Commonwealth v. Garner

19 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi

    73 N.E.3d 323 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 3 times

    The underlying felony at issue in this case, the unlawful possession of a firearm, falls within the latter category, and the jury were properly instructed that they must determine whether it was committed with a conscious disregard of risk for human life. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz , 408 Mass. 463, 466-467, 560 N.E.2d 698 (1990) (jury could have found that where defendant illegally carried loaded firearm in vehicle, crime was committed with conscious disregard for risk to human life where defendant and his brother were looking for individual involved in feud); Commonwealth v. Garner , 59 Mass.App.Ct. 350, 358, 795 N.E.2d 1202 (2003) (smuggling gun into crowded nightclub where shots had been fired in past constituted evidence of conscious disregard of risk to human life). The defendant properly does not dispute that the illegal possession of a firearm may properly constitute the predicate felony in a charge of felony-murder in the second degree.

  2. Commonwealth v. Holley

    478 Mass. 508 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Holley, 478 Mass. at 525, 527-528, 87 N.E.3d 77, we noted that, although a warrant for seventeen days of text messages lacked particularity, messages exchanged two to four days before the shooting were within a reasonable temporal scope.

    "As a general matter, there is no black-letter catalogue of predefined felonies deemed on a per se basis to be predicates for invocation of felony-murder in the second degree." Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 357, 795 N.E.2d 1202 (2003). Rather, an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree is necessary "when there is a rational basis in the evidence to warrant the instruction.

  3. Commonwealth v. Siniscalchi

    79 N.E.3d 1110 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017)

    That information was necessary for the jury to determine whether a felony-murder conviction would be in the first or second degree. See Commonwealth v. Garner , 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 357 n.7(2003).--------

  4. People v. Walker

    78 A.D.3d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 10 times

    majority of situations, a defendant charged with felony murder is precluded as a matter of law from relying on a justification defense since, having created a potentially life threatening situation, the defendant forfeits the right to use deadly physical force against the victim or any rescuer. Indeed, nearly every jurisdiction that has opined on the matter makes a justification defense unavailable to those who initiated the underlying felonies ( see e.g. State v Celaya, 135 Ariz 248, 660 P2d 849; Gray v State, 463 P2d 897 [Alaska 1970]; People v Loustaunau, 181 Cal App 3d 163, 226 Cal Rptr 216; People v Burns, 686 P2d 1360 [Colo 1983]; State v Amado, 254 Conn 184, 756 A2d 274; Holland v State, 916 So 2d 750 [Fla 2005], cert denied 547 US 1078; Roche v State, 690 NE2d 1115 [Ind 1997]; State v Marks, 226 Kan 704, 712, 602 P2d 1344, 1351; State v Scales, 655 So 2d 1326 [La 1995], cert denied 516 US 1050; Sutton v State, 139 Md App 412, 776 A2d 47, cert denied 366 Md 249, 783 A2d 223; Commonwealth v Garner, 59 Mass App Ct 350, 795 NE2d 1202; Layne v State, 542 So 2d 237 [Miss 1989]; Commonwealth v Foster, 364 Pa 288, 72 A2d 279; Smith v State, 209 Tenn 499, 354 SW2d 450.]; Davis v State, 597 SW2d 358 [Tex 1980], cert denied 449 US 976; State v Dennison, 115 Wash 2d 609, 801 P2d 193). The majority of cases where a defendant seeks a justification defense to a felony murder charge involve armed robbery ( see e.g. State v Celaya, 135 Ariz 248, 660 P2d 849; Gray v State, 463 P2d 897 [Alaska 1970]; People v Burns, 686 P2d 1360 [Colo 1983]; State v Amado, 254 Conn 184, 756 A2d 274; Holland v State, 916 So 2d 750 [Fla 2005]; Roche v State, 690 NE2d 1115 [Ind 1997]; State v Marks, 226 Kan 704, 712, 602 P2d 1344, 1351; State v Scales, 655 So 2d 1326 [La 1995]; Layne v State, 542 So 2d 237 [Miss 1989]; State v Bell, 338 NC 363, 450 SE2d 710, cert denied 515 US 1163; Commonwealth v Foster, 364 Pa 288, 72 A2d 279).

  5. Commonwealth v. Wojcik

    65 Mass. App. Ct. 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 2 times

    Several years after the trial, in 1999, the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide modified the elements required to prove felony-murder by excluding elements four and five from the jury instructions. Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 359 n. 8 (2003). Element four was removed because it was, inter alia, "a superfluous addition to the third element of felony-murder."

