Opinion
No. 11–P–280.
2012-06-22
COMMONWEALTH v. Steven JEAN–PIERRE.
By the Court (CYPHER, GREEN & TRAINOR, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On September 2, 2009, following a bench trial in the Woburn District Court, the defendant was convicted of malicious destruction of property with a value under $250. G.L. c. 266, § 127. The charge arose from an incident on July 30, 2009, during which the defendant shattered a pane of glass on a china cabinet, or “hutch.”
The damaged object was primarily referred to as a hutch during trial.
The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case. The trial judge denied the motion from the bench with respect to the charge of malicious destruction of property under $250.
The judge granted the defendant's motion for a required finding with respect to an assault and battery charge. The judge also granted the motion with respect to the original felony malicious destruction of property charge, reducing it to the lesser-included misdemeanor offense. G.L. c. 266, § 127.
The defendant appeals from his conviction, arguing that the judge should have allowed his motion for a required finding of not guilty because (1) there was insufficient evidence to show that someone other than the defendant was the owner of the hutch, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had acted with malice when he damaged the hutch.
We affirm the judgment.
Discussion. The standard of review on a defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty is ordinarily “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis original). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–319 (1979). The standard is applied “to the evidence before the judge at the close of the Commonwealth's case.” Ibid.
Here, at the close of the Commonwealth's case, the prosecution had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to meet the Latimore standard on the “property of another” element of the charge. See G.L. c. 266, § 127. “To prove the element of ‘the property of another,’ the Commonwealth need not prove exact ownership. Rather its burden is to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the property belonged to someone other than the defendant .” Commonwealth v. Caparella, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 506, 513 (2007) (in analogous larceny context), citing Commonwealth v. Souza, 397 Mass. 236, 238 (1986). The evidence presented at trial included testimony that the defendant's mother allowed police into the home where the hutch was located; the defendant identified himself as “homeless” during the booking process; and the defendant made statements on the day in question that his mother had told him to leave the house. Although the defendant testified during the presentation of his case that the hutch belonged to him, the judge was free not to credit this testimony. See Commonwealth v. Nunez, 446 Mass. 54, 59 (2006) (credibility determinations are for the fact finder). It was reasonable on this evidence for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant's mother owned the house, as well as any large household items within, including the hutch. The evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case was therefore sufficient to meet the “property of another” element of G.L. c. 266, § 127.
The Commonwealth also presented sufficient evidence on the element of malice. In a destruction of property context, “[m]alice requires a showing that the defendant's conduct was motivated by cruelty, hostility or revenge.” Commonwealth v. McDowell, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 15, 22 (2004), quoting from Commonwealth v. Armand, 411 Mass. 167, 170 (1991). Officer Gibbons, who was the officer who went to the scene when a dispatch was received, testified that the defendant said that “his mother was drunk and that ... she was yelling at his brother and that he wasn't doin' anything and then she started yellin' at him.” Gibbons testified that the defendant said that his mother “was standin' in front of him and pokin' him in the forehead with her finger while he was—while she yellin' at him and that he pushed her hand away, and he got up to walk outta the room.” Gibbons testified that the defendant said that after he left the room he “bumped his shoulder into the hutch and then he said he got mad and he—he punched the glass door out.” Gibbons also testified that he heard the defendant say during a telephone call from the police station that “his mother was drunk and getting his face [sic] ... and he smacked her hand away.” Gibbons's testimony relating the defendant's statements, combined with the evidence suggesting that the hutch belonged to the defendant's mother, raise the inference that the defendant's conduct was in retaliation after the argument he had with his mother directly prior to the breaking of the glass door on the hutch.
While the evidence here is far from overwhelming, it was enough that a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant's conduct was motivated by hostility, and therefore malicious. See Commonwealth v. Rumkin, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 635, 641 (2002).
Judgment affirmed.