One alternative to the current model jury instruction would be to substitute the word “another” for the phrase “the owner [of the property].” See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384–385, 154 N.E. 76 (1926), discussed infra. The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 154 N.E. 76 (1926), is misplaced.

In assessing whether a rational jury could find sufficient indicia of either "cruelty" or "hostility" on the part of the defendant and his confederates in the Commonwealth's scenario (we exclude consideration of the element of "revenge," which was not presented by the evidence), we are not unaware that the Commonwealth's case with respect to the requisite mental state must consist of "something more than a deliberate intent to do a wrong." Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384 (1926). (Such evidence would, however, establish the "wilfulness" element of the statutory violation, which the defendant does not contest.

Commonwealth v. Armand, 411 Mass. at 170. "Malice" requires a showing that the actor was "motivated by `cruelty, hostility or revenge'" (citation omitted) ibid., but this does not require, in the context of § 127, that the actor know who owned the property attacked, see Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384-385 (1926); Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 442 n. 4; the animus need not have so personalized an object. Take the facts as one can raise them from Commonwealth v. Morrill, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1003 (1982).

Therefore, he argues, malice cannot be inferred, and a required finding of not guilty should have been entered. In Peruzzi, this court traced the “development of the concept of malice in malicious damage cases” to Commonwealth v. Walden, 57 Mass. 558, 3 Cush. 558 (1849), and Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 154 N.E. 76 (1926). We concluded that “the Hosman decision ... reaffirm[ed] the holdings in the earlier cases that ‘something more than a deliberate intent to do a wrong’ must be shown to establish malice.

It is immaterial whether the defendant knew the identity of the owner of the property. Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, supra at 442 n. 4. See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384-385 (1926). The evidence clearly warranted the judge in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's destructive acts were by design and were hostile to the owner of the booth.

Malice has also been defined as conduct that possessed “such a spirit of hostility and ill will against the property and person of anyone, whoever he was, if he stood in the way, or barred the progress of [the defendant].” Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385 (1926). Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant urged his companions to rush the house, by making statements such as “let's get him,” and follow his example of striking down the victim with a brick in order to force his way into the Trabal home to take revenge on the person who stabbed their friend.

Ibid. He testified at trial that he had “ ‘intended to break whatever [he] broke’ ... [but] insisted that he had no hostility towards the landlords; they ‘never entered [his] mind.’ “ Id. at 228–229. As this court noted in Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 437, 440–443 (1983), “[t]he development of the concept of malice in malicious damage cases may be traced to Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 558 (1849),” and, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379 (1926). We concluded that “the Hosman decision ... reaffirm[ed] the holdings in the earlier cases that ‘something more than a deliberate intent to do a wrong’ must be shown to establish malice.

" Ibid. "'[S]omething more than a deliberate intent to do wrong' must be shown to establish malice." Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385 (1926). The Commonwealth also must prove that the value of the property destroyed exceeded $250.

See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385-386 (1926) (in determining the value of property that is the subject of malicious destruction, a jury may apply "common experience"). Cf. Corson v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 193, 198 n. 6 (1998) (life experience informs reasons and bases for a person's ability to value an asset).

Instead, the defendant's malicious acts of destruction would encompass, and the valuation would include, in addition to the gun cabinet, the damaged back door, the ceiling and walls into which the shots were fired, the wall punched in with his hand, and the windows broken by smashing guns against them. See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385-386 (1926) (in determining valuation of the property, fact finder may apply her "common experience"). Thus, whether determined by either valuation methodology — valuation of the full dwelling or valuation of the aggregated discrete parts of the dwelling — there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in the determination of the felony statutory threshold of $250.