Opinion
16-P-1132
07-10-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Antoine HARRIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In light of the misconduct at Hinton State Laboratory Institute involving Annie Dookhan, the primary chemist in his case, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas to the offenses of trafficking in cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E ; and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32. Following an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the motion, and the defendant timely appealed. We affirm.
Discussion. We review a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as a motion for new trial. Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009). We evaluate the decision "only to determine whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 441 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).
To prevail on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in a Doohkan-related matter, the defendant is required to satisfy a two-prong test articulated in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014). Under the first prong, the defendant must show egregious misconduct by the government that preceded entry of his guilty pleas. Id. at 347, 351-352. The judge correctly found here that Dookhan's participation in the analysis of the seized substances was sufficient to satisfy this prong. Ibid.
The judge's finding on the first prong is not challenged on appeal and is supported by the record.
Under the second prong, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Dookhan's misconduct." Id. at 355. In making this fact-specific inquiry, the judge may consider relevant factors, including whether the value of the evidence was outweighed by the benefits of entering into the plea agreement and whether the evidence of misconduct would have influenced counsel's recommendation regarding the acceptance of a plea offer. Id. at 355-356. On appeal, the defendant argues the judge abused his discretion in determining that the defendant did not satisfy the second prong of the Scott analysis. We disagree.
The judge's decision is well supported by the record and shows careful consideration of the relevant factors. See ibid. In concluding that the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known of Dookhan's misconduct, the judge relied heavily on the benefit the defendant received from pleading guilty. Notably, the defendant had already been convicted by a jury on the four counts he was facing. Although those previous convictions were overturned, the defendant had been sentenced to a total of ten and one-half to twelve years in prison. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the prosecutor dismissed two of the charges as well as a second offense enhancement, reducing his sentence by "over [fifty percent] from the maximum sentence, and [sixty percent] if he were granted parole after the minimum (four year) term." The defendant received credit for time served and, as a result, became eligible for parole after only four more months instead of the six and one-half years under the original sentencing scheme. Had he proceeded to trial, the defendant risked conviction of the additional charges and harsher sentences than he ultimately received pursuant to the guilty pleas. The judge thus reasonably determined that the agreement was "extraordinarily favorable" to the defendant.
The four counts were as follows: (1) trafficking in over fourteen grams of cocaine in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E ; (2) trafficking of cocaine within a school zone in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J ; (3) possession of heroin with intent to distribute, second offense, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 ; and (4) possession of heroin with intent to distribute in a school zone in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. The trial was bifurcated due to the second offense allegation in count three.
The convictions were overturned in light of the decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309-329 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Harris, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 1102 (2011).
The judge also relied on the defendant's previous convictions following the initial trial as evidence of the overall strength of the Commonwealth's case against him. The judge acknowledged that the certificates signed by Doohkan as the primary chemist were "the only direct evidence of the nature of the substances and their weight," but noted there existed "powerful circumstantial evidence of guilt." While evidence of Doohkan's misconduct would have provided a substantial ground of defense at trial, as the judge noted, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion to find that the overall strength of the Commonwealth's case against the defendant, along with the harsh sentences he faced upon retrial, and the substantial benefit he obtained from the plea agreement outweighed the defendant's potential ability to use that ground of defense at trial. See Scott, 467 Mass. at 356-357.
Contrary to the defendant's claim, the judge properly considered whether knowledge of the misconduct "would have influenced counsel's recommendation to accept a particular plea offer." Scott, 467 Mass. at 356. At the hearing, the defendant's trial counsel testified that had he known of the misconduct, he would have advised the defendant not to plead guilty until he had filed a Daubert-Lanigan motion and, potentially, a motion to dismiss based on the government's misconduct. He also believed that he could have negotiated a more favorable plea agreement by using the misconduct as leverage. The judge credited trial counsel's assertion of his beliefs, but ultimately determined no evidence was presented to show the Commonwealth would have continued to negotiate or even offer any plea agreement while those motions were litigated. As the judge stated on the record, without any evidence of such, it would be speculation to make that assumption.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994).
The defendant submitted an affidavit stating that had he known of the misconduct, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead insisted on a trial. The judge stated that those assertions "are inherently suspect" and did not credit them.
Conclusion. The judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise err in determining that the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Dookhan's misconduct.
Because there is no evidence here that "[avoiding] deportation was the determinative issue," Lee v. United States, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4045, *18 (June 23, 2017), in the defendant's decision to plead guilty, we note that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Lee has no relevance here.
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Order denying motion to vacate guilty pleas affirmed.