Opinion
19-P-350
08-29-2019
COMMONWEALTH v. Iris LARREGUI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
A grand jury indicted the defendant for the burning of a dwelling house, G. L. c. 266, § 1. A judge then granted the defendant's motion to suppress statements she made to an arson investigator on the ground that she did not act voluntarily because she was under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP). The Commonwealth appeals, contending that the judge (1) made a clearly erroneous factual finding that the defendant's answers to the investigator were not appropriate, despite the investigator's perception of the defendant's conduct when answering his questions, and (2) improperly weighed expert witness testimony and postquestioning hospital records indicating that the defendant was under the influence of PCP when speaking with the investigator. We affirm.
Discussion. "In reviewing the judge's allowance of the defendant's motion to suppress, we accept[ ] the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, give[ ] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but independently review[ ] the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Commonwealth v. Lujan, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 100 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 384 (1996).
The constitutional issue in this case is whether, given the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's answers to an arson investigator's questions were voluntary. Lujan, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 100-101. An important factor in this analysis is "the defendant's ... physical and mental condition." Id. at 101, quoting Magee, 423 Mass. at 388. The Commonwealth must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Lujan, supra. Here, the motion judge found that the Commonwealth had not met its burden. On appeal, the Commonwealth raises three unavailing challenges to this ruling.
1. Finding of inappropriate responses. The Commonwealth first contends that the judge made a clearly erroneous factual finding that the defendant gave "[in]appropriate" answers to the arson investigator's questions. We disagree.
When asked about the cause of the fire, the defendant referenced something about a toaster, a cigarette, and a lighter. The Commonwealth contends that because this was a responsive answer to the question asked of her, the judge erred in finding that the defendant did not respond "appropriate[ly]" to questioning. The Commonwealth asserts that the judge inconsistently found the investigator's testimony credible while rejecting his assessment that the defendant answered his questions appropriately. We disagree.
In determining the inappropriateness of the defendant's response, the judge factored in that the defendant's response was garbled, almost incomprehensible, and inconsistent with the investigator's findings, which ruled out the possibility of a toaster causing the fire. The judge also factored in that the defendant also exhibited manic and delusional behavior both before and after questioning.
Next, contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, the judge's finding was not inconsistent with crediting the investigator's testimony. Based upon the evidence, the judge made her own assessment of the "appropriate[ness]" of the defendant's answers. She was not required to accept the investigator's assessment. See Lujan, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 100-101, quoting Magee, 423 Mass. at 388 ("the defendant's ... physical and mental condition" are facts for the judge to find).
2. Weighing expert testimony and hospital records. The Commonwealth also contends that the judge improperly relied on the testimony of Dr. Andrew Bourke (a psychologist and court clinician) and the defendant's postquestioning hospital records that the defendant was under the influence of PCP when questioned by the investigator. Seeing no clear error in the judge's finding, we do not disturb a motion judge's weighing of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 647-648 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 743 (1990).
Here, just moments before the investigator's questioning, the defendant was seen bursting from a burning house, naked, burnt, and proclaiming that she was God. After questioning, she arrived at the hospital disoriented, singing, yelling, crying, and incorrectly insisting that she was there giving birth. Medical personnel determined that she was under the influence of drugs.
According to Dr. Bourke, the defendant's behavior raised serious concerns about her ability to make medical choices at that time. Dr. Bourke explained that PCP users can vacillate wildly between mania and calm, which explained the defendant's calm demeanor during the investigator's questioning. Based upon this testimony, the judge could have reasonably inferred that the defendant was under the influence of PCP, and did not give voluntary answers when questioned. Compare Commonwealth v. Hilton, 450 Mass. 173, 180 (2007) (reasonable inferences as well as evidence must support decision on motion to suppress). We discern no error.
Order allowing motion to suppress affirmed.