  6. Rodrigues v. Rodrigues

    701 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D. Mass. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., Wadlington v. Mitchell, No. 15-cv-10468, 2019 WL 360763, at *10 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2019) (designating "the elements of felony murder as (1) an unlawful killing, (2) committed in the course of a felony, and (3) the defendant committed the felony with a conscious disregard for human life" (quoting Mello v. DiPaulo, 295 F.3d 137, 149 (1st Cir. 2002))); Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App.Ct. 350, 795 N.E.2d 1202, 1210 (2003) (describing the elements, in relevant part, as requiring proof that "(1) the defendant participated in a felonious enterprise; (2) a homicide occurred in the course of that enterprise; [and] (3) the felony was inherently dangerous to human life or committed with conscious disregard on the part of the defendant for the risk to human life"); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 Mass. 24, 18 N.E.3d 654, 667 (2014) ("there must be a homicide that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a felony; the homicide must be a 'natural and probable consequence' of the predicate felony; and the felony must be either 'inherently dangerous' or 'committed . . . [with] conscious disregard of the risk to human life" (internal citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 95 Mass.App.Ct. 1105, 124 N.E.3d 160 (2019) (table) (same). This is analogous to the issue of whether a felony is "inherently dangerous" under Massachusetts law: While most caselaw articulates element three of the felony-murder d

  7. Schnitker v. State

    2017 WY 96 (Wyo. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    Indeed, nearly every jurisdiction that has opined on the matter makes a justification defense unavailable to those who initiated the underlying felonies (see e.g.State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 660 P.2d 849 [1983] ; Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 [Alaska 1970] ; People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal.App.3d 163, 226 Cal.Rptr. 216 [1986] ; People v. Burns, 686 P.2d 1360 [Colo.App. 1983] ; State v. Amado, 254 Conn. 184, 756 A.2d 274 [2000] ; Holland v. State, 916 So.2d 750 [Fla. 2005], cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1078, 126 S.Ct. 1790, 164 L.Ed.2d 531 [2006] ; Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115 [Ind. 1997] ; State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 712, 602 P.2d 1344, 1351 [1979] ; State v. Scales, 655 So.2d 1326 [La. 1995], cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050, 116 S.Ct. 716, 133 L.Ed.2d 670 [1996] ; Sutton v. State, 139 Md.App. 412, 776 A.2d 47 [2001], cert. denied, 366 Md. 249, 783 A.2d 223 [2001] ; Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass.App. Ct. 350, 795 N.E.2d 1202 [2003] ; Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237 [Miss. 1989] ; Commonwealth v. Foster, 364 Pa. 288, 72 A.2d 279 [1950] ; Smith v. State, 209 Tenn. 499, 354 S.W.2d 450 [1961] ; Davis v. State, 597 S.W.2d 358 [Tex.Crim.App. 1980], cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976, 101 S.Ct. 388, 66 L.Ed.2d 238 [1980] ; State v. Dennison, 115 Wash.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 [1990] ).

  8. Commonwealth v. Freeman

    09-P-1179 (Mass. May. 15, 2012)

    In Massachusetts, one who commits an armed robbery forfeits the right to assert a claim of self-defense, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 544 n.6 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Griffith, 404 Mass. 256, 265 (1989) ('[T]he right to claim self-defense is forfeited by one who commits an armed robbery'), as 'the nature of the underlying felony marks the defendant as the 'initiating and dangerous aggressor." Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 260 (2011), quoting from Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 363 n.14 (2003). The defendant's testimony did not refute evidence that the defendant's brother was engaged in an armed robbery of the victim, the commission of which forfeits any existing right to use self-defense altogether, thus Christopher had no right to exercise self-defense in these circumstances.

  9. Commonwealth v. Reveron

    10-P-2157 (Mass. Mar. 30, 2012)

    Where, as here, the predicate felony is not inherently dangerous, the Commonwealth must prove that it was committed with 'conscious disregard for the risk to human life.' Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508. 'Whether a particular felony . . . was committed with conscious disregard for life is a largely fact-dependent inquiry resting 'upon a case-by-case analysis of the nucleus of facts in which that felony is embedded.' A particular felony may be committed with conscious disregard in one factual context, but without it in another.' Commonwealth v. Lopez, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 395 (2011), quoting from Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 357 (2003). The facts to which the Commonwealth points -- the size of the drug transaction, the fact that the parties were strangers, and the fact that each participant brought 'back-up' -- are characteristics of drug transactions generally and do not alone suffice to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with conscious disregard for a risk to human life. There is no evidence that the defendant knew that any of the participants was armed or that he had any other indication that violence was likely.

  10. Commonwealth v. Rogers

    459 Mass. 249 (Mass. 2011)   Cited 59 times

    The rationale for this rule is that the nature of the underlying felony marks the defendant as the "initiating and dangerous aggressor." Commonwealth v. Garner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 363 n. 14 (2003). The present case, however, may not fit well within that general rule.