Opinion
10-P-2231
02-24-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. DANIEL R. FIGUEROA.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Daniel R. Figueroa, was found guilty of resisting arrest and disturbing the peace by a jury in the District Court. He challenges his convictions on two grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel and an abuse of discretion by the judge in denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm.
The material facts are undisputed. The defendant was involved in an altercation with police near his basement apartment. He was taken into custody and charged with multiple offenses, including resisting arrest and disturbing the peace. While in custody, the defendant was evaluated twice for medical and mental health issues; during that time he also disclosed his psychiatric illnesses of bipolar disorder and depression. He was prescribed psychiatric medications and an antidepressant by a psychiatrist in the sheriff's office. The defendant's patient care records described him as coherent, displaying logical thoughts, having good eye contact, and sitting quietly during evaluations approximately one year and four months prior to trial.
The patient care records were introduced without objection during the hearing on the motion for a new trial.
The evaluations took place on March 12, 2009, and November 17, 2009.
Prior to trial, the defendant appeared with his attorney in court for this case multiple times, and for a two-day jury trial on another charge as well. During trial, the judge observed that the defendant rambled during his testimony. The defendant was evaluated again on two occasions shortly following his convictions; he was found to be alert and oriented, with no psychosis. No disciplinary reports generated by the sheriff's office during the defendant's incarceration, both in the time leading up to trial and immediately after trial, reported that the defendant had acted out or shown a need to be placed in a psychiatric facility.
He appeared in court for other cases as well during this period.
After trial, the defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that he had been incompetent to stand trial. Included in the evidence was the opinion and testimony of an independent forensic psychiatrist. After two evidentiary hearings, the judge denied the motion.
Documentary evidence introduced without objection also included medical records from the sheriff's office, an affidavit from the defendant's former long-term psychiatrist, and prescription records.
The judge denied the defendant's motion after the first hearing, but allowed him to submit additional evidence, then held a second hearing and again denied the motion.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's ruling; a motion for a new trial should be granted only when "it appears that justice may not have been done." Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). A defendant's competency to stand trial depends on his "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [and] a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Commonwealth v. Simpson, 428 Mass. 646, 652 (1999), quoting from Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). When reviewing a motion for a new trial based on incompetency, the proper inquiry is whether the defendant's behavior at trial "raised 'a substantial question of possible doubt'" as to his competency. Simpson, supra, quoting from Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 62 (1978).
Where, as here, the judge acting on the motion was the trial judge, reversal for abuse of discretion is particularly rare. Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 670 (2004). The judge found that while the defendant had serious mental health issues, the issues did not result in his incompetency to stand trial. The judge noted that although the defendant was at times a difficult witness to control, he was generally understandable and made responsive answers. Some of the defendant's answers were seemingly calculated and self-serving, supporting a conclusion that he "ha[d] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 350 (2004) (citation omitted).
The presence of mental illness alone does not equate to incompetency to stand trial. See Commonwealth v. Robbins, 431 Mass. 442, 448 (2000) ("Past history of mental illness and abnormal behavior are factors for the judge to consider, but are not dispositive on this question").
The record further supports a finding that the defendant was taking his medication around the time of trial, and several evaluations noted his fluent and coherent speech, logical thoughts, and good eye contact. Furthermore, the defendant never raised the issue of his competency although, as noted, he had appeared in court for other matters, including another trial approximately six months prior to the trial in this case.
The judge acted within his discretion to discount the testimony of the independent psychiatrist and the assertions contained in the affidavit from the defendant's former psychiatrist. Despite opining that the defendant was incompetent during trial, the independent psychiatrist agreed that the defendant testified coherently and was able to give an account of what happened. Although the former psychiatrist had treated the defendant for eight years prior to trial, he had never evaluated the defendant for competency and, in general, had minimal professional experience conducting competency evaluations. Furthermore, his ultimate determination that the defendant "would have likely been incompetent to stand trial at any time during . . . the period [between] 2001 and 2009" is not dispositive; the relevant inquiry is the defendant's competency at the time of trial, which occurred in the spring of 2010. See Hill, 375 Mass. at 62.
The former psychiatrist had conducted ten to twenty competency evaluations approximately ten to fifteen years prior to submitting his affidavit in February, 2014.
Turning to the defendant's ineffective assistance claim, we find that the record amply supports a conclusion that the defendant was competent to stand trial. As such, trial counsel was not required to seek a competency hearing; the defendant was not "deprived . . . of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).
Judgments affirmed.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Grainger, & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 24, 2016.