Opinion
J-A27031-17 No. 660 WDA 2015
01-18-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ROBERT FERRANTE, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 4, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-02-CR-0013724-2013 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Robert Ferrante ("Ferrante") appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of first-degree murder. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502. We affirm.
We adopt the thorough and comprehensive summary of the factual history of this case, as set forth in the Opinion of the Honorable Jeffrey Manning, for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/16, at 4-23.
Briefly, the Commonwealth's evidence established that at 11:18 p.m., on April 17, 2013, Autumn Klein, M.D., Ph.D. ("Dr. Klein"), was seen leaving Presbyterian University Hospital, her place of employment. Upon arriving at her residence, Dr. Klein collapsed. At 11:52 p.m., Dr. Klein's husband, Ferrante, called for an ambulance. Pittsburgh paramedics Jerad Albaugh and Steve Mason arrived at the residence, where they found Dr. Klein unconscious on the kitchen floor. Ferrante told the paramedics that he was upstairs when Dr. Klein had entered the home, and discovered Dr. Klein when he came downstairs. Ferrante explained to paramedics that a zip lock bag containing a white powder, found in the kitchen, contained creatine. Ferrante explained that Dr. Klein took the creatine to help with fertility.
At the hospital, Andrew Farkas, M.D. ("Dr. Farkas"), asked Ferrante whether Dr. Klein had suffered previously from headaches. Ferrante stated that right before collapsing, Dr. Klein had complained of not feeling well. When placing an IV, Dr. Farkas observed that Dr. Klein's blood was bright red. Dr. Klein was subsequently transferred to the intensive care unit ("ICU"). Three days later, the supervising physician in the emergency room, Thomas Martin, M.D. ("Dr. Martin"), told Dr. Farkas that the results of Dr. Klein's blood test indicated the presence of a high level of cyanide. Dr. Farkas contacted the Allegheny County Medical Examiner's Office and informed them of his concerns regarding Dr. Klein. Dr. Klein was pronounced dead on April 20, 2013.
On July 24, 2013, Ferrante was charged with one count of criminal homicide for the death of Dr. Klein. A jury ultimately convicted Ferrante of first-degree murder. Following the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced Ferrante to life in prison. Ferrante filed post-sentence Motions and supplemental post-sentence Motions, all of which the trial court denied. Ferrante filed a Motion to reconsider the denial of his post-sentence Motions, which the trial court also denied. Thereafter, Ferrante timely filed a Notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Ferrante raises the following claims for our review:
I. Whether the Commonwealth had a duty to disclose to [Ferrante] before trial that [the] Nichols Institute ("Nichols"), a/k/a Quest Diagnostics, [Incorporated ("Quest"),] had a criminal conviction and had committed other bad acts which were relevant to the reliability of the Quest cyanide test result introduced at trial?Brief for Appellant at 1.
II. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder?
III. Whether the guilty verdict of first-degree murder was against the weight of the evidence?
IV. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [Ferrante's] suppression Motions [Nos.] 1, 20, 24, 28, 38, 60, 63, [and] 64[,] [and] allowing the fruits of the Commonwealth's illegal searches and seizures to be introduced at trial against [Ferrante]?
Ferrante first claims that the Commonwealth violated the United States Supreme Court's holding in Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by not disclosing that a subsidiary of Quest, Nichols Institute had a prior crimen falsi conviction. Brief for Appellant at 20. Ferrante argues that the Commonwealth had an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, even though there had been no request for such evidence by the accused. Id. Ferrante contends that after trial, his counsel discovered that Nichols had been convicted of a felony, for which it paid a fine of $40 million. Id. Ferrante additionally points out that Quest had paid $241 million to settle claims regarding Nichols's violations of the False Claims Act, for systematically overcharging California's Medi-Cal program for over 15 years. Id. at 21. Ferrante states that a determination of the cause of Dr. Klein's death depended upon the reliability of Quest's tests of Dr. Klein's blood. Id. Regardless of whether the Commonwealth knew of this information, Ferrante claims that the Commonwealth had an obligation to find out and disclose Nichols's prior criminal conviction and bad acts. Id. at 22. Ferrante asserts that these criminal convictions, "as well as the numerous lawsuits, are reflective of [the] lax standards and unreliable testing methods" of Quest. Id.
Ferrante argues that, the fact that Nichols was a subsidiary of Quest is a distinction without a difference, as the two are "interchangeable," as Quest had paid Nichols's criminal and civil fines. Brief for Appellant at 24.
