Opinion
No. 102308.
June 2, 2000
FINDINGS OF FACT, RULINGS OF LAW AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
Scott Kirwan, the defendant, stands indicted for the murder of Steven E. Meagher, in violation of G.L.c. 265, § 1. The matter is now before the court on the defendant's motions to suppress statements he made to police. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 25, 2000. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motions are DENIED .
FINDINGS OF FACT
On July 3, 1999, at approximately 12:55 am, Detective David Hurley of the Pembroke Police Department responded to Hosea's Restaurant in Pembroke, on a report of a gunshot victim. Det. Hurley arrived at 12:58 am and observed a large gathering of people over a fallen victim, later determined to be Steven E. Meagher. Meagher was making gurgling noises, was semi-conscious, had a one to two inch laceration on his chin, and had another wound to his chest, which appeared to be a stab wound. Witnesses reported that the injured man had been in an altercation with another man, whom they described. None of the witnesses indicated that he had observed the stabbing. The witnesses said that the other man had left and had gone across the street, and the witnesses pointed to a house. Det. Hurley was directed to a Brian Perry, who stated that he knew the man who fled, and named the defendant as that man. Perry said that Kirwan had gone into his (Kirwan's) house. Det. Hurley, in his capacity as a police officer, had spoken with Kirwan briefly in the past. Det. Hurley, who was in uniform, asked two other police officers at the scene to accompany him to question Kirwan.
Det. Hurley and the two officers went to Kirwan's house across the street. The house is a white, two family residence, and has in front a screened-in porch with a lock. Det. Hurley knocked on the door several times and, after some time, a man (later identified as the defendant's father) came to the door, motioned that he would return in a minute, and came back and opened the door. The defendant's father invited Det. Hurley inside, and Det. Hurley proceeded inside. Det. Hurley had not done anything to indicate that the defendant's father had to let him in. The other officers had gone around the outside of the residence.
The defendant's father called the defendant, who came within view of Det. Hurley. Det. Hurley identified himself as a police officer and asked the defendant to tell him about the fight he was just in at Hosea's. The defendant appeared calm, not upset, and compliant. The defendant's father was standing behind Det. Hurley, who was standing one to two feet away from the defendant in the hallway of the home, but not blocking the hallway. The two other police officers had not entered the home at that point. When asked to tell the officer about the fight at Hosea's, the defendant immediately said words to the effect that he had been pushed and pushed back. The defendant then said, "that's when." At this point the defendant stopped talking. Det. Hurley prompted him to finish his sentence by saying, "That's when what?" but the defendant remained silent. Det. Hurley asked the defendant about a wound to the victim's chest, and the defendant said he knew nothing about it. Det. Hurley reminded the defendant that he had just said he had been in a fight, and prompted him again regarding the stab wound. The defendant put his head down and said nothing.
At this point, Det. Hurley motioned to the defendant to sit in the living room of the house, though he did not indicate that the defendant was under arrest. Det. Hurley then questioned the defendant's father for several minutes about the defendant's whereabouts. The defendant's father indicated that he had been in bed when the defendant came in and said that the police were going to come and take him (the defendant) away. Det. Hurley then asked the defendant's father for permission to search the house, and the defendant's father consented. Det. Hurley searched the defendant's room, looking through drawers and a dresser, but found nothing of significance. Det. Hurley then looked through the kitchen, dining room, and other rooms but found no weapons. While this was occurring, the defendant remained in the living room. While Det. Hurley never told the defendant he was not free to leave, the defendant made no attempt to get up. After the search, Det. Hurley placed the defendant under arrest for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. At this point, Det. Hurley advised the defendant of his Miranda rights.
The two other officers, who had been sent around the residence, at some point entered the residence. They were not present when Det. Hurley was questioning the defendant in the hallway. The detective was polite and courteous to the defendant. No threats were made by the detective and no show of force was made by the police. The detective did not tell the defendant that the wounds to the victim were life-threatening, that there were two other officers outside the home, or that the defendant was a suspect.
