdiction to correct after the appeal was filed. Compare Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 2001) (holding trial court was permitted to amend time credit aspect of the sentencing order to reflect the trial court's intent as clearly expressed at the sentencing hearing); with Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 241 A.3d 372, 2020 WL 5946994 at *3 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) (holding trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the defendant's sentencing order after an appeal was taken because adding additional time credit was not "a patent mistake in the record or an obvious error in its original sentencing order," but rather amounted to "wholly changing [the defendant']s sentence").
Therefore, the trial court's February 8, 2023 sentencing order is a legal nullity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 663 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2017). Moreover, the January 13, 2023 judgment of sentence is illegal because it lacks an award of credit for the time Appellant served pending trial on these charges. See Gibbs, supra at 1167; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760. Accordingly, while we affirm Appellant's convictions and his judgment of sentence in all other respects, we vacate both sentencing orders and remand for resentencing that includes Appellant's time credit.
Sentencing orders of February 8, and January 13, 2023, vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.