See Buchanan v State, 561 P.2d 1197 (Alas, 1977); State v Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212; 700 P.2d 1312 (1984); People v Coston, 40 Colo. App. 205; 576 P.2d 182 (1977), aff'd 633 P.2d 470 (1981); Klase v State, 346 A.2d 160 (Del, 1975); State v Bruns, 304 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa, 1981); Rackley v Commonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 512 (Ky, 1984); Brooks v State, 560 N.E.2d 49, 57 (Ind, 1990); Commonwealth v Carter, 271 Pa. Super. 508; 414 A.2d 369 (1979); State v Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155; 453 A.2d 1315 (1982); Inge v Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360; 228 S.E.2d 563 (1976); State v King, 31 Wn. App. 56; 639 P.2d 809 (1982). Although one court has opined that a suggestive lineup of inanimate objects might violate the Due Process Clause under unspecified circumstances, see Commonwealth v Jones, 25 Mass. App. 55; 514 N.E.2d 1337 (1987), that court had no difficulty upholding the identification when confronted with facts remarkably similar to the procedures followed in our case. III

See Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1017, 116 S.Ct. 582, 133 L.Ed.2d 504 (1995); Inge v. Procunier, 758 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Inge v. Sielaff, 474 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 104, 88 L.Ed.2d 85 (1985); Buchanan v. State, 561 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1977); Roscoe, supra, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312; People v. Coston, 40 Colo.App. 205, 576 P.2d 182 (1977), aff'd, 633 P.2d 470 (Colo.1981); State v. Bruns, 304 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1981); Rackley v. Commonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 512 (Ky.1984); Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 55, 514 N.E.2d 1337 (1987); People v. Miller, 211 Mich.App. 30, 535 N.W.2d 518 (1995); Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238 (Miss.1999); State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155, 453 A.2d 1315 (1982); Delgado, supra, 188 N.J. 48, 902 A.2d 888.

See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 574 (1984). See also Commonwealth v. Riley, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 553-554 (1988); Commonwealth v. Laaman, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 362, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 834 (1988); Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 60 (1987); Commonwealth v. Key, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 234 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 230 (1978). In concluding that the identification of the defendant was reliable, the judge cited Goncalves's good opportunity to view his assailants, his certainty in identifying the defendant, and his rejection of hundreds of other photographs as well as suspects presented to him prior to his identification of the defendant.

See Commonwealth v. Storey, supra at 317 (one-on-one identification not precluded from admission solely because a lineup could have been easily arranged); Commonwealth v. Barnett, 371 Mass. 87, 92 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (witness's life need not be in jeopardy). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 399 Mass. 60, 67-68 (1987); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 479 (1980); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 497-502 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1034 (1969); Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 59-60 (1987). Such identification procedures are justified by the need for prompt criminal investigation while the victim's "recollection or mental image of the offender is still fresh, before other images crowd in or his attempts to verbalize his impressions can themselves distort the original picture," and it "provides the witness with good opportunity for an accurate identification."

February 26, 1988Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55 (1987). MR. JUSTICE LIACOS did not participate.

To the extent that the witness's identification was of those articles as opposed to the defendant, there was an absence of the "extreme" circumstances required to render such indirect proof of the defendant's guilt fundamentally unfair. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, supra at 51-52; Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 62 (1987); Commonwealth v. Raedy, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 445 (2007). Further, the record shows that the judge was aware of the witness's partial reliance on these articles in identifying the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 399 Mass. 60, 67-68 (1987). Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 59-60 (1987), and cases cited. Although the officers' statements to Blais, made prior to the hospital showup, that the man he would see had a gash on his head in the same place that Blais had struck the intruder, contained some inherent suggestiveness, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leaster, 395 Mass. 96, 103 (1985), we are convinced that Blais's opportunity to observe his assailant at the time of the incident and his prompt, unequivocal recognition of the defendant at the hospital attest to the reliability of his identification.

Unnecessarily suggestive identifications need not be excluded, however, where it is determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the suggestiveness has not caused the identifications to be unreliable. See Commonwealth v. Bernard, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 505 (1978); Commonwealth v. Cincotta, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 816-817 (1979); Commonwealth v. Avery, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 102-103 (1981); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 574, 577-578 (1984); Commonwealth v. Crowe, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 467-468 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 838 (1986); Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 60 (1987). Commonwealth v. Laaman, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 362 (1988).

See e.g., Id. at 461 citing Commonwealth v. Barnett, 371 Mass. 87 91-92 (1976); see also. Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 61 (1987). Show-up identification procedures are "justified by the need for efficient investigation in the immediate aftermath of crime. . . . while . . . recollection[s] or mental image[s] of the offender are still fresh . . ."

See e.g., Id. at 461 citing Commonwealth v. Barnett, 371 Mass. 87, 91-92 (1976); see also, Commonwealth v. Jones, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 61 (1987). Show-up identification procedures are "justified by the need for efficient investigation in the immediate aftermath of crime. . . . while . . . recollection[s] or mental image[s] of the offender are still fresh. . . ."