"In Brady , the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment[,] irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Burke , 781 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Pursuant to Brady and its progeny, the prosecutor has a duty to learn of all evidence that is favorable to the accused which is known by others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115
S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995). Pursuant to Kyles , "the prosecutor's Brady obligation clearly extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Burke , 566 Pa. 402, 781 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. 2011). Moreover, there is no Brady violation when the defense has equal access to the allegedly withheld evidence. See Commonwealth v. Spotz , 587 Pa. 1, 896 A.2d 1191, 1248 (Pa. 2006) ("It is well established that no Brady violation occurs where the parties had equal access to the information or if the defendant knew or could have uncovered such evidence with reasonable diligence." (internal citation omitted)).Commonwealth v. Weiss , 81 A.3d 767, 783 (Pa. 2013).
Our Supreme Court has explained that, in order to establish a Brady violation,
a defendant must show that: (1) evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or because it could have been used for impeachment; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. However, [t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. Rather, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.Commonwealth v. Willis , 46 A.3d 648, 656 (Pa. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 codified the United States Supreme Court's holding in Brady :
Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the defendant, and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth
might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant's attorney all of the following requested items or information, provided they are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph such items.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a) (emphasis added).(a) Any evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth[.]
We have reviewed the parties' arguments regarding this claim, as set forth in their briefs, and the record certified to this Court on appeal. Further, we have reviewed the trial court's comprehensive and well-reasoned Opinion with regard to this claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 39-40. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis with regard to Ferrante's first claim, albeit with the following addendum. See id.
There is nothing of record indicating that the Commonwealth had, in its possession, evidence of Nichols's conviction. Further, Ferrante had equal access to information regarding Nichols's conviction of misbranding, and could have uncovered such conviction with due diligence. See id. However, more fundamental to Ferrante's claim, even if the Commonwealth were under a duty to discover and disclose the conviction of Nichols, we cannot conclude that the information was "material," as Ferrante had suffered no prejudice from the Commonwealth's non-disclosure.
Evidence of unrelated civil settlements generally would not be admissible. See Commonwealth v. Sherwood , 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009) (recognizing that "evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity.").
Nichols previously had pled guilty to misbranding a Chemiluminescence Intact Parathyroid Hormone Immunoassay ("PHI"), which is used to test parathyroid hormone ("PTH") levels in patients. See U.S.F.D.A. "Quest Diagnostics Incorporated To Pay $302 Million to Resolve Allegations that a Subsidiary Sold Misbranded Test Kits." (available at: https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm261942.htm, (12/15/17). "The PTH tests at issue ... were widely used by medical practitioners to determine if patients suffering from conditions such as End Stage Renal Disease were also suffering from hyperparathyroidism, a condition which involves the overactivity of the parathyroid glands and the release of excessive amounts of PTH." Id. As alleged in the criminal information against Nichols, there were periods of time in which the Advantage Intact PTH Assay provided elevated results, yet Nichols improperly represented that its results were similar to another test. Id.
The Quest technicians testifying in this case did not use the Advantage Intact PTH Assay to determine the levels of cyanide in Dr. Klein's blood. Thus, we cannot conclude that Nichols's misbranding conviction, a conviction involving a different testing procedure for a different substance, was "material." Similarly, even if such evidence was admissible, we would conclude that Ferrante suffered no prejudice resulting from the alleged non-disclosure, as the evidence was not "material." Consequently, Ferrante is not entitled to relief on this claim.
For the above-stated reasons, we additionally deny Ferrante's Application for a remand to explore whether the Commonwealth was aware of Nichols's conviction.
Ferrante next claims that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction of first-degree murder. Brief for Appellant at 25, 26. Ferrante argues that the Commonwealth's case "rested solely on circumstantial evidence," and that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had caused Dr. Klein's death. Id. at 25. In support, Ferrante directs our attention to the following evidence, presented at trial.
Ferrante asserts that although the Center for Disease Control and Prevention states that cyanide poisoning "produced symptoms within seconds to minutes; death may occur within minutes[,]" and that such symptoms include nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain and irritation of the lining of the esophagus and stomach, were not observed by the first responders or the staff at the emergency room. Id. at 26. Ferrante points to testimony that the symptoms presented by Dr. Klein were inconsistent with cyanide poisoning. Id. at 27. Ferrante additionally refers to the testimony of Cyril Wecht, M.D. ("Dr. Wecht"), who opined that Dr. Klein's "cause of death was undetermined, but could lead to a conclusion of cardiac dysrhythmia." Id. Ferrante posits that the evidence does not exclude other hypotheses consistent with his innocence, and that Dr. Klein could have died from cardiac dysrhythmia. Id.