RULINGS OF LAW
The defendant argues two grounds on which he believes the court should suppress the statements he made to Det. Hurley. He argues for suppression under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and G.L.c. 276, § 1, because the police made a warrantless entry into the defendant's home to arrest the defendant and the statements were the fruit of that unlawful seizure. He also argues for suppression under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, because the police questioned him without advising him of his Miranda rights.
Fourth Amendment and Article 14
The police may not make a warrantless entry into a dwelling to make an arrest in the absence of justification for the failure to obtain an arrest or search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 806 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Midi, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 593-94, rev. denied, 430 Mass. 1102 (1999). However, no warrant permitting entry into a dwelling is needed if the police obtain the consent of a person authorized to consent to the entry. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 96-97 (1997). If a person is cloaked with sufficient apparent authority to consent to a search, the search is valid. Commonwealth v. Wahlstrom, 375 Mass. 115, 118 (1978). The Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the consent was obtained voluntarily. Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37, 46 (1995); Commonwealth v. Voisine, 414 Mass. 772, 783 (1993). Voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass. 294, 299 (1998); Sanna, 424 Mass. at 97.
In this case, the police obtained the consent of the defendant's father to enter the house, and the defendant's father himself called to the defendant. As the father of the defendant and the person opening the door to the residence at that late hour, the defendant's father was (at the very least) cloaked with the apparent authority to consent to the police entry to the home. There is no evidence that the consent was in any way involuntarily given. The only evidence in the record shows that the defendant's father, who had been advised by his son that the police were likely to arrive soon, willingly allowed the police to enter the home. The Commonwealth has shown that the defendant's father's consent was "unfettered by coercion, express or implied, and also something more than mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Voisine, 414 Mass. at 783 (quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 555 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the entry was lawful.
After the entry, Det. Hurley questioned the defendant. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment and Article 14, the question for the court is whether the defendant was "seized" when he was questioned by Det. Hurley and, if so, whether the police had sufficient justification. Under Article 14, a person is "seized" in the constitutional sense "if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 786 (1996) (quoting Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 791 (1985)). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Many factors are considered in determining whether an encounter is a "seizure" or whether it is consensual. When police use conduct evidencing a "show of authority" that could be expected to command compliance, beyond merely identifying themselves as police officers, such conduct may lead to a conclusion that the person questioned is not free to leave. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 403 Mass. 640, 644 (1988). Factors demonstrating a show of authority include the following: threatening presence of several police officers, display of a weapon, physical touching of the person, authoritarian language, retention of property, and pursuit of the suspect. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983); Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 74 (1997), rev. denied, 426 Mass. 1109 (1998). See generally Joseph A. Grasso, Jr. Christine M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 4-2 (1999).
The separate issue of the Fifth Amendment Miranda warnings is discussed below.
The analysis under the Fourth Amendment to determine whether a person has been seized is whether, in addition to not being "free to leave," there was an application of physical force to the person or the person submitted to an assertion of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991). The defendant raises both Fourth Amendment and Article 14 grounds for his motion. Because Article 14 provides greater substantive protection on this issue than does the Fourth Amendment, the court need only apply Article 14. See Stoute, 422 Mass. at 786-87.
In this case, while the evidence only shows that one police officer was present during the initial questioning, there was no display of a weapon, no touching of the defendant, and no retention of the defendant's property, the court concludes that the defendant was seized in the constitutional sense. The defendant was confronted with a police officer in the hallway of his home during the early morning hours, the home was located very near the scene of the fight, and the defendant was questioned about the fight. A reasonable person in these circumstances would not have felt free to leave.
To paraphrase defense counsel, one might ask, Confronted with the police in his home in the middle of the night, to where might a reasonable person go?
To justify the seizure of a person to conduct a threshold inquiry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that the person seized is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405 (1974). This reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts and the specific reasonable inferences that follow from those facts in light of the officer's experience. Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 763 (1981); Silva, 366 Mass. at 406. Mere hunches or good faith beliefs are not sufficient. The test is objective. The court asks whether the facts, viewed from the perspective of the objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Reasonable suspicion may be based on reports from victims or bystanders. Commonwealth v. White, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 172, rev. denied, 427 Mass. 1103 (1998).
