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Commonwealth v. Geier

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Jan 6, 2020
No. 1438 MDA 2018 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2020)

Opinion

J. A20011/19 No. 1438 MDA 2018

01-06-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DANELLE RAE GEIER, Appellant


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 23, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No. CP-14-CR-0001369-2016 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:

Danelle Rae Geier appeals from the April 23, 2018 aggregate judgment of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed after a jury found her guilty of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 903, and 4910(2), respectively.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case, as gleaned from the certified record, are as follows: On September 22, 2016, appellant and co-defendant, George Gene Ishler, Jr., were charged with first-degree murder and related offenses in connection with the death of Pennsylvania State University Professor Ronald V. Bettig ("the victim"), whose body was discovered on the floor of a quarry pit in Centre County, Pennsylvania on August 17, 2016. Both appellant and Ishler gave statements to the Pennsylvania State Police wherein they confessed to entering a conspiracy to murder the victim and make it look like it had been an accident or a suicide. The Commonwealth gave notice of its intention to consolidate appellant's case with Ishler's case on September 22, 2016.

Ishler is the half-brother of appellant's mother.

On October 27, 2016, appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to, inter alia , sever her case from that of Ishler. The trial court denied appellant's motion on December 29, 2016. Following a joint, six-day jury trial, a jury found appellant guilty of the aforementioned charges on April 23, 2018. That same day, the trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on May 3, 2018, and a supplemental post-sentence motion on June 11, 2018. Following hearings, the trial court denied appellant's post-sentence motions on August 6, 2018. This timely appeal followed.

The record reflects that on August 29, 2018, the trial court directed appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 21 days. Appellant filed her timely Rule 1925(b) statement on September 10, 2018, and the trial court filed a brief Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 24, 2018, indicating that it was relying on the reasoning set forth in its prior August 6, 2018 opinion denying appellant's post-sentence motions.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and unconstitutionally deny [appellant's] due
process rights to a fair trial and right to present a defense when it summarily denied her request to present the testimony of Jonathan E. Stube, Ph.D., LPC, and Michael C. Wolff, Ph.D., CADC, from the Penn State Psych Clinic, challenging the voluntariness of her statements and the voluntariness of her actions?

B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to sever a case where the defendants had such clearly antagonistic defenses that the opening cross[-]examination question of [appellant] by her co-defendant's counsel was: "You are a lying, manipulative woman who would say and do anything to get whatever you want?"

C. Did the trial court err when it failed to order a new trial after the Commonwealth failed to disclose prior to trial that one of its key witnesses, Joel Allen Marlow, had pending criminal charges in Centre County?
Appellant's brief at 5-6 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

Preliminarily, we recognize that

a court has the discretion to require an expert, who has conducted an examination or test for a defendant but who has not completed a report for the defendant, to prepare (and the defendant to disclose) a report, which must provide, among other things, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the expert's opinion. A court's discretion to order the production of such a report is, again, dependent upon whether the defendant intends on calling the expert as a witness in the criminal proceedings. When the defendant fails to comply with a trial court's order requiring preparation and disclosure of an expert report, the trial court may sanction the defendant by prohibiting the defendant from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Radecki , 180 A.3d 441, 452 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

Likewise, "[a] motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and . . . its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Dozzo , 991 A.2d 898, 901 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted), appeal denied , 5 A.3d 818 (Pa. 2010). Our supreme court has formulated the following three-part test for deciding the merits of a motion to sever:

[1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in the affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.
Commonwealth v. Melvin , 103 A.3d 1, 29 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted; brackets in original).

Lastly, we note that

after-discovered evidence is the basis for a new trial when it: 1) has been discovered after the trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; 2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; 3) will not be used solely for impeaching the credibility of a witness; and 4) is of such nature and character that a new verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted.
Commonwealth v. Chamberlain , 30 A.3d 381, 414 (Pa. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied , 566 U.S. 986 (2012).

With these principles in mind, we note that the trial court authored a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion that properly addresses and disposes of appellant's three claims. Specifically, we agree that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in precluding the introduction of the proposed testimony of Dr. Wolfe and Dr. Stube immediately prior to the start of trial, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E). As recognized by the trial court, the defense sought to introduce these witnesses as fact witnesses to testify regarding appellant's mental state, when clearly their testimony constituted untimely expert testimony. ( See trial court opinion, 8/6/18 at 3-4.) We further agree with the trial court that appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's decision to deny her motion to sever, as the record establishes that appellant failed to satisfy the three-part test set forth in Melvin. Notably, the evidence in this matter was clearly "capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion," as both defendants were charged with criminal conspiracy and had previously confessed to the victim's murder, and the confessions were admitted at trial. ( Id. at 2-3; see also Melvin , 103 A.3d at 29.) Additionally, we agree that appellant is not entitled to a new trial on account of the fact that she was not informed of the pending criminal charges against Commonwealth witness Marlow, as appellant failed to satisfy the third prong of the "after discovered evidence" test and "the only evidentiary value of [the] charges against Marlow [was] to impeach his credibility." ( Id. at 4-5.) Accordingly, we adopt the pertinent portions of the trial court's well-reasoned August 6, 2018 opinion as our own and affirm on that basis.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Gantman, P.J.E. joins this Memorandum.

McLaughlin, J. concurs in the result. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 01/06/2020

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Summaries of

Commonwealth v. Geier

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Jan 6, 2020
No. 1438 MDA 2018 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2020)
Case details for

Commonwealth v. Geier

Case Details

Full title:COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DANELLE RAE GEIER, Appellant

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Jan 6, 2020

Citations

No. 1438 MDA 2018 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2020)