Ferrante also asserts that there were conflicts in the Commonwealth's evidence as to the level of cyanide found in Dr. Klein's blood. Id. at 28. Specifically, Ferrante contends that the Commonwealth "ignored the NMS [Labs ("NMS")] results in favor of a single result from an unaccredited, non-forensic laboratory with a history and reputation for dishonesty." Id. Ferrante points out the discrepancies in the cyanide level reported by Quest, and the level indicated in a second test performed by NMS. Id. at 28-29. In addition, Ferrante relies on evidence that Dr. Klein's organs were accepted for transplantation to living people, as no cyanide was detected by the Center for Organ Recovery & Education ("CORE"). Id. at 28. According to Ferrante, "[a] conviction based on conjecture, especially here[,] when scientific evidence and technology was available to prove guilt/innocence to a certainty, cannot stand." Id. at 29.
Finally, Ferrante directs our attention to the testimony of Quest lab technician Sonia Obscemea, who stated that Quest's test could have produced a false positive result. Id. Ferrante also argues that the trial court should have considered the known or potential rate of error. Id.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether,
viewing all the evidence admitted at trial the in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced[,] is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Talbert , 129 A.3d 536, 542-43 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth a comprehensive summary of the evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/13, at 4-23. The trial court addressed Ferrante's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, in its Opinion, and concluded that the claim lacks merit. Id. at 40. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis with regard to Ferrante's second claim. See id. at 4-23, 44.
In his third claim, Ferrante argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 30, 39. In support, Ferrante points out that Quest is not an accredited forensic laboratory and that forensic laboratories are subject to stringent requirements. Id. at 30-31. In addition, Ferrante asserts that Quest did not follow its own standard operating procedures, when it failed to repeat the cyanide test; its control test was not negative for cyanide; and the lab technician failed to run a dilution control. Id. at 31-32. According to Ferrante, Obcemea, the lab technician, "could not remember how many spectrophotometers she used at that time or which machine she used on Klein's blood sample." Id. at 33. Further, Ferrante asserts that Obcemea could not remember whether the spectrophotometer that she used to test Dr. Klein's sample was the one taken out for repairs a week later. Id. Ferrante also points out that Dr. Klein's blood cyanide level was amended three times by different Quest personnel, and that a false positive can result from the method used by Quest to test the sample. Id. at 34-35. Ferrante directs our attention to other purported errors by Obcemea, and violations of Quest's standard operating procedures. Id. at 35-39.
In order to preserve a challenge to the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, "the issue must be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial either orally prior to sentencing, by written motion prior to sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion." Commonwealth v. Lewis , 45 A.3d 405, 410 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc). As our Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the function of an appellate court on appeal is to review the trial court's exercise of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather than to consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of the evidence. An appellate court may not overturn the trial court's decision unless the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. Further, in reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, a verdict will be overturned only if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice.Commonwealth v. Cash , 137 A.3d 1262, 1270 (Pa. 2016).
In his post-sentence Motions filed on February 17, 2015, Ferrante challenged the weight of the evidence based upon the following assertions:
The verdict was also against the weight of the evidence. As stated above, the Commonwealth's toxicology evidence was "so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture." Commonwealth v. Farquharson , 467 Pa. 50,60, 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976). The Commonwealth's experts (i.e., the pathologist and the toxicologist) accepted the Quest blood test result (3.4 mg/L or 2.2 mg/L) without reservation. The Pennsylvania Courts have held that if the basis for the expert's opinion is faulty (i.e., reliance on the Quest results here) the opinion is incompetent and entitled to no weight. See Viener v. Jacobs , 834 A. 2d 546 (Pa. Super. 2003); see also Commonwealth v. Sero , 387 A.2d 63 (Pa. 1978).Post-Sentence Motions, 2/17/15, at 7. In his Supplemental Post-Sentence Motions, Ferrante raised no further challenge to the verdict as against the weight of the evidence.
On the other hand, the defense experts did not accept this faulty Quest evidence and concluded that a finding of cyanide poisoning could not be made within any reasonable degree of medical certainty, and that the cause of death was consistent with cardiac. Hence, the opinions of the defense experts are entitled to greater weight. Accordingly, [Ferrante] is entitled to, at a minimum, a new trial.
As set forth above, Ferrante did not challenge the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, based upon Quest's purported violation(s) of its standard operating procedures. The trial court did not address these contentions in its Opinion. "[A] challenge to the weight of the evidence must first be raised in the trial court and failure to do so [will constitute] a waiver of the claim." Commonwealth v. Widmer , 689 A.2d 211, 212 (Pa. 1997). Because Ferrante failed to preserve this challenge to the weight of the evidence before the trial court, in his post-sentence Motions, we conclude that it is not preserved for our review. See Cash , 137 A.3d 1270; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
To the extent that Ferrante generally challenges the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to Ferrante's claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/16, at 44.