Here, the information provided to Det. Hurley from bystanders, including one specifically named Brian Perry, provided the requisite justification. The specific and articulable facts given to Det. Hurley (that the victim had been in an altercation with Scott Kirwan, who left the scene and entered the house across the street) and those facts personally known to him (that the victim had been wounded and that Det. Hurley knew the defendant from a prior encounter or encounters) provided Det. Hurley with objectively reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have committed a crime. Thus, the brief initial seizure of the defendant in the hallway was justified. The scope of that seizure and inquiry was reasonable under the circumstances, as it lasted just long enough for Det. Hurley to confirm his suspicion that the defendant may have committed the crime. E.g., Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 585 (1997).
Following this initial questioning, Det. Hurley searched the house and placed the defendant in the living room. While the search of the defendant's room, including his dresser and drawers, may have been of questionable constitutionality, see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(b) (1996 2000 Supp.), nothing of significance was found and the defendant made no statements in connection with the search, and thus there is nothing to consider suppressing. Similarly, while the defendant may have been under arrest when he was placed in the living room, it is unnecessary for the court to consider whether probable cause to arrest existed in the context of a motion to suppress statements, because the defendant made no further statements.
No evidence was presented at the hearing as to the reasonableness of Det. Hurley's belief that the defendant's father had authority to consent to the search of the defendant's bedroom, including bureau drawers.
In sum, the court finds and rules that the police entry into the defendant's home was lawful because the defendant's father consented. The encounter in the hallway constituted a seizure of the defendant under Article 14, but it was justified because Det. Hurley possessed reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime. No further statements were made, and thus the court need not decide whether the search of the defendant's bedroom and the detention of the defendant in the living room were lawful.
Fifth Amendment and Article 12
The court's ruling in this section is limited to those issues raised by the defendant. In holding that the defendant's statements were voluntarily made and that Miranda warnings were not required, the court does not reach the evidentiary issue regarding the defendant's silence in response to Det. Hurley's questions, an issue not addressed by the parties. Such an issue is appropriately an issue for trial. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989) (prearrest silence not admissible). See generally Maria Noelle Berger, Note, Defining the Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Should Prearrest Silence be Admissible as Substantive Evidence of Guilt?, 1999 U. Ill. L.Rev. 1015 (1999).
In ruling on a motion to suppress statements on Fifth Amendment and Article 12 grounds, the court must decide (1) whether the police satisfied Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), and its progeny and (2) whether the statements were made voluntarily. Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 145 (1982). The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove compliance with Miranda and voluntariness of statements. Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 197 n. 9 (1997); Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 920-21 (1983).
Under Miranda, an individual must be informed prior to custodial interrogation that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him, and that he has the right to an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443-44. "Custodial interrogation" is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement personnel after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 (1995).
"Interrogation" under this analysis includes both express questioning or its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). It is clear that, in the hallway encounter, the defendant was subjected to "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 826, 827-28, rev. denied, 430 Mass. 1112 (1999). The more difficult question is whether the defendant was in "custody."
To decide whether an encounter with the police was custodial, the court's ultimate inquiry is "whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 126 (1998) (quoting United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 712 (1st Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The test is an objective one: whether a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would experience the environment in which the interrogation took place as coercive." Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 (1999). See also Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 144 (1999). The factors which guide the court's evaluation are: (1) the place of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has begun to focus on the suspect (which is material only to the extent such suspicion influences the objective conditions of interrogation, Morse, 427 Mass. at 125), (3) the nature of the interrogation (whether it was aggressive or informal and influenced in its contours by the suspect), and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the suspect was free to end the interview by leaving or asking the interrogator to leave. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1984). See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 154-55 (2000).
