Opinion
16-P-278
01-30-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. William LAJOIE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Before us are the merits of the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal from the allowance of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. We affirm.
Background . We recite the facts as found by the motion judge. On July 28, 2014, at approximately 2:00 P.M. , a police officer in Warren, Rhode Island, was dispatched to a location following a citizen's report of a suspicious vehicle. The officer spoke to the identified caller, who reported that she observed from her office window a green Toyota Sienna drive east down a dead-end street, return driving west, then enter the parking lot of the church across the way. She saw the occupants, two men, exit and "throw items into a small wooded area" at the back of the parking lot. The men switched positions in the vehicle, left the lot, and traveled on a main road toward Barrington, Rhode Island. The officer accompanied the caller to the wooded area, and there observed a discarded jewelry box with a Nordstrom label. The officer contacted dispatch with the vehicle license plate number, provided by the caller, and dispatch alerted the Barrington police department.
A Barrington police officer was instructed to "be on the lookout" for the Sienna, the transmission informing him that the occupants had been observed by witnesses discarding empty jewelry boxes from the vehicle. The officer stationed himself in the area toward which the Sienna had reportedly traveled, and soon observed the vehicle. The officer pulled out behind the Sienna, which abruptly turned into a Dunkin' Donuts parking lot. The officer found this unusual because he had observed both of the vehicle's occupants holding Dunkin' Donuts coffee cups, and perceived the abrupt turn as an attempt to elude him. The officer pulled in behind the Sienna, blocking its exit, activated his blue lights, and ordered one occupant (who had exited) to get back into the car. The officer looked through the car window and observed women's pocketbooks on the back seat and women's jewelry on the floor of the back seat area, whereupon the vehicle's occupants were placed under arrest.
In fact, the Warren officer's testimony referenced only one witness and one jewelry box. In consistent testimony, the Barrington officer stated that the dispatch referred to a single discarded jewelry box. The motion judge's decision referred variously to a box or boxes.
The motion judge allowed the defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that "the facts known to the police at the time of the defendant's seizure," which occurred when the Barrington officer blocked the Sienna in at the parking lot, "did not amount to reasonable suspicion." The Commonwealth appeals.
As conceded by the defendant at oral argument, all procedural questions regarding the timeliness of the Commonwealth's application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal were resolved by a panel of this court, in a decision under our rule 1:28, affirming an order of the single justice. See Commonwealth v. Lajoie , 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1122 (2016).
Discussion . "In reviewing a motion to suppress, we adopt the motion judge's factual findings absent clear error." Commonwealth v. Isaiah I ., 450 Mass. 818, 821 (2008). We "conduct an independent review of [her] ultimate findings and conclusions of law." Commonwealth v. Jimenez , 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002). As the vehicle stop took place in Rhode Island, the parties agree that the law of that State is applicable. See Commonwealth v. Gullick , 386 Mass. 278, 281 (1982). Rhode Island has adopted the United States Supreme Court's reasonable suspicion test in analyzing warrantless searches and seizures. Reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts that the person detained is engaged in criminal activity." State v. Abdullah , 730 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam), quoting from State v. Halstead , 414 A.2d 1138, 1147 (R.I. 1980).
In this case, the only information received by the Barrington officer was the dispatch informing him to "be on the lookout" for a vehicle whose occupants "had been seen by a witness discarding an empty jewelry box into the woods on the street in Warren." Police were also aware that the vehicle had earlier driven to the end of a one-way street and then back again. But police had no information that any crime involving stolen items from Nordstrom had recently occurred. As noted by the motion judge, the officer's own observations of the vehicle "added very little to the information known" to him. The abrupt turn made by the Sienna's driver was apparently lawful, the officer observed no traffic violations or criminal activity, and he made no attempt to further inquire of the vehicle's occupants before seizing the vehicle by activating his blue lights and blocking it into the parking lot.
Unlike under the Massachusetts collective information doctrine, see Commonwealth v. Gullick , 386 Mass. at 283, it appears that under Rhode Island law, information known to one law enforcement officer may not be imputed to another unless transmitted to him through official channels. See State v. Smith , 121 R.I. 138, 141 (1979) ; In re John N ., 463 A.2d 174, 177 (R.I. 1983). Under this rule, only those facts known to the Barrington officer at the time of the vehicle stop, including those transmitted to him through official channels, would be relevant to the reasonable suspicion calculus. The information about the vehicle activity on the one-way street was never communicated to the Barrington officer. The motion judge did not rely on this point, however, and there is no need for us to do so.
Conclusion . We agree with the motion judge that "[e]ven when viewed in their totality, the facts known to police officers at that moment more closely resemble a hunch than specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom" amounting to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
At oral argument, the Commonwealth contended for the first time that the behavior observed by the caller was criminal activity because littering is a criminal offense in Rhode Island. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 37-15-6, 37-15-7. Because this argument was not raised below, it is waived. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 13(a)(2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. Fuller , 30 Mass. App. Ct. 927, 929 & n.1 (1991).
Order allowing motion to suppress affirmed .