Opinion
22-P-69
01-23-2023
COMMONWEALTH v. ROBERT FRANCIS JASSE.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a conviction after a jury trial of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a.) (1), the defendant claims that the District Court judge erred by denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty. He contends that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol. We affirm.
A conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor requires the Commonwealth to prove the following elements: "(1) operation of a vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) under the influence of alcohol." Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 631 (1995) . Here, the defense contests the third element. Because the Commonwealth met its burden through a combination of physical indicia of impairment, field sobriety tests, and statements of the defendant, the trial judge properly denied the motions.
In reviewing a motion for a required finding of not guilty, the "question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The "assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence [is] properly left to the jury." Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 510 (2016).
The Commonwealth presented ample evidence at trial that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Reading Police Sergeant Justin Martel testified as to his observations while interacting with the defendant, who was the sole occupant of a car idling in a parking lot adjacent to a State highway. While speaking to the defendant, Sergeant Martel noticed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. The defendant presented with bloodshot and glassy eyes and slurred speech. After agreeing to submit to three field sobriety tests and receiving instructions, the defendant did not complete two of them and admitted, "I couldn't do this if I was sober." On a third test, he could not walk in a straight line, and he abandoned the test after taking just six of nine steps. Sergeant Martel formed the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated. Another officer noticed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the cruiser used to transport the defendant. This evidence presented the classic indicia of impairment due to alcohol. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bryer, 398 Mass. 9, 10-11 (1986) (unsteadiness, "odor of alcohol," and "red and glassy" eyes); Commonwealth v. Lavendier, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 501, 506-507 (2011) ("slurred speech"); Commonwealth v. Shabo, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 923, 924 (1999) ("performed inadequately" on field sobriety tests). Sergeant Martel's opinion testimony "may also be taken into account" in the sufficiency calculus. Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 317, 321 (1994). The "defendant's own statements" about his lack of sobriety provided further evidence of intoxication. Lavendier, supra at 506. This is not a case, such as Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401 Mass. 470, 473 (1988), where a conviction could not be sustained by the uncorroborated statements of the defendant.
The defendant correctly notes that evidence of an idling car in a parking lot provided "no direct evidence of the defendant's manner of driving." Such direct evidence, however, is not required. "The Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant actually drove in an unsafe or erratic manner." Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985). The Commonwealth "must prove a diminished capacity to operate safely," and did so here. Id. See Sudderth, 37 Mass.App.Ct. at 318 (sufficient evidence where defendant was "asleep in a reclined position in the driver's seat of a stationary car" whose engine was running).
The defense arguments on appeal offer alternative, innocent explanations for his appearance and conduct on the night in question. The defendant concludes that "the evidence of impairment was not overwhelming and there was no evidence sufficient to establish that any perceived impairment was due to the consumption of alcohol." "To the extent that conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the jury to decide which version to credit." Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113 (2010). Also, the "assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence [is] properly left to the jury." AdonSoto, 475 Mass. at 510. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, jurors could readily conclude that the defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished his "ability to operate a motor vehicle safely." Connolly, 394 Mass. at 173.
Judgment affirmed.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.