The fact that a defendant did not feel free to leave does not itself render an interrogation custodial, if his freedom of action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 630 (1988); Commonwealth v. Ayre, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 20-21 (1991). Where, as here, a defendant is the subject of a Terry-type stop, Miranda warnings are required if a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe himself to be in custody. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. and 827. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) ( Terry stops not subject to dictates of Miranda, due to noncoercive character of such stops, but Miranda warnings required if freedom of action curtailed to degree associated with formal arrest); United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 960 (1st Cir. 1986), on subsequent appeal, United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1987) (Whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave is the "standard for determining whether a person has been seized within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, but [this] is not alone determinative of whether he has been placed in custody for the purposes of the [F]ifth."). See generally Richard G. Stearns, Massachusetts Criminal Law: A District Court Prosecutor's Guide 114 282-83 (1999). There is no requirement that Miranda warnings be given prior to general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of persons in the fact-finding process, if the questioning is intended to verify or dispel a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 339-40; Commonwealth v. Cameron, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 (1998). It is a question of degree. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 827. See also Borodine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202, 1206 (1st Cir. 1979) (drawing line between custodial interrogation and general on-the-scene questioning difficult task). While Miranda warnings are not required during inquiries to focus investigative efforts by determining threshold facts such as identity or what generally occurred, they are required in situations where, for example, a defendant is pursued and apprehended by police, handcuffed, and locked in police cruiser during a Terry inquiry. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 828. See also Larkin, 429 Mass. at 434 ("The question, therefore, is not whether a person is in custody in some abstract sense or for some other purpose, but whether he is in custody in the sense that implicates the concerns motivating the Miranda rule in the first place.").
The facts of this case fall closer to the former type of inquiry than the latter. The place of interrogation was the defendant's home. While, as the defendant argues, questioning by the police in one's home under circumstances such as those in this case could cause a suspect to believe that he is not free to leave (which speaks to the fourth Bryant factor), the home is not, in general, a coercive environment. The defendant was in a hallway, in the presence of his father, confronted by one police officer, who did not physically block the means of egress. Cf. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 151, 154 (measure of physical oppressiveness in place of interrogation where defendant was in eleven by twelve foot bedroom in home, with three police officers, two of whom remained standing blocking closed door); Commonwealth v. Jones, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 382, rev. denied, 425 Mass. 1101 (1997) (interrogated defendant locked in rear seat of police car, tried once to leave but was stopped, and was directly confronted by two accusers).
It appears from the evidence that Det. Hurley considered the defendant to be a suspect. Det. Hurley's belief is relevant to the custody inquiry only if it was communicated to the defendant or otherwise influenced the objective conditions of the questioning. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994). Based on what the defendant said to his father upon entering the home, the defendant appears to have feared that the police would suspect him of the crime. Det. Hurley's appearance at the house shortly thereafter certainly confirmed the defendant's fears. However, the court must examine the " objective conditions surrounding [the] interrogation." Morse, 427 Mass. at 124 (emphasis added). Det. Hurley's questions were investigatory in nature, rather than accusatory. When he began to confirm his suspicions, Det. Hurley then placed the defendant in custody in the living room. Det. Hurley's suspicions were not objectively communicated to a degree that would transform the encounter into a custodial situation. Cf. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 154-55 (officers' suspicions that defendant fired gun were "unmistakably and forcefully" conveyed to defendant, where officer announced at beginning of interrogation theory that defendant committed crime and showed defendant false fingerprint card as "support" for theory).
The questioning was not the sort of aggressive interrogation that is directed toward eliciting an incriminating response from a suspect. As stated above, Det. Hurley's questions were investigatory, brief, and designed to confirm or dispel quickly his suspicion that the defendant was involved in the stabbing. Cf. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 155 (officers' questioning was "aggressive and persistent," defendant's denials were "scorned and overridden," substance of conversation was harsh, and conversation was of type normally attendant to arrest and custody); Jones, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 382 (while not aggressive, questioning took place in tense atmosphere within police car).
As to the fourth Bryant factor, whether the defendant was free to end the interrogation, this is clearly in the defendant's favor. A reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to end the interrogation or leave the hallway. The court notes, however, that the psychological forces preventing the defendant from leaving or ending the interrogation were not so extreme as in Coleman. In Coleman, the defendant was told that if he persisted in denying the officers' allegations, he would be arrested and handcuffed on the spot, in front of his aunt, but, if he confessed, he would only be summoned into court. 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 152. The police also told the Coleman defendant that if a certain other person elected to cooperate with the prosecution, the charges against the defendant would be greatly escalated, but if the defendant were to confess, no such elevated charges would be brought. Id.