In his fourth claim, Ferrante claims that the trial court erred in denying the following suppression Motions: Numbers 1, 20, 24, 28, 38, 60, 63 and 64. Brief for Appellant at 39. Ferrante argues that by denying these Motions, the suppression court improperly permitted "fruits of the Commonwealth's illegal searches and seizures to be introduced against [Ferrante] at trial." Id. (capitalization omitted). Specifically, Ferrante argues that the Quest blood test results are "prone to error and are entitled to no weight[;]" "the search warrants were issued based upon the Commonwealth's misstatements relative to the Quest tests[;] and the evidence seized pursuant to those warrants must be suppressed." Id.
Ferrante first argues that the items seized pursuant to the search warrant for Ferrante's vehicle should have been suppressed. Id. at 40. In this regard, Ferrante states that the search warrant sought evidence of "cyanide and any and all items that are capable of storing, transporting or delivering cyanide." Id. (capitalization omitted). Ferrante challenges the seizure of his computer, a Lexar "jump drive," and a USB storage device from the trunk of his car. Id. According to Ferrante, because this initial seizure was unlawful, evidence seized from these items, pursuant to subsequent warrants, are fruits of the poisonous tree, and should be suppressed. Id. at 41.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Ferrante's challenge to the seizures resulting from the vehicle search, and concluded that the challenge lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/13, at 24-32. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to Ferrante's challenge to the items seized from his vehicle. See id.
Ferrante next challenges the search warrants seeking computers, laptops and other electronic devices. Brief for Appellant at 41. Ferrante argues that there is no information, in the affidavits of probable cause, indicating why evidence of a crime may be found in these computers or devices. Id. Ferrante contends that the initial search warrants sought "[a]ny and all computers or laptops that may contain [c]yanide information." Id. at 42. Ferrante asserts that the warrants were overbroad, and "permitted an illegal rummaging through [Ferrante's] computers in search of incriminating evidence." Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed these contentions and concluded that they lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/13, at 32-37. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis with regard to Ferrante's assertions. See id.
In his fourth claim, Ferrante also argues that the evidence seized should be suppressed because the search warrants were not stored in the Allegheny County Department of Court Records. Brief for Appellant at 43. Ferrante contends that law enforcement officials violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 210 (Return of Papers to Clerk) by not maintaining and preserving these records. Brief for Appellant at 43.
Our review of the record discloses that Ferrante did not raise this claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal. Accordingly, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Castillo , 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (stating that "[a]ny issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived."); see also Commonwealth v. Mason , 130 A.3d 601, 635-36 (Pa. 2015) (stating that "[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.").
Finally, we address an Application for Relief, filed by Ferrante. In his Application, Ferrante asks this court to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. Application for Relief, 10/20/17. Ferrante contends that at an evidentiary hearing, he would present evidence related to the testing of Dr. Klein's liver, prior to the transplant of that organ. Id. Ferrante directs our attention to testimony, by Dr. Wecht and another expert, that cyanide is not limited to blood, but is deposited in organs and tissues throughout the body. Id. at 4.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(c) provides that "[a] post-sentence motion for a new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence must be filed in writing promptly after such discovery." Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(c).
Our review of the record discloses that the evidence related to Dr. Klein's transplanted organ is not "newly discovered," but cumulative to other evidence presented at trial. During opening arguments, defense counsel informed the jury that
[t]he samples and the blood that [were] sent to CORE, the transplant people, [tested] negative, negative for cyanide. The organs, there is a liver and a healthy kidney in two people as we talk. Dr. Martin thought it was so critical when he heard about
the cyanide level of 3.4, he frantically called CORE to hold off on the transplantation. Where do we clean our blood from? Our liver and kidneys. Well, they are in two healthy people for all we know because there was successful transplantation and the blood testing was negative.N.T. (Vol. I), 11/4-7/13, at 66. Dr. Wecht also testified regarding two tests performed by CORE on body tissues from Dr. Klein. N.T. (Vol. IV), 11/4-7/13, at 163. Dr. Wecht stated that the two tests on Dr. Klein's tissues came back "negative." Id.
Contrary to Ferrante's assertion, the letter from a transplant recipient, regarding the condition of his/her organ, is merely cumulative of the results of the CORE test. As such, we decline Ferrante's request for a remand on this issue.
Ferrante's Application further alleges a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Absent extraordinary circumstances, which do not exist here, "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal." Commonwealth v. Holmes , 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013). We decline to remand the matter for a hearing, without prejudice to Ferrante's right to raise this claim in a timely filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. --------
Motion to file exhibit under seal granted; Applications for Relief Denied; Judgment of Sentence Affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/18/2018
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