This was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant harbored feelings of anger and hostility toward Garrett, and that the damage the defendant caused to Garrett's motor vehicle was motivated by those feelings, and therefore his actions were malicious. See Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 443 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384 (1926) ("'something more than a deliberate intent to do a wrong' must be shown to establish malice"). The judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.

The defendant need not have known, nor directed his animus toward the specific property owner; he was simply required to act maliciously toward the property that was damaged. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384 (1926) ("It was not essential that [the defendant] should know who owned the Dodge automobiles, or that he should have been actuated by a spirit of personal hostility to the owners of these automobiles. It was enough that he intended willfully and maliciously to destroy the property of another, whoever he might be"); Chambers, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 144 (jury instruction on malice was "inaccurate [though in a way that was beneficial to the defendant] insofar as it required the Commonwealth to establish the defendant's malice was directed specifically toward the owner of the property she damaged or destroyed"); Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 4 ("However, malice does not require that the defendant know the identity of the owner of the property damaged").

It is true, as the Commonwealth points out, that the trier of fact may employ "common sense" and common experience to determine the valuation issue. See Commonwealth v. Muckle , 59 Mass.App.Ct. 631, 643, 797 N.E.2d 456 (2003), citing Commonwealth v. Hosman , 257 Mass. 379, 385-386, 154 N.E. 76 (1926). Here, however, equipped only with the brand and photograph of the ring, we cannot conclude that the application of common sense and experience is sufficient to fill the evidentiary gap. Compare Muckle , supra (noting jury may apply "common sense" to conclude that value of vehicle exceeded $250), with Tracy , 27 Mass.App.Ct. at 467, 539 N.E.2d 1043 (concluding common experience of jurors insufficient to establish that value of firearm exceeded one hundred dollars).

Malice has also been defined as conduct that possessed “such a spirit of hostility and ill will against the property and person of anyone, whoever he was, if he stood in the way, or barred the progress of [the defendant].” Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385 (1926). Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant urged his companions to rush the house, by making statements such as “let's get him,” and follow his example of striking down the victim with a brick in order to force his way into the Trabal home to take revenge on the person who stabbed their friend.

One alternative to the current model jury instruction would be to substitute the word “another” for the phrase “the owner [of the property].” See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384–385, 154 N.E. 76 (1926), discussed infra. The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 154 N.E. 76 (1926), is misplaced.

Ibid. He testified at trial that he had “ ‘intended to break whatever [he] broke’ ... [but] insisted that he had no hostility towards the landlords; they ‘never entered [his] mind.’ “ Id. at 228–229. As this court noted in Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 437, 440–443 (1983), “[t]he development of the concept of malice in malicious damage cases may be traced to Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 558 (1849),” and, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379 (1926). We concluded that “the Hosman decision ... reaffirm[ed] the holdings in the earlier cases that ‘something more than a deliberate intent to do a wrong’ must be shown to establish malice.

" Ibid. "'[S]omething more than a deliberate intent to do wrong' must be shown to establish malice." Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385 (1926). The Commonwealth also must prove that the value of the property destroyed exceeded $250.

Therefore, he argues, malice cannot be inferred, and a required finding of not guilty should have been entered. In Peruzzi, this court traced the “development of the concept of malice in malicious damage cases” to Commonwealth v. Walden, 57 Mass. 558, 3 Cush. 558 (1849), and Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 154 N.E. 76 (1926). We concluded that “the Hosman decision ... reaffirm[ed] the holdings in the earlier cases that ‘something more than a deliberate intent to do a wrong’ must be shown to establish malice.

See note 8, supra. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385-386 (1926); Commonwealth v. Muckle, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 643 (2003). For the foregoing reasons, we do not discern error in the jury instructions such as would give rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, and warrant reversal.

Id. at 5. See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384-385 (1926). Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the juvenile's conduct was wanton, i.e., the acts he committed were "done heedlessly and in reckless disregard of the rights of others."