Taken as a whole, these factors lead the court to conclude that the interrogation of the defendant in this case was not custodial. See Streifel, 781 F.2d at 961 ("[I]n a non-stationhouse setting, Miranda is not triggered simply because a person detained by the police has reasonable cause to believe that he is not free to leave. Rather, a host of factors must be considered.") (emphasis in original). While the defendant was not free to leave, Det. Hurley was, pursuant to a Terry-type inquiry, conducting a brief, preliminary investigation to focus investigative efforts. The defendant was questioned in his home, in the presence of his father, by a single police officer who did not indicate to the defendant that he was under arrest. No weapon was drawn, no physical restraint was applied, and the hallway was not blocked. The circumstances do not demonstrate an environment so dominated by the police that the defendant was, when in his hallway, restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. This is not the sort of "incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere" with which Miranda was concerned. Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 658 (1993) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445). The defendant was not "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures." Commonwealth v. Shine, 398 Mass. 641, 648 (1986) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457). Det. Hurley asked questions which were natural and preliminary and designed to determine what, if anything, the defendant knew. See Shine, 398 Mass. at 649. See also Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 3-5 (1976) and Borodine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202, 1205-08 (1st Cir. 1979) (ten minute questioning of defendant in basement laundry room not inherently coercive and not "custodial," but constituted general on-the-scene questioning). Although the latter part of the detective's questioning of the defendant was more focused and aggressive, it was, on balance, a brief, preliminary effort to confirm or dispel a suspicion. Indeed, the defendant's decision not to respond to two of the detective's questions, and the detective's acquiescence in the second of those decisions, both suggest the absence of pressure upon the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See Larkin, 429 Mass. at 433-34. The Terry seizure of the defendant at the time of the questioning was not a seizure of a sort that exerts upon a person "pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
For these reasons, the court rules that the questioning of the defendant in the hallway was not custodial and there was no violation of Miranda. This does not end the court's inquiry, however.
In addition to showing compliance with Miranda, the Commonwealth also must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements made were voluntary and not the product of coercion. Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 851 n. 2 (1983); Day, 387 Mass. at 920-21. A statement is voluntary if it is the product of a rational intellect and free will. Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 662 (1995). The court inquires whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, the will of the suspect was overborne to the extent that the statement was not the result of a free and voluntary act. Id. at 662-63. Factors include the defendant's conduct, his age, education, and experience, his physical and mental condition, the influence of drugs or alcohol, and the details of the interrogation, including the location and manner of interrogation, the use of misrepresentations, threats or promises by the police, and the recitation of Miranda warnings. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 426 Mass. 715, 722 (1998); Selby, 420 Mass. at 663; Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986).
In this case, the evidence indicates that the defendant's responses to Det. Hurley's questions were voluntary. The evidence shows that the defendant was able to respond appropriately to Det. Hurley's questions. The defendant appeared calm. There is no evidence that the defendant's will was overborne or that he was at all impaired or unable to answer questions rationally. In fact, the defendant several times ceased answering or declined to answer Det. Hurley's questions. The Commonwealth has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's statements were voluntary, the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Selby, 420 Mass. at 662. Cf. Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 382-84 (1996) (statement not voluntary where defendant questioned for seven hours, appeared emotionally distraught and disheveled, responses to questions interrupted by periods of sobbing and shaking, and defendant was afterwards committed to mental health facility based on extreme level of distress and suicidal ideation).
CONCLUSION
The statements the defendant made in the hallway were not obtained as a result of a violation of the United States Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The defendant's father consented to the police entry into the defendant's home. While the defendant was "seized," such seizure was justified because Det. Hurley had reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have committed a crime, and the scope of the seizure did not exceed its justification — i.e., it lasted only long enough for Det. Hurley to confirm his suspicion. Though the objective circumstances would have led the defendant to believe he was not free to leave, he was not in "custody" and thus need not have been given a Miranda warning. The defendant's statements were voluntary.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant's motions to suppress statements be DENIED .