Commonwealth v. Hosman

31 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Cooper

    162 N.E. 733 (Mass. 1928)   Cited 19 times
    In Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 378, it was held that an indictment which, because of the omission of the words "wilfully and maliciously," set out no offence, could not be corrected by the insertion of those words.

    The charge upon this point was full and complete. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384, 385, and cases there cited. The other assignments of error need not be discussed.

  2. State v. Farnsworth

    51 Idaho 768 (Idaho 1932)   Cited 41 times

    To constitute malice, it is not necessary that the defendant know the owner of the property. ( People v. Jones, 241 Ill. 482, 16 Ann. Cas. 332, 89 N.E. 752; Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 154 N.E. 76.) Appellants' requested Instruction No. 3 was sufficiently covered by Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 as given.

  3. Parker v. Levin

    285 Mass. 125 (Mass. 1934)   Cited 39 times
    In Parker v. Levin, 285 Mass. 125, 188 N.E. 502, 90 A.L.R. 1446 (1934), the court held that an award of substantial damages was proper even though the damages could not be computed with any exactness, where in the nature of things and under the circumstances of the case a breach of contract would cause substantial damages and where it could not be urged that no basis existed for any damages or that an award of more than nominal damages was clear speculation.

    Although the basis for a rational estimate of substantial damages was scanty, we cannot say that no basis existed, or that the award of more than nominal damages must have been a pure speculation. Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co. 200 Mass. 1, 8. Wellington v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 312, 317. Lowrie v. Castle, 225 Mass. 37, 51, 52. Whitcomb v. Reed-Prentice Co. 262 Mass. 348, 360. O'Reilly's Case, 265 Mass. 456. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386. Bradford v. Cunard Steamship Co. 147 Mass. 55, 57. Hawkins v. Jamrog, 277 Mass. 540, 544, 545. Connery v. Cass, 277 Mass. 545, 551. If, as we think, more than nominal damages could be awarded, the defendant raises no question as to their amount or the method by which the judge assessed them. Page v. Johnston, 205 Mass. 274, 279. The general exception to the finding does not raise the point that the evidence was insufficient in law to support it. Keohane, petitioner, 179 Mass. 69, 73. Reid v. Doherty, 273 Mass. 388.

  4. Commonwealth v. Barker

    311 Mass. 82 (Mass. 1942)   Cited 30 times
    In Commonwealth v. Barker, 311 Mass. 82, 84, 90, the defendant (in a companion case) in a prosecution for accepting a bribe insisted at trial that he had received the money only for the purpose of giving it to another municipal officer, and an instruction similar to that requested by Household was given.

    Commonwealth v. Capland, 254 Mass. 556. Commonwealth v. Friedman, 256 Mass. 214. Taylor v. Creeley, 257 Mass. 21. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386. Claffey v. Fenelon, 263 Mass. 427, 435.

  5. Thibault v. Devio

    63 N.E.2d 354 (Mass. 1945)   Cited 6 times

    The case falls within the authority of numerous decisions. Bradford v. Cunard Steamship Co. 147 Mass. 55. Manilla v. Houghton, 154 Mass. 465, 468. Scullane v. Kellogg, 169 Mass. 544, 550. McGarrahan v. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad, 171 Mass. 211, 220. Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co. 200 Mass. 1, 8. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386. Cross v. Sharaffa, 281 Mass. 329, 331. Parker v. Levin, 285 Mass. 125, 129. Doherty v. Ruiz, 302 Mass. 145, 147. Exceptions overruled.

  6. Rich v. United Mutual Fire Ins. Co.

    328 Mass. 133 (Mass. 1951)   Cited 20 times
    In Rich v. United Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 328 Mass. 133, 102 N.E.2d 431 (1951) the issue was whether the loss was caused by vandalism.

    Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 558, 561. Commonwealth v. Williams, 110 Mass. 401. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19, 35. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 266, §§ 94-138.

  7. Commonwealth v. Lamothe

    343 Mass. 417 (Mass. 1961)   Cited 22 times
    Meaning of malice for arson is applicable to attempted arson

    The defendant relies heavily on a line of cases involving prosecutions for malicious mischief. Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 558. Commonwealth v. Williams, 110 Mass. 401. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379. But these cases are not in point. In offences of that sort it has generally been recognized that malice has a meaning quite different from its ordinary meaning in the criminal law.

  8. Commonwealth v. Kostka

    370 Mass. 516 (Mass. 1976)   Cited 98 times
    Finding of competence after hearing, despite evidence of mental illness including ingestion of light bulb, id. at 520 n. 3

    Second, we believe that the facts underlying the presumption are within the jury's common sense and knowledge and that it would be inappropriate and artificial to forbid jurors to rely, at least in part, on their common experience. See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250, 254-255 (1st Cir. 1975) (Campbell, J., concurring). Cf. Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965). "[I]n deciding the issue of insanity in a criminal case, the jury may infer that the defendant is sane from their common knowledge of the fact that a great majority of men are sane, and of the probability that any particular man is sane."

  9. Commonwealth v. Marshall

    373 Mass. 65 (Mass. 1977)   Cited 13 times
    Rejecting waiver of jury trial in capital case despite abolition of death penalty

    He requested that an additional special venire be drawn. In Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926), the venire was exhausted and jurors were summoned from another session to complete the panel. There is no showing that the defendant was prejudiced in any way by the selection of jurors from the regular jury pool.

  10. Commonwealth v. Walters

    12 Mass. App. Ct. 389 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 15 times
    Affirming conviction but ordering resentencing where jurors were "warranted" in finding the property damaged to be worth more than one hundred dollars, but jury not instructed on essential element of value

    There was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the truck was worth more than one hundred dollars; therefore it was not necessary that the judge strike the allegation that the value was more than one hundred dollars before submitting the case to the jury. Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926). 2.