Opinion
15-P-1512
03-27-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. James E. JONES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Among other charges, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(b ). He moved to withdraw his guilty pleas to all of the offenses charged on the basis that the drug certificate showed that the assistant analyst was Annie Dookhan. The judge allowed the defendant's motion after a nonevidentiary hearing.
The defendant also pleaded guilty to charges of operating a motor vehicle after suspension of his license as a subsequent offense, G. L. c. 90, § 23 ; assault and battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D ; and resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B.
The Commonwealth appeals from the allowance of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The defendant asserts that an evidentiary hearing took place to the extent that the drug certificates and affidavits were placed in the record. The defendant also asserts waiver in that the Commonwealth did not request a full evidentiary hearing and did not submit briefing on the issues raised by the defendant's motion although the judge invited it to do so.
We review the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas as a motion for new trial. See Commonwealth v. Furr , 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009). "If a judge is inclined to grant such a motion, he or she must first conclude that it raises a substantial issue which would necessitate an evidentiary hearing." Commonwealth v. Ubeira-Gonzalez , 87 Mass. App. Ct. 37, 40 (2015). However, if the substantial issue raises "solely a question of law based on undisputed facts, an evidentiary hearing may not be necessary." Id . at 40 n.4.
We evaluate the decision "only to determine whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Acevedo , 446 Mass. 435, 441 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Grace , 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).
To prevail on a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in cases of governmental misconduct, the defendant must establish that: (1) there was egregious government misconduct in his case, and (2) the egregious misconduct materially influenced his decision to plead guilty. See Commonwealth v. Scott , 467 Mass. 336, 347–357 (2014), citing Ferrara v. United States , 456 F.3d 278, 290-291 (1st Cir. 2006).
We conclude from the record that the defendant did not, and could not, demonstrate that any alleged misconduct influenced his decision. The defendant provided a drug certificate that states the substance was analyzed was November 4, 2010. The first signature on the certificate on the line labeled "Assistant Analyst" was that of Annie Dookhan. The defendant states in his affidavit that he pleaded guilty on September 9, 2010.
Accordingly, the defendant did not show that "egregious misconduct was undertaken ‘by government agents' prior to the entry of the defendant's guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Ruffin , 475 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2016), quoting from Scott , supra at 348. "Where a drug certificate signed by Dookhan postdates the defendant's guilty plea, the underlying assumption of Scott is absent." Ruffin , supra . Seeing no other basis to find that governmental misconduct occurred prior to the defendant's acceptance of a guilty plea, we conclude that the motion judge erred in allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea on the charge of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(b ).
As we conclude that no evidentiary hearing was warranted, we do not address the defendant's argument that the Commonwealth waived such a hearing.
The Ferrera analysis does not apply to the defendant's nondrug-related charges as the defendant alleges no governmental wrongdoing in connection with those charges. The defendant raises no other issue that would allow us to conclude that the tender of his pleas was defective or that justice may not have been done. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).
We reject the defendant's argument that applying Ruffin in this appeal violates his due process rights. Ruffin is a straightforward application of the rule announced in Scott . If Ruffin had not yet been decided we would reach the same result.
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We conclude it was error to allow the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and for new trial, and we reverse.
So ordered .
Reversed.